FKIE_CVE-2022-50721
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-24 13:15 - Updated: 2026-11-10 12:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/dma/qcom/qcom_adm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5653bd0200944e5803fa8e32dc36aa49931312f9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5c9f8c2dbdbe53818bcde6aa6695e1331e5f841f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9a041174c58a226e713f6cebd41eccec7a5cfa72",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5c9f8c2dbdbe53818bcde6aa6695e1331e5f841f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b9d2140c3badf4107973ad77c5a0ec3075705c85",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5c9f8c2dbdbe53818bcde6aa6695e1331e5f841f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/dma/qcom/qcom_adm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.19.17",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: qcom-adm: fix wrong calling convention for prep_slave_sg\n\nThe calling convention for pre_slave_sg is to return NULL on error and\nprovide an error log to the system. Qcom-adm instead provide error\npointer when an error occur. This indirectly cause kernel panic for\nexample for the nandc driver that checks only if the pointer returned by\ndevice_prep_slave_sg is not NULL. Returning an error pointer makes nandc\nthink the device_prep_slave_sg function correctly completed and makes\nthe kernel panics later in the code.\n\nWhile nandc is the one that makes the kernel crash, it was pointed out\nthat the real problem is qcom-adm not following calling convention for\nthat function.\n\nTo fix this, drop returning error pointer and return NULL with an error\nlog."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ndmaengine: qcom-adm: corregir convenci\u00f3n de llamada incorrecta para prep_slave_sg\n\nLa convenci\u00f3n de llamada para pre_slave_sg es devolver NULL en caso de error y proporcionar un registro de error al sistema. Qcom-adm en su lugar proporciona un puntero de error cuando ocurre un error. Esto causa indirectamente un p\u00e1nico del kernel, por ejemplo, para el controlador nandc que solo verifica si el puntero devuelto por device_prep_slave_sg no es NULL. Devolver un puntero de error hace que nandc piense que la funci\u00f3n device_prep_slave_sg se complet\u00f3 correctamente y provoca p\u00e1nicos del kernel m\u00e1s tarde en el c\u00f3digo.\n\nSi bien nandc es el que provoca el fallo del kernel, se se\u00f1al\u00f3 que el problema real es que qcom-adm no sigue la convenci\u00f3n de llamada para esa funci\u00f3n.\n\nPara solucionar esto, se debe dejar de devolver un puntero de error y devolver NULL con un registro de error."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-50721",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T12:10:00.177",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-24T13:15:58.767",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5653bd0200944e5803fa8e32dc36aa49931312f9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a041174c58a226e713f6cebd41eccec7a5cfa72"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9d2140c3badf4107973ad77c5a0ec3075705c85"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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