FKIE_CVE-2022-50700
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-24 11:15 - Updated: 2026-10-15 22:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htc.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/hw.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "c4bedc3cda09d896c92adcdb6b62aa93b0c47a8a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d390509bdf501c9c8c6e61248e4bc9314c86d854",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "79a124b588aadb5a22695542778de14366ff3219",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d390509bdf501c9c8c6e61248e4bc9314c86d854",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "acd4324e5f1f11351630234297f95076f0ac9a2f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d390509bdf501c9c8c6e61248e4bc9314c86d854",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htc.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/hw.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.18"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.18",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0.16",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath10k: Delay the unmapping of the buffer\n\nOn WCN3990, we are seeing a rare scenario where copy engine hardware is\nsending a copy complete interrupt to the host driver while still\nprocessing the buffer that the driver has sent, this is leading into an\nSMMU fault triggering kernel panic. This is happening on copy engine\nchannel 3 (CE3) where the driver normally enqueues WMI commands to the\nfirmware. Upon receiving a copy complete interrupt, host driver will\nimmediately unmap and frees the buffer presuming that hardware has\nprocessed the buffer. In the issue case, upon receiving copy complete\ninterrupt, host driver will unmap and free the buffer but since hardware\nis still accessing the buffer (which in this case got unmapped in\nparallel), SMMU hardware will trigger an SMMU fault resulting in a\nkernel panic.\n\nIn order to avoid this, as a work around, add a delay before unmapping\nthe copy engine source DMA buffer. This is conditionally done for\nWCN3990 and only for the CE3 channel where issue is seen.\n\nBelow is the crash signature:\n\nwifi smmu error: kernel: [ 10.120965] arm-smmu 15000000.iommu: Unhandled\ncontext fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x7fdfd8ac0,\nfsynr=0x500003,cbfrsynra=0xc1, cb=6 arm-smmu 15000000.iommu: Unhandled\ncontext fault:fsr=0x402, iova=0x7fe06fdc0, fsynr=0x710003,\ncbfrsynra=0xc1, cb=6 qcom-q6v5-mss 4080000.remoteproc: fatal error\nreceived: err_qdi.c:1040:EF:wlan_process:0x1:WLAN RT:0x2091:\ncmnos_thread.c:3998:Asserted in copy_engine.c:AXI_ERROR_DETECTED:2149\nremoteproc remoteproc0: crash detected in\n4080000.remoteproc: type fatal error \u003c3\u003e remoteproc remoteproc0:\nhandling crash #1 in 4080000.remoteproc\n\npc : __arm_lpae_unmap+0x500/0x514\nlr : __arm_lpae_unmap+0x4bc/0x514\nsp : ffffffc011ffb530\nx29: ffffffc011ffb590 x28: 0000000000000000\nx27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000004\nx25: 0000000000000003 x24: ffffffc011ffb890\nx23: ffffffa762ef9be0 x22: ffffffa77244ef00\nx21: 0000000000000009 x20: 00000007fff7c000\nx19: 0000000000000003 x18: 0000000000000000\nx17: 0000000000000004 x16: ffffffd7a357d9f0\nx15: 0000000000000000 x14: 00fd5d4fa7ffffff\nx13: 000000000000000e x12: 0000000000000000\nx11: 00000000ffffffff x10: 00000000fffffe00\nx9 : 000000000000017c x8 : 000000000000000c\nx7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffffa762ef9000\nx5 : 0000000000000003 x4 : 0000000000000004\nx3 : 0000000000001000 x2 : 00000007fff7c000\nx1 : ffffffc011ffb890 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace:\n__arm_lpae_unmap+0x500/0x514\n__arm_lpae_unmap+0x4bc/0x514\n__arm_lpae_unmap+0x4bc/0x514\narm_lpae_unmap_pages+0x78/0xa4\narm_smmu_unmap_pages+0x78/0x104\n__iommu_unmap+0xc8/0x1e4\niommu_unmap_fast+0x38/0x48\n__iommu_dma_unmap+0x84/0x104\niommu_dma_free+0x34/0x50\ndma_free_attrs+0xa4/0xd0\nath10k_htt_rx_free+0xc4/0xf4 [ath10k_core] ath10k_core_stop+0x64/0x7c\n[ath10k_core]\nath10k_halt+0x11c/0x180 [ath10k_core]\nath10k_stop+0x54/0x94 [ath10k_core]\ndrv_stop+0x48/0x1c8 [mac80211]\nieee80211_do_open+0x638/0x77c [mac80211] ieee80211_open+0x48/0x5c\n[mac80211]\n__dev_open+0xb4/0x174\n__dev_change_flags+0xc4/0x1dc\ndev_change_flags+0x3c/0x7c\ndevinet_ioctl+0x2b4/0x580\ninet_ioctl+0xb0/0x1b4\nsock_do_ioctl+0x4c/0x16c\ncompat_ifreq_ioctl+0x1cc/0x35c\ncompat_sock_ioctl+0x110/0x2ac\n__arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xf4/0x3e0\nel0_svc_common+0xb4/0x17c\nel0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x58\nel0_svc_compat+0x8/0x2c\n\nTested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.2.0-01387-QCAHLSWMTPLZ-1"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-50700",
"lastModified": "2026-10-15T22:17:32.860",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2022-50700",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:32:09.043160Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-24T11:15:50.153",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79a124b588aadb5a22695542778de14366ff3219"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acd4324e5f1f11351630234297f95076f0ac9a2f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4bedc3cda09d896c92adcdb6b62aa93b0c47a8a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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