FKIE_CVE-2022-50675
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-09 16:17 - Updated: 2026-06-17 05:23
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored
Prior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 ("arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE
is untagged"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries
(those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use
test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags) without inadvertently
setting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page.
The above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any
control at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM.
However, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like
swap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A
subsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination
page even if the tags were owned by KASAN.
This issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in
commit e5b8d9218951 ("arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page->flags").
When this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting
access faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the
original page->flags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y):
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26
Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218
Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2]
Move the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual
place where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored
(mte_restore_tags()).
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c",
"arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "918002bdbe4328c8c0164a22e8ebf2384b80dc23",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69e3b846d8a753f9f279f29531ca56b0f7563ad0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "749e9fc18b1e1a3f93a9512e91bd7f93002d2821",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69e3b846d8a753f9f279f29531ca56b0f7563ad0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a8e5e5146ad08d794c58252bab00b261045ef16d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "69e3b846d8a753f9f279f29531ca56b0f7563ad0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c",
"arch/arm64/mm/mteswap.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.82",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored\n\nPrior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 (\"arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE\nis untagged\"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries\n(those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use\ntest_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, \u0026page-\u003eflags) without inadvertently\nsetting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page.\n\nThe above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any\ncontrol at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM.\nHowever, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like\nswap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A\nsubsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination\npage even if the tags were owned by KASAN.\n\nThis issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in\ncommit e5b8d9218951 (\"arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page-\u003eflags\").\nWhen this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting\naccess faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the\noriginal page-\u003eflags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y):\n\n BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26\n Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218\n Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2]\n\nMove the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual\nplace where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored\n(mte_restore_tags())."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-50675",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T05:23:58.663",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-09T16:17:19.730",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/749e9fc18b1e1a3f93a9512e91bd7f93002d2821"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918002bdbe4328c8c0164a22e8ebf2384b80dc23"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8e5e5146ad08d794c58252bab00b261045ef16d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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