FKIE_CVE-2022-49980
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-06-18 11:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 05:19| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f44b0b95d50fffeca036e1ba36770390e0b519dd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2ccea03a8f7ec93641791f2760d7cdc6cab6205f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2191c00855b03aa59c20e698be713d952d51fc18",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2ccea03a8f7ec93641791f2760d7cdc6cab6205f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.19.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6A68E1F8-6957-46BF-A921-09842AEFCA7C",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.19.7",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: gadget: Fix use-after-free Read in usb_udc_uevent()\n\nThe syzbot fuzzer found a race between uevent callbacks and gadget\ndriver unregistration that can cause a use-after-free bug:\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_udc_uevent+0x11f/0x130\ndrivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1732\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888078ce2050 by task udevd/2968\n\nCPU: 1 PID: 2968 Comm: udevd Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220628-syzkaller #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google\n06/29/2022\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline]\n print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433\n kasan_report+0xbe/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495\n usb_udc_uevent+0x11f/0x130 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1732\n dev_uevent+0x290/0x770 drivers/base/core.c:2424\n---------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe bug occurs because usb_udc_uevent() dereferences udc-\u003edriver but\ndoes so without acquiring the udc_lock mutex, which protects this\nfield. If the gadget driver is unbound from the udc concurrently with\nuevent processing, the driver structure may be accessed after it has\nbeen deallocated.\n\nTo prevent the race, we make sure that the routine holds the mutex\naround the racing accesses."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: USB: gadget: Correcci\u00f3n de lectura de Use-After-Free en usb_udc_uevent() El analizador de vulnerabilidades syzbot encontr\u00f3 una ejecuci\u00f3n entre las devoluciones de llamadas de uevent y la anulaci\u00f3n del registro del controlador del gadget que puede causar un error de Use-After-Free: --------------------------------------------------------------- ERROR: KASAN: Use-After-Free en usb_udc_uevent+0x11f/0x130 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1732 Lectura de tama\u00f1o 8 en la direcci\u00f3n ffff888078ce2050 por la tarea udevd/2968 CPU: 1 PID: 2968 Comm: udevd No contaminado 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220628-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 29/06/2022 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xbe/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 usb_udc_uevent+0x11f/0x130 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:1732 dev_uevent+0x290/0x770 drivers/base/core.c:2424 --------------------------------------------------------------- El error ocurre porque usb_udc_uevent() desreferencia udc-\u0026gt;driver pero lo hace sin adquirir el Mutex udc_lock, que protege este campo. Si el controlador del gadget se desvincula del udc simult\u00e1neamente con el procesamiento de uevent, se puede acceder a la estructura del controlador despu\u00e9s de su desasignaci\u00f3n. Para evitar la competencia, nos aseguramos de que la rutina mantenga el mutex en los accesos de competencia."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-49980",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T05:19:40.303",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-06-18T11:15:25.480",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2191c00855b03aa59c20e698be713d952d51fc18"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f44b0b95d50fffeca036e1ba36770390e0b519dd"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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