FKIE_CVE-2022-49669
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-02-26 07:01 - Updated: 2026-06-17 05:18| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.19 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c",
"net/mptcp/protocol.h",
"net/mptcp/subflow.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a8a3e95c74e48c2c9b07b81fafda9122993f2e12",
"status": "affected",
"version": "86e39e04482b0aadf3ee3ed5fcf2d63816559d36",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6aeed9045071f2252ff4e98fc13d1e304f33e5b0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "86e39e04482b0aadf3ee3ed5fcf2d63816559d36",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c",
"net/mptcp/protocol.h",
"net/mptcp/subflow.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.18.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.19",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "9545F2C7-C654-49EE-904D-DE0CBC8E81C0",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.18.10",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.17",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.19:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A8C30C2D-F82D-4D37-AB48-D76ABFBD5377",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.19:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "BF8547FC-C849-4F1B-804B-A93AE2F04A92",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.19:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F3068028-F453-4A1C-B80F-3F5609ACEF60",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.19:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "2E9C0DB0-D349-489F-A3D6-B77214E93A8A",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: fix race on unaccepted mptcp sockets\n\nWhen the listener socket owning the relevant request is closed,\nit frees the unaccepted subflows and that causes later deletion\nof the paired MPTCP sockets.\n\nThe mptcp socket\u0027s worker can run in the time interval between such delete\noperations. When that happens, any access to msk-\u003efirst will cause an UaF\naccess, as the subflow cleanup did not cleared such field in the mptcp\nsocket.\n\nAddress the issue explicitly traversing the listener socket accept\nqueue at close time and performing the needed cleanup on the pending\nmsk.\n\nNote that the locking is a bit tricky, as we need to acquire the msk\nsocket lock, while still owning the subflow socket one."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mptcp: corregir la ejecuci\u00f3n en sockets mptcp no aceptados Cuando se cierra el socket de escucha que posee la solicitud relevante, libera los subflujos no aceptados y eso provoca la eliminaci\u00f3n posterior de los sockets MPTCP emparejados. El trabajador del socket mptcp puede ejecutarse en el intervalo de tiempo entre dichas operaciones de eliminaci\u00f3n. Cuando eso sucede, cualquier acceso a msk-\u0026gt;first provocar\u00e1 un acceso UaF, ya que la limpieza del subflujo no borr\u00f3 dicho campo en el socket mptcp. Aborde el problema recorriendo expl\u00edcitamente la cola de aceptaci\u00f3n del socket de escucha en el momento del cierre y realizando la limpieza necesaria en el msk pendiente. Tenga en cuenta que el bloqueo es un poco complicado, ya que necesitamos adquirir el bloqueo del socket msk, mientras a\u00fan poseemos el del socket del subflujo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-49669",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T05:18:48.290",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2022-49669",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-02-27T17:58:23.864289Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-02-26T07:01:41.870",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aeed9045071f2252ff4e98fc13d1e304f33e5b0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a3e95c74e48c2c9b07b81fafda9122993f2e12"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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