FKIE_CVE-2022-49146
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-02-26 07:00 - Updated: 2026-06-17 05:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: use virtio_device_ready() in virtio_device_restore()
After waking up a suspended VM, the kernel prints the following trace
for virtio drivers which do not directly call virtio_device_ready() in
the .restore:
PM: suspend exit
irq 22: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x49
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
__report_bad_irq+0x3a/0xaf
note_interrupt.cold+0xb/0x60
handle_irq_event+0x71/0x80
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x95/0x1e0
__common_interrupt+0x6b/0x110
common_interrupt+0x63/0xe0
asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
? __do_softirq+0x75/0x2f3
irq_exit_rcu+0x93/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0xd0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
arch_cpu_idle+0x12/0x20
default_idle_call+0x39/0xf0
do_idle+0x1b5/0x210
cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
start_secondary+0xf3/0x100
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc3/0xcb
</TASK>
handlers:
[<000000008f9bac49>] vp_interrupt
[<000000008f9bac49>] vp_interrupt
Disabling IRQ #22
This happens because we don't invoke .enable_cbs callback in
virtio_device_restore(). That callback is used by some transports
(e.g. virtio-pci) to enable interrupts.
Let's fix it, by calling virtio_device_ready() as we do in
virtio_dev_probe(). This function calls .enable_cts callback and sets
DRIVER_OK status bit.
This fix also avoids setting DRIVER_OK twice for those drivers that
call virtio_device_ready() in the .restore.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/virtio/virtio.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "94e9f5da39ee5f8ea31be1585de31c54f10dedce",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d50497eb4e554e1f0351e1836ee7241c059592e6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4ae431113179d72c668b61df320af0c06d1aa5c5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d50497eb4e554e1f0351e1836ee7241c059592e6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8d65bc9a5be3f23c5e2ab36b6b8ef40095165b18",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d50497eb4e554e1f0351e1836ee7241c059592e6",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/virtio/virtio.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.16.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.16.19",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.17.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "20C43679-0439-405A-B97F-685BEE50613B",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.16.19",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "210C679C-CF84-44A3-8939-E629C87E54BF",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.17.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.17",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio: use virtio_device_ready() in virtio_device_restore()\n\nAfter waking up a suspended VM, the kernel prints the following trace\nfor virtio drivers which do not directly call virtio_device_ready() in\nthe .restore:\n\n PM: suspend exit\n irq 22: nobody cared (try booting with the \"irqpoll\" option)\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x49\n dump_stack+0x10/0x12\n __report_bad_irq+0x3a/0xaf\n note_interrupt.cold+0xb/0x60\n handle_irq_event+0x71/0x80\n handle_fasteoi_irq+0x95/0x1e0\n __common_interrupt+0x6b/0x110\n common_interrupt+0x63/0xe0\n asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40\n ? __do_softirq+0x75/0x2f3\n irq_exit_rcu+0x93/0xe0\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0xd0\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20\n arch_cpu_idle+0x12/0x20\n default_idle_call+0x39/0xf0\n do_idle+0x1b5/0x210\n cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30\n start_secondary+0xf3/0x100\n secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc3/0xcb\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n handlers:\n [\u003c000000008f9bac49\u003e] vp_interrupt\n [\u003c000000008f9bac49\u003e] vp_interrupt\n Disabling IRQ #22\n\nThis happens because we don\u0027t invoke .enable_cbs callback in\nvirtio_device_restore(). That callback is used by some transports\n(e.g. virtio-pci) to enable interrupts.\n\nLet\u0027s fix it, by calling virtio_device_ready() as we do in\nvirtio_dev_probe(). This function calls .enable_cts callback and sets\nDRIVER_OK status bit.\n\nThis fix also avoids setting DRIVER_OK twice for those drivers that\ncall virtio_device_ready() in the .restore."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: virtio: usar virtio_device_ready() en virtio_device_restore() Despu\u00e9s de reactivar una m\u00e1quina virtual suspendida, el kernel imprime el siguiente seguimiento para los controladores virtio que no llaman directamente a virtio_device_ready() en .restore: PM: suspender salir irq 22: a nadie le import\u00f3 (intente arrancar con la opci\u00f3n \"irqpoll\") Seguimiento de llamada: dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x49 dump_stack+0x10/0x12 __report_bad_irq+0x3a/0xaf note_interrupt.cold+0xb/0x60 handle_irq_event+0x71/0x80 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x95/0x1e0 __common_interrupt+0x6b/0x110 common_interrupt+0x63/0xe0 asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 ? __do_softirq+0x75/0x2f3 irq_exit_rcu+0x93/0xe0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0xd0 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch_cpu_idle+0x12/0x20 default_idle_call+0x39/0xf0 do_idle+0x1b5/0x210 cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30 start_secondary+0xf3/0x100 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc3/0xcb controladores: [\u0026lt;000000008f9bac49\u0026gt;] vp_interrupt [\u0026lt;000000008f9bac49\u0026gt;] vp_interrupt Deshabilitando IRQ #22 Esto sucede porque no invocamos la devoluci\u00f3n de llamada .enable_cbs en virtio_device_restore(). Esa devoluci\u00f3n de llamada es utilizada por algunos transportes (por ejemplo, virtio-pci) para habilitar interrupciones. Vamos a solucionarlo, llamando a virtio_device_ready() como lo hacemos en virtio_dev_probe(). Esta funci\u00f3n llama a la devoluci\u00f3n de llamada .enable_cts y establece el bit de estado DRIVER_OK. Esta soluci\u00f3n tambi\u00e9n evita configurar DRIVER_OK dos veces para aquellos controladores que llaman a virtio_device_ready() en .restore."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-49146",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T05:17:12.700",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-02-26T07:00:51.793",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ae431113179d72c668b61df320af0c06d1aa5c5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d65bc9a5be3f23c5e2ab36b6b8ef40095165b18"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94e9f5da39ee5f8ea31be1585de31c54f10dedce"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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