FKIE_CVE-2022-42463
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2022-10-14 15:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 05:04
Severity
8.3 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
OpenHarmony-v3.1.2 and prior versions have an authenication bypass vulnerability in a callback handler function of Softbus_server in communication subsystem. Attackers can launch attacks on distributed networks by sending Bluetooth rfcomm packets to any remote device and executing arbitrary commands.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| openharmony | openharmony | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "OpenHarmony",
"vendor": "OpenHarmony",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "3.1.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "OpenHarmony-v3.1.x-Release",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "scy@openharmony.io"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openharmony:openharmony:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C026D184-A8AE-4DE6-A339-EA4469DDD4E7",
"versionEndIncluding": "3.1.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "OpenHarmony-v3.1.2 and prior versions have an authenication bypass vulnerability in a callback handler function of Softbus_server in communication subsystem. Attackers can launch attacks on distributed networks by sending Bluetooth rfcomm packets to any remote device and executing arbitrary commands."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "OpenHarmony versiones v3.1.2 y versiones anteriores, presentan una vulnerabilidad de omisi\u00f3n de autentificaci\u00f3n en una funci\u00f3n de callback handler de Softbus_server en el subsistema de comunicaci\u00f3n. Los atacantes pueden lanzar ataques en redes distribuidas mediante el env\u00edo de paquetes Bluetooth rfcomm a cualquier dispositivo remoto y ejecutando comandos arbitrarios"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-42463",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T05:04:58.140",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "scy@openharmony.io",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2022-42463",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-05-14T15:11:34.807910Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2022-10-14T15:16:24.883",
"references": [
{
"source": "scy@openharmony.io",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://gitee.com/openharmony/security/blob/master/en/security-disclosure/2022/2022-10.md"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://gitee.com/openharmony/security/blob/master/en/security-disclosure/2022/2022-10.md"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "scy@openharmony.io",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-287"
}
],
"source": "scy@openharmony.io",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-287"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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