FKIE_CVE-2022-30636

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-07-02 20:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 04:43
Summary
httpTokenCacheKey uses path.Base to extract the expected HTTP-01 token value to lookup in the DirCache implementation. On Windows, path.Base acts differently to filepath.Base, since Windows uses a different path separator (\ vs. /), allowing a user to provide a relative path, i.e. .well-known/acme-challenge/..\..\asd becomes ..\..\asd. The extracted path is then suffixed with +http-01, joined with the cache directory, and opened. Since the controlled path is suffixed with +http-01 before opening, the impact of this is significantly limited, since it only allows reading arbitrary files on the system if and only if they have this suffix.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert",
          "platforms": [
            "windows"
          ],
          "product": "golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert",
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "DirCache.Get"
            },
            {
              "name": "DirCache.Put"
            },
            {
              "name": "DirCache.Delete"
            },
            {
              "name": "HostWhitelist"
            },
            {
              "name": "Manager.GetCertificate"
            },
            {
              "name": "Manager.Listener"
            },
            {
              "name": "NewListener"
            },
            {
              "name": "listener.Accept"
            },
            {
              "name": "listener.Close"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "golang.org/x/crypto",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.0.0-20220525230936-793ad666bf5e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@golang.org"
    },
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:golang:crypto:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "crypto",
          "vendor": "golang",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.0.0-20220525230936-793ad666bf5e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "httpTokenCacheKey uses path.Base to extract the expected HTTP-01 token value to lookup in the DirCache implementation. On Windows, path.Base acts differently to filepath.Base, since Windows uses a different path separator (\\ vs. /), allowing a user to provide a relative path, i.e. .well-known/acme-challenge/..\\..\\asd becomes ..\\..\\asd. The extracted path is then suffixed with +http-01, joined with the cache directory, and opened. Since the controlled path is suffixed with +http-01 before opening, the impact of this is significantly limited, since it only allows reading arbitrary files on the system if and only if they have this suffix."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "httpTokenCacheKey usa path.Base para extraer el valor del token HTTP-01 esperado para buscarlo en la implementaci\u00f3n de DirCache. En Windows, path.Base act\u00faa de manera diferente a filepath.Base, ya que Windows usa un separador de ruta diferente (\\ vs. /), lo que permite al usuario proporcionar una ruta relativa, es decir, .well-known/acme-challenge/..\\. .\\asd se convierte en ..\\..\\asd. Luego, la ruta extra\u00edda tiene el sufijo +http-01, se une al directorio de cach\u00e9 y se abre. Dado que la ruta controlada tiene el sufijo +http-01 antes de abrirse, el impacto de esto es significativamente limitado, ya que solo permite leer archivos arbitrarios en el sistema si y solo si tienen este sufijo."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2022-30636",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T04:43:59.593",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2022-30636",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-07-03T13:57:10.933970Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-07-02T20:15:05.173",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@golang.org",
      "url": "https://go.dev/cl/408694"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@golang.org",
      "url": "https://go.dev/issue/53082"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@golang.org",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2961"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://go.dev/cl/408694"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://go.dev/issue/53082"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2961"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@golang.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}



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