FKIE_CVE-2022-30269
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2022-07-26 23:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 04:43
Severity
Summary
Motorola ACE1000 RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle application integrity. They allow for custom application installation via either STS software, the C toolkit, or the ACE1000 Easy Configurator. In the case of the Easy Configurator, application images (as PLX/DAT/APP/CRC files) are uploaded via the Web UI. In case of the C toolkit, they are transferred and installed using SFTP/SSH. In each case, application images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cve@mitre.org | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-179-06 | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource | |
| cve@mitre.org | https://www.forescout.com/blog/ | Not Applicable | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-179-06 | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://www.forescout.com/blog/ | Not Applicable |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| motorola | ace1000_firmware | - | |
| motorola | ace1000 | - |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:motorola:ace1000_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D94120E5-38DE-44EF-B1D6-C418DC816D25",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
},
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:motorola:ace1000:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D16356CC-9056-4675-8DBE-EF395A5529E8",
"vulnerable": false
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Motorola ACE1000 RTUs through 2022-05-02 mishandle application integrity. They allow for custom application installation via either STS software, the C toolkit, or the ACE1000 Easy Configurator. In the case of the Easy Configurator, application images (as PLX/DAT/APP/CRC files) are uploaded via the Web UI. In case of the C toolkit, they are transferred and installed using SFTP/SSH. In each case, application images were found to have no authentication (in the form of firmware signing) and only relied on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Motorola ACE1000 RTUs versiones hasta 02-05-2022, manejan inapropiadamente la integridad de las aplicaciones. Permiten la instalaci\u00f3n de aplicaciones personalizadas por medio del software STS, el kit de herramientas C o el ACE1000 Easy Configurator. En el caso del Easy Configurator, las im\u00e1genes de las aplicaciones (como archivos PLX/DAT/APP/CRC) son cargadas por medio de la Interfaz de Usuario Web. En el caso del kit de herramientas C, son transferidas e instaladas mediante SFTP/SSH. En cada caso, las im\u00e1genes de la aplicaci\u00f3n no ten\u00edan autenticaci\u00f3n (en forma de firma de firmware) y s\u00f3lo eran basadas en sumas de comprobaci\u00f3n no seguras para las comprobaciones de integridad peri\u00f3dicas"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-30269",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T04:43:21.593",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2022-07-26T23:15:08.097",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Third Party Advisory",
"US Government Resource"
],
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-179-06"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog/"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Third Party Advisory",
"US Government Resource"
],
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-179-06"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-345"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.