FKIE_CVE-2021-47590
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-06-19 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 04:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix deadlock in __mptcp_push_pending()
__mptcp_push_pending() may call mptcp_flush_join_list() with subflow
socket lock held. If such call hits mptcp_sockopt_sync_all() then
subsequently __mptcp_sockopt_sync() could try to lock the subflow
socket for itself, causing a deadlock.
sysrq: Show Blocked State
task:ss-server state:D stack: 0 pid: 938 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x2d6/0x10c0
? __mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x70
? csum_partial+0xd/0x20
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x26/0x50
schedule+0x4e/0xc0
__lock_sock+0x69/0x90
? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0
__lock_sock_fast+0x35/0x50
mptcp_sockopt_sync_all+0x38/0xc0
__mptcp_push_pending+0x105/0x200
mptcp_sendmsg+0x466/0x490
sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x60
__sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160
? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0
? fpregs_restore_userregs+0x12/0xd0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f9ba546c2d0
RSP: 002b:00007ffdc3b762d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9ba56c8060 RCX: 00007f9ba546c2d0
RDX: 000000000000077a RSI: 0000000000e5e180 RDI: 0000000000000234
RBP: 0000000000cc57f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9ba56c8060
R13: 0000000000b6ba60 R14: 0000000000cc7840 R15: 41d8685b1d7901b8
</TASK>
Fix the issue by using __mptcp_flush_join_list() instead of plain
mptcp_flush_join_list() inside __mptcp_push_pending(), as suggested by
Florian. The sockopt sync will be deferred to the workqueue.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "23311b92755ffa9087332d1bb8c71c0f6a10cc08",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1b3e7ede1365a24db1b4fd837e58a595f52fa4ad",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3d79e3756ca90f7a6087b77b62c1d9c0801e0820",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1b3e7ede1365a24db1b4fd837e58a595f52fa4ad",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.16",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D42075C1-1BC2-41C8-B06D-3A7E0EDABE84",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.13",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: fix deadlock in __mptcp_push_pending()\n\n__mptcp_push_pending() may call mptcp_flush_join_list() with subflow\nsocket lock held. If such call hits mptcp_sockopt_sync_all() then\nsubsequently __mptcp_sockopt_sync() could try to lock the subflow\nsocket for itself, causing a deadlock.\n\nsysrq: Show Blocked State\ntask:ss-server state:D stack: 0 pid: 938 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __schedule+0x2d6/0x10c0\n ? __mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x70\n ? csum_partial+0xd/0x20\n ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x26/0x50\n schedule+0x4e/0xc0\n __lock_sock+0x69/0x90\n ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0\n __lock_sock_fast+0x35/0x50\n mptcp_sockopt_sync_all+0x38/0xc0\n __mptcp_push_pending+0x105/0x200\n mptcp_sendmsg+0x466/0x490\n sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x60\n __sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160\n ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0\n ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0x12/0xd0\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30\n do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\nRIP: 0033:0x7f9ba546c2d0\nRSP: 002b:00007ffdc3b762d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9ba56c8060 RCX: 00007f9ba546c2d0\nRDX: 000000000000077a RSI: 0000000000e5e180 RDI: 0000000000000234\nRBP: 0000000000cc57f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9ba56c8060\nR13: 0000000000b6ba60 R14: 0000000000cc7840 R15: 41d8685b1d7901b8\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nFix the issue by using __mptcp_flush_join_list() instead of plain\nmptcp_flush_join_list() inside __mptcp_push_pending(), as suggested by\nFlorian. The sockopt sync will be deferred to the workqueue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se resolvi\u00f3 la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mptcp: corrige el punto muerto en __mptcp_push_pending() __mptcp_push_pending() puede llamar a mptcp_flush_join_list() con el bloqueo del socket de subflujo retenido. Si dicha llamada llega a mptcp_sockopt_sync_all(), posteriormente __mptcp_sockopt_sync() podr\u00eda intentar bloquear el socket de subflujo por s\u00ed mismo, provocando un punto muerto. sysrq: Mostrar estado bloqueado tarea: estado del servidor ss: D pila: 0 pid: 938 ppid: 1 banderas: 0x00000000 Seguimiento de llamadas: __schedule+0x2d6/0x10c0? __mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x70 ? csum_partial+0xd/0x20? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x26/0x50 horario+0x4e/0xc0 __lock_sock+0x69/0x90 ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0 __lock_sock_fast+0x35/0x50 mptcp_sockopt_sync_all+0x38/0xc0 __mptcp_push_pending+0x105/0x200 mptcp_sendmsg+0x466/0x490 sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x60 __sys_sendto+0xf0/0x160? do_wait_intr_irq+0xa0/0xa0? fpregs_restore_userregs+0x12/0xd0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f9ba546c2d0 RSP: dc3b762d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9ba56c8060 RCX: 00007f9ba546c2d0 RDX: 000000000000077a RSI: 0000000000e5e180 RDI: 0000000000000234 RBP: 0000000000cc57f0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9ba56c8060 R13: 0000000000b6ba60 R14: 0000000000cc7840 R15: 41d8685b1d7901b8 Solucione el problema usando __mptcp_flush_join_list() en su lugar de mptcp_flush_join_list() simple dentro __mptcp_push_pending(), como sugiere Florian. La sincronizaci\u00f3n de sockopt se aplazar\u00e1 a la cola de trabajo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2021-47590",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T04:17:49.750",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2021-47590",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-09-10T17:12:36.639321Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-06-19T15:15:53.610",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23311b92755ffa9087332d1bb8c71c0f6a10cc08"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d79e3756ca90f7a6087b77b62c1d9c0801e0820"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23311b92755ffa9087332d1bb8c71c0f6a10cc08"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d79e3756ca90f7a6087b77b62c1d9c0801e0820"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-667"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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|---|
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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