FKIE_CVE-2021-39214
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2021-09-16 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 04:039.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "mitmproxy",
"vendor": "mitmproxy",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 7.0.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:mitmproxy:mitmproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B8BF4DAA-4BE5-4F62-9B5C-A230FB0F0832",
"versionEndIncluding": "7.0.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "mitmproxy is an interactive, SSL/TLS-capable intercepting proxy. In mitmproxy 7.0.2 and below, a malicious client or server is able to perform HTTP request smuggling attacks through mitmproxy. This means that a malicious client/server could smuggle a request/response through mitmproxy as part of another request/response\u0027s HTTP message body. While a smuggled request is still captured as part of another request\u0027s body, it does not appear in the request list and does not go through the usual mitmproxy event hooks, where users may have implemented custom access control checks or input sanitization. Unless one uses mitmproxy to protect an HTTP/1 service, no action is required. The vulnerability has been fixed in mitmproxy 7.0.3 and above."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "mitmproxy es un proxy interactivo con capacidad de interceptaci\u00f3n SSL/TLS. En mitmproxy versiones 7.0.2 y por debajo, un cliente o servidor malicioso es capaz de llevar a cabo ataques de contrabando de peticiones HTTP mediante mitmproxy. Esto significa que un cliente/servidor malicioso podr\u00eda pasar de contrabando una petici\u00f3n/respuesta mediante mitmproxy como parte del cuerpo del mensaje HTTP de otra petici\u00f3n/respuesta. Mientras que una petici\u00f3n de contrabando sigue siendo capturada como parte del cuerpo de otra petici\u00f3n, no aparece en la lista de peticiones y no pasa por los ganchos de eventos habituales de mitmproxy, donde los usuarios pueden haber implementado comprobaciones de control de acceso personalizadas o saneo de entradas. A menos que se use mitmproxy para proteger un servicio HTTP/1, no es requerida ninguna acci\u00f3n. La vulnerabilidad ha sido corregida en mitmproxy versiones 7.0.3 y superiores"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2021-39214",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T04:03:19.593",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 6.4,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2021-09-16T15:15:07.460",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mitmproxy/mitmproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-22gh-3r9q-xf38"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mitmproxy/mitmproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-22gh-3r9q-xf38"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-444"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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