FKIE_CVE-2021-21906
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2021-12-22 19:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 03:36| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| talos-cna@cisco.com | https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1357 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1357 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| garrett | ic_module_cma | 5.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Garrett Metal Detectors",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "Garrett Metal Detectors iC Module CMA Version 5.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:garrett:ic_module_cma:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "784C02B2-BE54-4105-8386-8E620CF5A318",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in how the CMA readfile function of Garrett Metal Detectors iC Module CMA Version 5.0 is used at various locations. The Garrett iC Module exposes an authenticated CLI over TCP port 6877. This interface is used by a secondary GUI client, called \u201cCMA Connect\u201d, to interact with the iC Module on behalf of the user. Every time a user submits a password to the CLI password prompt, the buffer containing their input is passed as the password parameter to the checkPassword function."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Se presenta una vulnerabilidad de desbordamiento de b\u00fafer en la regi\u00f3n stack de la memoria en la forma en que es usada la funci\u00f3n CMA readfile de Garrett Metal Detectors iC Module CMA Versi\u00f3n 5.0, en varios lugares. El Garrett iC Module expone una CLI autenticada a trav\u00e9s del puerto TCP 6877. Esta interfaz es usada por un cliente GUI secundario, llamado \"CMA Connect\", para interactuar con el iC Module en nombre del usuario. Cada vez que un usuario env\u00eda una contrase\u00f1a a la solicitud de contrase\u00f1a de la CLI, el b\u00fafer que contiene su entrada es pasado como par\u00e1metro de contrase\u00f1a a la funci\u00f3n checkPassword"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2021-21906",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T03:36:20.280",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "SINGLE",
"availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"baseScore": 9.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"integrityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
"impactScore": 10.0,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV30": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.5,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2021-12-22T19:15:09.837",
"references": [
{
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1357"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1357"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-121"
}
],
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.