Vulnerability-Lookup

FKIE_CVE-2020-4060

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2020-06-22 16:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 03:19

Severity

4.1 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L
5.0 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L

Summary

In LoRa Basics Station before 2.0.4, there is a Use After Free vulnerability that leads to memory corruption. This bug is triggered on 32-bit machines when the CUPS server responds with a message (https://doc.sm.tc/station/cupsproto.html#http-post-response) where the signature length is larger than 2 GByte (never happens in practice), or the response is crafted specifically to trigger this issue (i.e. the length signature field indicates a value larger than (2**31)-1 although the signature actually does not contain that much data). In such a scenario, on 32 bit machines, Basic Station would execute a code path, where a piece of memory is accessed after it has been freed, causing the process to crash and restarted again. The CUPS transaction is typically mutually authenticated over TLS. Therefore, in order to trigger this vulnerability, the attacker would have to gain access to the CUPS server first. If the user chose to operate without authentication over TLS but yet is concerned about this vulnerability, one possible workaround is to enable TLS authentication. This has been fixed in 2.0.4.

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j	Mitigation, Third Party Advisory
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j	Mitigation, Third Party Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	semtech	lora_basics_station	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "LoRa Basics Station",
          "vendor": "LoRa Basics",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.0.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:semtech:lora_basics_station:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BF29D2B9-752D-41CA-BF80-3AFEC3095467",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2.0.4",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In LoRa Basics Station before 2.0.4, there is a Use After Free vulnerability that leads to memory corruption. This bug is triggered on 32-bit machines when the CUPS server responds with a message (https://doc.sm.tc/station/cupsproto.html#http-post-response) where the signature length is larger than 2 GByte (never happens in practice), or the response is crafted specifically to trigger this issue (i.e. the length signature field indicates a value larger than (2**31)-1 although the signature actually does not contain that much data). In such a scenario, on 32 bit machines, Basic Station would execute a code path, where a piece of memory is accessed after it has been freed, causing the process to crash and restarted again. The CUPS transaction is typically mutually authenticated over TLS. Therefore, in order to trigger this vulnerability, the attacker would have to gain access to the CUPS server first. If the user chose to operate without authentication over TLS but yet is concerned about this vulnerability, one possible workaround is to enable TLS authentication. This has been fixed in 2.0.4."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En LoRa Basics Station versiones anteriores a 2.0.4, se presenta una vulnerabilidad de Uso de la Memoria Previamente Liberada que conlleva a una corrupci\u00f3n de la memoria. Este error es desencadenado en m\u00e1quinas de 32 bits cuando el servidor CUPS responde con un mensaje (https://doc.sm.tc/station/cupsproto.html#http-post-response) donde la longitud de la firma es mayor que 2 GByte (nunca sucede en la pr\u00e1ctica), o la respuesta est\u00e1 dise\u00f1ada espec\u00edficamente para desencadenar este problema (es decir, el campo length signature indica un valor mayor que (2**31)-1 aunque la firma en realidad no contiene tantos datos). En tal escenario, en m\u00e1quinas de 32 bits, Basic Station ejecutar\u00eda una ruta de c\u00f3digo, donde se accede a una porci\u00f3n de memoria despu\u00e9s de que ha sido liberada, lo que hace que el proceso se bloquee y se reinicie nuevamente. La transacci\u00f3n de CUPS generalmente se autentica mutuamente por medio de TLS. Por lo tanto, para desencadenar esta vulnerabilidad, el atacante primero tendr\u00eda que conseguir acceso al servidor CUPS. Si el usuario elige operar sin autenticaci\u00f3n por medio de TLS pero est\u00e1 preocupado por esta vulnerabilidad, una soluci\u00f3n posible es habilitar la autenticaci\u00f3n TLS. Esto se ha corregido en la versi\u00f3n 2.0.4"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2020-4060",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T03:19:30.307",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV2": [
      {
        "acInsufInfo": false,
        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
        "cvssData": {
          "accessComplexity": "LOW",
          "accessVector": "NETWORK",
          "authentication": "SINGLE",
          "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
          "baseScore": 4.0,
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P",
          "version": "2.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
        "impactScore": 2.9,
        "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
        "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
        "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary",
        "userInteractionRequired": false
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 4.1,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 5.0,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2020-06-22T16:15:11.557",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2020-4060 (GCVE-0-2020-4060)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2020-06-22 15:45 – Updated: 2024-08-04 07:52

Title

Use After Free in in cups_update_info in LoRa Basics Station

Summary

Severity

4.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L

CWE

CWE-416 - Use After Free

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7895 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/securi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
LoRa Basics	LoRa Basics Station	Affected: < 2.0.4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
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      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-04T07:52:20.843Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
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              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "LoRa Basics Station",
          "vendor": "LoRa Basics",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.0.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In LoRa Basics Station before 2.0.4, there is a Use After Free vulnerability that leads to memory corruption. This bug is triggered on 32-bit machines when the CUPS server responds with a message (https://doc.sm.tc/station/cupsproto.html#http-post-response) where the signature length is larger than 2 GByte (never happens in practice), or the response is crafted specifically to trigger this issue (i.e. the length signature field indicates a value larger than (2**31)-1 although the signature actually does not contain that much data). In such a scenario, on 32 bit machines, Basic Station would execute a code path, where a piece of memory is accessed after it has been freed, causing the process to crash and restarted again. The CUPS transaction is typically mutually authenticated over TLS. Therefore, in order to trigger this vulnerability, the attacker would have to gain access to the CUPS server first. If the user chose to operate without authentication over TLS but yet is concerned about this vulnerability, one possible workaround is to enable TLS authentication. This has been fixed in 2.0.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 4.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
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            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
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            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-416: Use After Free",
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          "url": "https://github.com/lorabasics/basicstation/security/advisories/GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-v9ph-r496-4m2j",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Use After Free in in cups_update_info in LoRa Basics Station",
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        },
        "affects": {
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                "product": {
                  "product_data": [
                    {
                      "product_name": "LoRa Basics Station",
                      "version": {
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                            "version_value": "\u003c 2.0.4"
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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