FKIE_CVE-2019-10270
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2019-06-21 18:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 02:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cve@mitre.org | https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2019060101 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2019060101 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ultimatemember | ultimate_member | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ultimatemember:ultimate_member:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A0451A41-7BA3-42DA-A431-52551BC7C4EE",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.0.40",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An arbitrary password reset issue was discovered in the Ultimate Member plugin 2.39 for WordPress. It is possible (due to lack of verification and correlation between the reset password key sent by mail and the user_id parameter) to reset the password of another user. One only needs to know the user_id, which is publicly available. One just has to intercept the password modification request and modify user_id. It is possible to modify the passwords for any users or admin WordPress Ultimate Members. This could lead to account compromise and privilege escalation."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Se detect\u00f3 un problema de restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a arbitrario en el plugin Member versi\u00f3n 2.39 de Ultimate para WordPress. Es posible restablecer la contrase\u00f1a de otro usuario (debido a la falta de comprobaci\u00f3n y correlaci\u00f3n entre la clave de restablecimiento de la contrase\u00f1a enviada por correo y el par\u00e1metro user_id). Solo se necesita conocer el user_id, que est\u00e1 disponible p\u00fablicamente. Solo hay que interceptar la solicitud de modificaci\u00f3n de contrase\u00f1a y modificar el ID de usuario. Es posible modificar las contrase\u00f1as de cualquier usuario o administrador de WordPress Ultimate Members. Esto podr\u00eda conllevar a comprometer la cuenta y la escalada de privilegios."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2019-10270",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T02:10:36.817",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "SINGLE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2019-06-21T18:15:09.577",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2019060101"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2019060101"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-640"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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