FKIE_CVE-2019-10056

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2019-08-28 21:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 02:10
Summary
An issue was discovered in Suricata 4.1.3. The code mishandles the case of sending a network packet with the right type, such that the function DecodeEthernet in decode-ethernet.c is executed a second time. At this point, the algorithm cuts the first part of the packet and doesn't determine the current length. Specifically, if the packet is exactly 28 long, in the first iteration it subtracts 14 bytes. Then, it is working with a packet length of 14. At this point, the case distinction says it is a valid packet. After that it casts the packet, but this packet has no type, and the program crashes at the type case distinction.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
suricata-ids suricata 4.1.3
suricata-ids suricata 4.1.4

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:suricata-ids:suricata:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "D159B6E7-A8BD-49CF-A0BF-98AE20B0541A",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:suricata-ids:suricata:4.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "ABD52035-B1CC-4D94-BFA1-556041577F2F",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "An issue was discovered in Suricata 4.1.3. The code mishandles the case of sending a network packet with the right type, such that the function DecodeEthernet in decode-ethernet.c is executed a second time. At this point, the algorithm cuts the first part of the packet and doesn\u0027t determine the current length. Specifically, if the packet is exactly 28 long, in the first iteration it subtracts 14 bytes. Then, it is working with a packet length of 14. At this point, the case distinction says it is a valid packet. After that it casts the packet, but this packet has no type, and the program crashes at the type case distinction."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Se descubri\u00f3 un problema en Suricata 4.1.3. El c\u00f3digo maneja mal el caso de enviar un paquete de red con el tipo correcto, de modo que la funci\u00f3n DecodeEthernet en decode-ethernet.c se ejecuta por segunda vez. En este punto, el algoritmo corta la primera parte del paquete y no determina la longitud actual. Espec\u00edficamente, si el paquete tiene exactamente 28 de longitud, en la primera iteraci\u00f3n resta 14 bytes. Entonces, est\u00e1 trabajando con una longitud de paquete de 14. En este punto, la distinci\u00f3n de caso dice que es un paquete v\u00e1lido. Despu\u00e9s de eso, lanza el paquete, pero este paquete no tiene tipo, y el programa se bloquea en la distinci\u00f3n entre may\u00fasculas y min\u00fasculas."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2019-10056",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T02:10:07.250",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV2": [
      {
        "acInsufInfo": false,
        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
        "cvssData": {
          "accessComplexity": "LOW",
          "accessVector": "NETWORK",
          "authentication": "NONE",
          "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
          "baseScore": 5.0,
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P",
          "version": "2.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
        "impactScore": 2.9,
        "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
        "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
        "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary",
        "userInteractionRequired": false
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV30": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2019-08-28T21:15:10.630",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/issues/2946"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Not Applicable",
        "Release Notes",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://suricata-ids.org/2019/04/30/suricata-4-1-4-released/"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/issues/2946"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Not Applicable",
        "Release Notes",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://suricata-ids.org/2019/04/30/suricata-4-1-4-released/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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