FKIE_CVE-2018-9070
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2018-07-13 16:29 - Updated: 2026-06-17 02:06| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| psirt@lenovo.com | https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-22172 | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-22172 | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| lenovo | smart_assistant | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Lenovo Smart Assistant",
"vendor": "Lenovo Group Ltd.",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "Earlier than 12.1.82"
}
]
}
],
"source": "psirt@lenovo.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:lenovo:smart_assistant:*:*:*:*:*:android:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "147F093A-AF17-4B94-82AE-D477AFFF897A",
"versionEndExcluding": "12.1.82",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "For the Lenovo Smart Assistant Android app versions earlier than 12.1.82, an attacker with physical access to the smart speaker can, by pressing a specific button sequence, enter factory test mode and enable a web service intended for testing the device. As with most test modes, this provides extra privileges, including changing settings and running code. Lenovo Smart Assistant is an Amazon Alexa-enabled smart speaker developed by Lenovo."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Para la aplicaci\u00f3n de Android Lenovo Smart Assistant en versiones anteriores a la 12.1.82, un atacante con acceso f\u00edsico al altavoz inteligente puede, pulsando una determinada secuencia de botones, entrar en el modo de pruebas de f\u00e1brica y habilitar un servicio web destinado a probar el dispositivo. Como con la mayor\u00eda de modos de prueba, \u00e9ste proporciona privilegios extras, incluyendo el cambio de configuraci\u00f3n y la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo. Lenovo Smart Assistant es un altavoz inteligente dise\u00f1ado para Amazon Alexa desarrollado por Lenovo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2018-9070",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T02:06:01.580",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
"accessVector": "LOCAL",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"integrityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"vectorString": "AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.4,
"impactScore": 10.0,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV30": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "PHYSICAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.5,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2018-07-13T16:29:00.643",
"references": [
{
"source": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-22172"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-22172"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.