FKIE_CVE-2018-14984

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2018-12-28 21:29 - Updated: 2026-06-17 01:42
Summary
The Leagoo Z5C Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed app with a package name of com.android.messaging (versionCode=1000110, versionName=1.0.001, (android.20170630.092853-0)) with an exported broadcast receiver app component named com.android.messaging.trackersender.TrackerSender. Any app co-located on the device, even one with no permissions, can send a broadcast intent with certain embedded data to the exported broadcast receiver application component that will result in the programmatic sending of a text message where the phone number and body of the text message is controlled by the attacker.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
leagoo z5c_firmware -
leagoo z5c -

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:leagoo:z5c_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "4D154876-DE6B-4E01-BF92-8B4685192BB4",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        },
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:leagoo:z5c:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A457046C-0268-40C3-A641-570650C7CE14",
              "vulnerable": false
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ],
      "operator": "AND"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Leagoo Z5C Android device with a build fingerprint of sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed app with a package name of com.android.messaging (versionCode=1000110, versionName=1.0.001, (android.20170630.092853-0)) with an exported broadcast receiver app component named com.android.messaging.trackersender.TrackerSender. Any app co-located on the device, even one with no permissions, can send a broadcast intent with certain embedded data to the exported broadcast receiver application component that will result in the programmatic sending of a text message where the phone number and body of the text message is controlled by the attacker."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "El dispositivo Android Leagoo Z5C con una huella digital sp7731c_1h10_32v4_bird:6.0/MRA58K/android.20170629.214736:user/release-keys contiene una aplicaci\u00f3n preinstalada, cuyo paquete se denomina com.android.messaging (versionCode=1000110, versionName=1.0.001, (android.20170630.092853-0)) con un componente de app de recepci\u00f3n de transmisiones exportada llamado com.android.messaging.trackersender.TrackerSender. Cualquier app que tambi\u00e9n est\u00e9 en el dispositivo, incluso aunque no tenga permisos, puede enviar un intent de transmisi\u00f3n con ciertos datos embebidos al componente de la aplicaci\u00f3n de recepci\u00f3n de transmisiones exportada que resultar\u00e1 en el env\u00edo program\u00e1tico de un mensaje de texto en el que el n\u00famero de tel\u00e9fono y el cuerpo del mensaje de texto est\u00e1n controlados por el atacante."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2018-14984",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T01:42:01.183",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV2": [
      {
        "acInsufInfo": false,
        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
        "cvssData": {
          "accessComplexity": "LOW",
          "accessVector": "NETWORK",
          "authentication": "NONE",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.0,
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
          "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N",
          "version": "2.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
        "impactScore": 2.9,
        "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
        "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
        "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary",
        "userInteractionRequired": false
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV30": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2018-12-28T21:29:00.307",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/android-firmware-defcon-2018/"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Technical Description",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/DEFCON-26-Johnson-and-Stavrou-Vulnerable-Out-of-the-Box-An-Eval-of-Android-Carrier-Devices-WP-Updated.pdf"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/android-firmware-defcon-2018/"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Technical Description",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/DEFCON-26-Johnson-and-Stavrou-Vulnerable-Out-of-the-Box-An-Eval-of-Android-Carrier-Devices-WP-Updated.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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