FKIE_CVE-2017-7670

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2017-07-10 18:29 - Updated: 2026-06-17 01:24
Summary
The Traffic Router component of the incubating Apache Traffic Control project is vulnerable to a Slowloris style Denial of Service attack. TCP connections made on the configured DNS port will remain in the ESTABLISHED state until the client explicitly closes the connection or Traffic Router is restarted. If connections remain in the ESTABLISHED state indefinitely and accumulate in number to match the size of the thread pool dedicated to processing DNS requests, the thread pool becomes exhausted. Once the thread pool is exhausted, Traffic Router is unable to service any DNS request, regardless of transport protocol.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "Apache Traffic Control",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.8.0 incubating"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.0.0 RC0 incubating"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "1DBD0BDC-FE45-4783-836C-98AC3C1AD582",
              "versionEndIncluding": "1.8.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:1.8.1:rc0:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7C7D341B-4BCD-4040-9539-0B3D3BF489AA",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "F4A5940F-5AF1-4E6A-8D40-800C402188DE",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A07F5552-C1D7-4D61-A7EA-FACE14BFB707",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "CF329CC2-2B4C-46B7-AAB3-5902C66731C8",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "FAA4DE4E-41E9-4D6A-824A-259A10C58A33",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A5A0F919-6FA5-4C28-B840-E605C7EA1C43",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:traffic_control:2.0.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C6EA36D0-C636-4D8F-96B3-77BF5266D9B2",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Traffic Router component of the incubating Apache Traffic Control project is vulnerable to a Slowloris style Denial of Service attack. TCP connections made on the configured DNS port will remain in the ESTABLISHED state until the client explicitly closes the connection or Traffic Router is restarted. If connections remain in the ESTABLISHED state indefinitely and accumulate in number to match the size of the thread pool dedicated to processing DNS requests, the thread pool becomes exhausted. Once the thread pool is exhausted, Traffic Router is unable to service any DNS request, regardless of transport protocol."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "El componente Traffic Router del proyecto Apache Traffic Control en incubaci\u00f3n es vulnerable a un ataque de denegaci\u00f3n de servicio de estilo Slowloris. Las conexiones TCP realizadas en el puerto DNS configurado permanecer\u00e1n en el estado ESTABLISHED hasta que el cliente cierre expl\u00edcitamente la conexi\u00f3n o se reinicie Traffic Router. Si las conexiones permanecen en el estado ESTABLISHED indefinidamente y se acumulan en n\u00famero para que coincida con el tama\u00f1o del grupo hilo (subprocesos) dedicado al procesamiento de peticiones DNS, el grupo hilo (subprocesos) se agota. Una vez que se agota el grupo de hilo (subprocesos), Traffic Router no puede atender ninguna petici\u00f3n DNS, independientemente del protocolo de transporte."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2017-7670",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T01:24:56.580",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV2": [
      {
        "acInsufInfo": false,
        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
        "cvssData": {
          "accessComplexity": "LOW",
          "accessVector": "NETWORK",
          "authentication": "NONE",
          "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
          "baseScore": 5.0,
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P",
          "version": "2.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
        "impactScore": 2.9,
        "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
        "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
        "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary",
        "userInteractionRequired": false
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV30": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.0"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2017-07-10T18:29:00.253",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/42b207e9f526353b504591684bd02a5e9fcb4b8f28534253d07740a0%40%3Cusers.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/bb09fc29e9c2ee85b118a3d5748a8a523d30cf691ff8b606c6a1748c%40%3Ccommits.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c675031ac220b5eae64a9c84a03ee60045c6045738607dca4a96cb8%40%3Ccommits.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/42b207e9f526353b504591684bd02a5e9fcb4b8f28534253d07740a0%40%3Cusers.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/bb09fc29e9c2ee85b118a3d5748a8a523d30cf691ff8b606c6a1748c%40%3Ccommits.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c675031ac220b5eae64a9c84a03ee60045c6045738607dca4a96cb8%40%3Ccommits.trafficcontrol.apache.org%3E"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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