FKIE_CVE-2017-16338
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2018-08-02 19:29 - Updated: 2026-06-17 01:09| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| talos-cna@cisco.com | https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0484 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0484 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| insteon | hub_firmware | 1012 | |
| insteon | hub | - |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Insteon",
"vendor": "Insteon",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "Insteon Hub 2245-222 - Firmware version 1012"
}
]
}
],
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:insteon:hub_firmware:1012:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "17F98B37-72C0-48A5-A4E2-12327F48327E",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
},
{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:insteon:hub:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"vulnerable": false
}
],
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"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An attacker could send an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability in Insteon Hub running firmware version 1012. At 0x9d01bad0 the value for the host key is copied using strcpy to the buffer at 0xa00016e0. This buffer is 32 bytes large, sending anything longer will cause a buffer overflow."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Un atacante podr\u00eda enviar una petici\u00f3n HTTP autenticada para desencadenar esta vulnerabilidad en Insteon Hub, con la versi\u00f3n 1012 de firmware. En 0x9d01bad0, el valor de la clave del host se copia mediante strcpy al b\u00fafer en 0xa00016e0. Este b\u00fafer tiene un tama\u00f1o de 32 bytes, por lo que el env\u00edo de algo m\u00e1s grande provocar\u00e1 un desbordamiento de b\u00fafer."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2017-16338",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T01:09:12.463",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "SINGLE",
"availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"baseScore": 8.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
"impactScore": 8.5,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV30": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.0"
},
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"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
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"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2018-08-02T19:29:00.357",
"references": [
{
"source": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0484"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2017-0484"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "talos-cna@cisco.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-120"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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