FKIE_CVE-2010-3192
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2010-10-14 05:58 - Updated: 2026-06-16 23:22{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:gnu:glibc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D4B57CAA-FEDE-48A6-A22F-56CAEA79F200",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.26",
"vulnerable": true
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"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Certain run-time memory protection mechanisms in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) print argv[0] and backtrace information, which might allow context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by executing an incorrect program, as demonstrated by a setuid program that contains a stack-based buffer overflow error, related to the __fortify_fail function in debug/fortify_fail.c, and the __stack_chk_fail (aka stack protection) and __chk_fail (aka FORTIFY_SOURCE) implementations."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Algunos mecanismos run-time de protecci\u00f3n de memoria en la Librer\u00eda C de GNU (tambi\u00e9n conocido como glibc o libc6) print argv[0] y backtrace information, lo cual permite a atacantes dependientes del contexto obtener informaci\u00f3n sensible de procesos de memoria mediante la ejecuci\u00f3n de un programa incorrecto, como el demostrado por un programa setuid que contiene un error de desbordamiento de b\u00fafer basado en pila, relacionado con la funci\u00f3n __fortify_fail en debug/fortify_fail.c, y las implementaciones __stack_chk_fail (tambi\u00e9n conocida como stack protection) y __chk_fail (tambi\u00e9n conocida como FORTIFY_SOURCE)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2010-3192",
"lastModified": "2026-06-16T23:22:20.710",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
]
},
"published": "2010-10-14T05:58:06.833",
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"tags": [
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"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
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}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.