FKIE_CVE-2007-1527
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2007-03-20 20:19 - Updated: 2026-06-16 22:37| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| microsoft | windows_vista | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_vista:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "3852BB02-47A1-40B3-8E32-8D8891A53114",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The LLTD Mapper in Microsoft Windows Vista does not verify that an IP address in a TLV type 0x07 field in a HELLO packet corresponds to a valid IP address for the local network, which allows remote attackers to trick users into communicating with an external host by sending a HELLO packet with the MW characteristic and a spoofed TLV type 0x07 field, aka the \"Spoof and Management URL IP Redirect\" attack."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El LLTD Mapper en Microsoft Windows Vista no verifica que un direcci\u00f3n IP en un campo 0x07 tipo TLV en un paquete HELLO corresponde a una direcci\u00f3n IP valida para la red local, lo cual permite a atacantes remotos enga\u00f1ar usuarios dentro de la comunicaci\u00f3n con un host externo con el env\u00edo de paquetes HELLO con la caracter\u00edstica MW y un campo TLV tipo 0x07 suplantado, tambi\u00e9n conocido como ataque \"suplantaci\u00f3n y gesti\u00f3n de la redirecci\u00f3n URL IP\"."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2007-1527",
"lastModified": "2026-06-16T22:37:45.813",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
]
},
"published": "2007-03-20T20:19:00.000",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/33663"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/462793/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/464617/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23279"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/Vista_Network_Attack_Surface_RTM.pdf"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/04/microsofts_inaccurate_teredo_d.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/33663"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/462793/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/464617/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23279"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/Vista_Network_Attack_Surface_RTM.pdf"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/04/microsofts_inaccurate_teredo_d.html"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-Other"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.