FKIE_CVE-2006-4775
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2006-09-14 00:07 - Updated: 2026-06-16 22:29{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:12.1\\(19\\):*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4944AFEF-D002-4C86-958A-4EB753399FB5",
"vulnerable": true
}
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}
],
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP) feature in Cisco IOS 12.1(19) and CatOS allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service by sending a VTP update with a revision value of 0x7FFFFFFF, which is incremented to 0x80000000 and is interpreted as a negative number in a signed context."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP) caracter\u00edstico en Cisco IOS 12.1(19) y CatOS permite a un atacante remoto provocar una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio con el env\u00edo de una actualizaci\u00f3n de VTP con un valor de revisi\u00f3n de 0x7FFFFFFF, el cual se incrementa a 0x80000000 y es interpretado como un n\u00famero negativo en un contexto de se\u00f1ales."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2006-4775",
"lastModified": "2026-06-16T22:29:46.357",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 6.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
]
},
"published": "2006-09-14T00:07:00.000",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/21896"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
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},
{
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"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1016843"
},
{
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"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20060913-vtp.shtml"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/175148"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/28776"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.phenoelit.de/stuff/CiscoVTP.txt"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/445896/100/0/threaded"
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{
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"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/445938/100/0/threaded"
},
{
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"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19998"
},
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},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/28925"
},
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},
{
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"tags": [
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"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20060913-vtp.shtml"
},
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"tags": [
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"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/175148"
},
{
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"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/28776"
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{
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"url": "http://www.phenoelit.de/stuff/CiscoVTP.txt"
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"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/445896/100/0/threaded"
},
{
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"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/445938/100/0/threaded"
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"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19998"
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"tags": [
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"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/3600"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/28925"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-399"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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