FKIE_CVE-2005-4493
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2005-12-22 11:03 - Updated: 2026-06-16 22:18{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:speartek:speartek:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4B36FFFB-FE80-4286-BA79-0B1195321F67",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SpearTek 6.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified search parameters."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2005-4493",
"lastModified": "2026-06-16T22:18:54.043",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"baseScore": 6.8,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.6,
"impactScore": 6.4,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": true,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
]
},
"published": "2005-12-22T11:03:00.000",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://pridels0.blogspot.com/2005/12/speartek-xss-vuln.html"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2006-August/001008.html"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/22068"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16018"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2005/3052"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://pridels0.blogspot.com/2005/12/speartek-xss-vuln.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2006-August/001008.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/22068"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16018"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2005/3052"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vendorComments": [
{
"comment": "We are aware of numerous existing script vulnerabilities and exploits and stand by the security of our system and our ability to address these. This particular exploit is not particularly serious as no sensitive or private user information is ever held within cookies during our checkout process. All user information and client information is secure in our platform. We take all security threats quite seriously and view the efforts of the author of this particular exploit as harmful to our professional image. This is especially important to note because the particular script vulnerability that has been raised poses no real threat to the stability or security of our systems. Again, we are formally responding to this posted cross-site script vulnerability to communicate that we take all such potential security issues very seriously and this particular issue has been addressed.\n\nIn version 7.0.0 of our software, we have addressed the mentioned cross site scripting vulnerabilities. On any page that a form is on, the query string is sanitized to eliminate the vectors outlined in the XSS vulnerability. Form data is handled to protect against a form post from a different site to try and initialize a cross site scripting attacking via a form post. Sensitive data is not stored in session cookies and in the event that a cookie was stolen, it would contain nothing useful for the attacker. Our software is a hosted application, which allows us to make quick remedies as new exploits are found. Also, our system is monitored consistently and alerts are sent to our administrators when any malicious attempt is seen. The details of this alert include the data sent, from what referral and if there is a specific user that is being targeted on our system.",
"lastModified": "2006-11-07T00:00:00",
"organization": "Speartek"
}
],
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-Other"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.