CVE-2026-99693 (GCVE-0-2026-99693)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 05:50 – Updated: 2026-11-20 05:50| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 , < e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20
(git)
Affected: 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 , < 901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367 (git) Affected: 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 , < 1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977 (git) Affected: 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 , < 61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
2.6.16
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.16 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.118 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.64 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.5 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.4-rc2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
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"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.118",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.64",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.5",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc2",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.16",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure\n\nA migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an\nin-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion\nconsumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again\nwithout checking whether the assertion already consumed it.\n\nThe target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the\nALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the\nsender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the\nstatus arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration\nthat the target has already completed:\n\n Old-master sender Finishing assertion\n ----------------- -------------------\n publish MLE; take in-use reference\n send ALL_DONE; wait for status\n take lookup reference\n unlink MLE\n put lookup and base references\n send returns a connection error\n put base reference again; free MLE\n put in-use reference; access freed MLE\n\ndlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm-\u003espinlock from the MLE lookup to\nthe final puts, and it takes dlm-\u003emaster_lock around the unlink and the\nputs. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the\nassertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender\u0027s in-use\nreference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a\nlater assertion no longer finds it.\n\nAn assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner\nand cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at\nthat point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node\nstill holds the other nodes\u0027 locks and refmap bits, so it could neither\nbe purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration\ndoes instead: drop those locks under res-\u003espinlock if the target still\nowns the lockres, and recalculate its usage.\n\nUse the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the\ntarget-death failure paths. The sender\u0027s in-use reference keeps the MLE\nalive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful\nmigration retains its existing in-use-only put.\n\nA target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its\ndeath. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it\ndisconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message\nhandlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time\nthe DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the\ndomain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have\nbeen answered.\n\nTwo windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler\nswitches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes\u0027 locks moments\nlater, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the\nsender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting\nfor the target before giving up would only stretch the first window\ninto the time in which recovery of the target can observe it.\n\nKASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0\n dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0\n dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0\n dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0\n o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110\n ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0\n ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440\n ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940\n generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490\n kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0\n deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120\n deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0\n cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450\n task_work_run+0x144/0x230\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 593:\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0\n dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0\n dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0\n dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0\n o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/\n---truncated---"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T05:50:37.348Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a"
}
],
"title": "ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99693",
"datePublished": "2026-11-20T05:50:37.348Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.429Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T05:50:37.348Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-99693",
"date": "2026-11-20",
"epss": "0.00168",
"percentile": "0.06294"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.118",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure\n\nA migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an\nin-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion\nconsumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again\nwithout checking whether the assertion already consumed it.\n\nThe target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the\nALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the\nsender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the\nstatus arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration\nthat the target has already completed:\n\n Old-master sender Finishing assertion\n ----------------- -------------------\n publish MLE; take in-use reference\n send ALL_DONE; wait for status\n take lookup reference\n unlink MLE\n put lookup and base references\n send returns a connection error\n put base reference again; free MLE\n put in-use reference; access freed MLE\n\ndlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm-\u003espinlock from the MLE lookup to\nthe final puts, and it takes dlm-\u003emaster_lock around the unlink and the\nputs. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the\nassertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender\u0027s in-use\nreference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a\nlater assertion no longer finds it.\n\nAn assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner\nand cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at\nthat point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node\nstill holds the other nodes\u0027 locks and refmap bits, so it could neither\nbe purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration\ndoes instead: drop those locks under res-\u003espinlock if the target still\nowns the lockres, and recalculate its usage.\n\nUse the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the\ntarget-death failure paths. The sender\u0027s in-use reference keeps the MLE\nalive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful\nmigration retains its existing in-use-only put.\n\nA target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its\ndeath. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it\ndisconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message\nhandlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time\nthe DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the\ndomain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have\nbeen answered.\n\nTwo windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler\nswitches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes\u0027 locks moments\nlater, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the\nsender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting\nfor the target before giving up would only stretch the first window\ninto the time in which recovery of the target can observe it.\n\nKASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0\n dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0\n dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0\n dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0\n o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110\n ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0\n ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440\n ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940\n generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490\n kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0\n deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120\n deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0\n cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450\n task_work_run+0x144/0x230\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 593:\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0\n dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0\n dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0\n dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0\n o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99693",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:18:04.567",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-20T06:18:04.567",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-20T11:26:47+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-99693",
"id": "CVE-2026-99693",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-20T05:50:37.348000+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "204",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in OCFS2 lock migration",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99693.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.