CVE-2026-99650 (GCVE-0-2026-99650)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 05:50 – Updated: 2026-11-20 05:50
VLAI
Title
mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in A folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the swap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma can then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it to compare roots. Doing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse mapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim. SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused immediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another anon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked to that anon_vma. Move the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into folio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the folio's anon_vma pointer against the VMA's own anon_vma and root first. If neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA's anon_vma_chain. The VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that reverse mapping can find the new mapping. Lorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion: "This isn't quite equivalent to the existing check. Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you split a VMA then fork both of them like this: VMA A / \ <split> VMA B VMA C \ / root <- anon_vma 1 ----^ ^---- <fork> / parent \ anon_vma 2 anon_vma 3 | | VMA D VMA E VMA's D and E both get their own new anon_vma's such that: VMA D: anon_vma 2 -> anon_vma 1 -> root VMA E: anon_vma 3 -> anon_vma 1 -> root And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check: anon_vma->root == vma->anon-vma->root Would be true for VMA's B, C, D & E. However after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... πŸ™‚ I don't know. [...] after your change it'd be true for VMA D only, as it's the only one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that you are making the test stricter but more correct. " If this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could just track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks. There isn't really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might be able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really is no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid. Document the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma().
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Linux CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 7143 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: ba6f0ff3981e6263ab81ac512f04cca55b85ec81 , < 85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a (git)
Affected: ba6f0ff3981e6263ab81ac512f04cca55b85ec81 , < 4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e (git)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Linux Linux Affected: 2.6.36
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.36 (semver)
Unaffected: 7.3.5 , ≀ 7.3.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.4-rc2 , ≀ * (original_commit_for_fix)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/ksm.c",
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                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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                  "versionStartIncluding": "2.6.36",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
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                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in\n\nA folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the\nswap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma\ncan then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it\nto compare roots.\n\nDoing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse\nmapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim.\n\nSLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused\nimmediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another\nanon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked\nto that anon_vma.\n\nMove the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into\nfolio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the\nfolio\u0027s anon_vma pointer against the VMA\u0027s own anon_vma and root first.\n\nIf neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA\u0027s anon_vma_chain.\nThe VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that\nreverse mapping can find the new mapping.\n\nLorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion:\n\n  \"This isn\u0027t quite equivalent to the existing check.\n\n  Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you\n  split a VMA then fork both of them like this:\n\n                  VMA A\n               /        \\         \u003csplit\u003e\n            VMA B      VMA C\n               \\        /\n        root \u003c- anon_vma 1\n               ----^ ^----        \u003cfork\u003e\n              /   parent  \\\n        anon_vma 2   anon_vma 3\n             |            |\n           VMA D        VMA E\n\n  VMA\u0027s D and E both get their own new\n  anon_vma\u0027s such that:\n\n  VMA D: anon_vma 2 -\u003e anon_vma 1 -\u003e root\n  VMA E: anon_vma 3 -\u003e anon_vma 1 -\u003e root\n\n  And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check:\n\n\tanon_vma-\u003eroot == vma-\u003eanon-vma-\u003eroot\n\n  Would be true for VMA\u0027s B, C, D \u0026 E.\n\n  However after your change it\u0027d be true for VMA D only, as it\u0027s the only\n  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain.\n\n  Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... \ud83d\ude42 I don\u0027t\n  know.\n\n  [...] after your change it\u0027d be true for VMA D only, as it\u0027s the only\n  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that\n  you are making the test stricter but more correct.\n\"\n\nIf this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could\njust track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks.\n\nThere isn\u0027t really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might\nbe able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really\nis no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid.\n\nDocument the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma()."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T05:50:03.838Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e"
        }
      ],
      "title": "mm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-99650",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-20T05:50:03.838Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.427Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T05:50:03.838Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
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  "dataVersion": "5.2",
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    "epss": {
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      "date": "2026-11-20",
      "epss": "0.00156",
      "percentile": "0.04832"
    },
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        "affected": [
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                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "product": "Linux",
                "programFiles": [
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                  "mm/util.c"
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                "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
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              }
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        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/ksm: fix use of a freed anon_vma at swap-in\n\nA folio read from a swap slot previously shared by KSM can remain in the\nswap cache after the process that first mapped it exits. Its anon_vma\ncan then be freed, so ksm_might_need_to_copy() must not dereference it\nto compare roots.\n\nDoing so can result in some false-positives, resulting in the reverse\nmapping missing the new folio mapping, preventing migration and reclaim.\n\nSLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU allows individual anon_vma objects to be reused\nimmediately after freeing. A stale pointer can then refer to another\nanon_vma whose root matches, even though the target VMA is not linked\nto that anon_vma.\n\nMove the anonymous rmap compatibility checks into\nfolio_anon_rmap_compatible(). Keep the page-index check and compare the\nfolio\u0027s anon_vma pointer against the VMA\u0027s own anon_vma and root first.\n\nIf neither matches, bite the bullet and walk the VMA\u0027s anon_vma_chain.\nThe VMA keeps these anon_vmas alive, and finding a match guarantees that\nreverse mapping can find the new mapping.\n\nLorenzo Stoakes says in a private discussion:\n\n  \"This isn\u0027t quite equivalent to the existing check.\n\n  Every anon_vma in an anon_vma_chain shares the same root, but if you\n  split a VMA then fork both of them like this:\n\n                  VMA A\n               /        \\         \u003csplit\u003e\n            VMA B      VMA C\n               \\        /\n        root \u003c- anon_vma 1\n               ----^ ^----        \u003cfork\u003e\n              /   parent  \\\n        anon_vma 2   anon_vma 3\n             |            |\n           VMA D        VMA E\n\n  VMA\u0027s D and E both get their own new\n  anon_vma\u0027s such that:\n\n  VMA D: anon_vma 2 -\u003e anon_vma 1 -\u003e root\n  VMA E: anon_vma 3 -\u003e anon_vma 1 -\u003e root\n\n  And if you found a folio referencing anon_vma 2, the existing check:\n\n\tanon_vma-\u003eroot == vma-\u003eanon-vma-\u003eroot\n\n  Would be true for VMA\u0027s B, C, D \u0026 E.\n\n  However after your change it\u0027d be true for VMA D only, as it\u0027s the only\n  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain.\n\n  Whether or not that could actually happen in practice... \ud83d\ude42 I don\u0027t\n  know.\n\n  [...] after your change it\u0027d be true for VMA D only, as it\u0027s the only\n  one with anon_vma 2 in its anon_vma_chain. [...] I would [...] say that\n  you are making the test stricter but more correct.\n\"\n\nIf this affects performance when KSM was never even involved, we could\njust track whether KSM ever merged anything and just skip these checks.\n\nThere isn\u0027t really a lot we can do otherwise: for mapped folios we might\nbe able to use folio_get_anon_vma(), but for unmapped folios there really\nis no easy way to see if the anon_vma is still valid.\n\nDocument the (confusing) lifetime requirements of folio_anon_vma()."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-99650",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-20T06:17:58.720",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2026-11-20T06:17:58.720",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c2dec1dce368ad9e9b1814307cb5ef3832fa07e"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85260730efefc48111603fa865d224bae1f5447a"
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        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Received"
      }
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-20T11:25:53+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-99650",
      "id": "CVE-2026-99650",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-11-20T05:50:03.838000+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "204",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in KSM swap-in",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99650.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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