CVE-2026-99563 (GCVE-0-2026-99563)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:45 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:45
VLAI
Title
smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections. Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released. sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the listener. In order to make that work: - a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently. - smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc. - smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released. - smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
Linux CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 7143 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94 , < c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb (git)
Affected: dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94 , < df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f (git)
Affected: dc691b91ad1677def14582a279e56fd943b52f94 , < 328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 7.1
Unaffected: 0 , < 7.1 (semver)
Unaffected: 7.2.15 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.3.2 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.4-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/accept.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/internal.h",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/listen.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.h"
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            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c",
            "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.h"
          ],
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          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
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              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
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              "version": "7.2.15",
              "versionType": "semver"
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              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
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                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.15",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
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              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener\n\nA child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready\nlist via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was\ndestroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted\n(negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...)\nstayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener\nwas destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections\nsmbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with\n-EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop\nksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.\n\nNow a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the\nend of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was\nstarted, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it\nwith smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener\u0027s\nrdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy()\ndoes for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against\nthe backlog until they are released.\n\nsc-\u003eaccept.listener is now only changed under listener-\u003elisten.lock\nand whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket:\nsmbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the\nlistener.\n\nIn order to make that work:\n\n- a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via\n  kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc-\u003eaccept.listener\n  under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.\n\n- smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending\n  list and sets nsc-\u003eaccept.listener before it calls\n  smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the\n  rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero\n  return it schedules nsc\u0027s teardown with\n  smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the\n  listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its\n  own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The\n  teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc\u0027s\n  id_priv-\u003ehandler_mutex across the handler, so nsc-\u003erdma.cm_id must\n  not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex\n  (and the listener\u0027s) also guarantees nsc can\u0027t go away under us,\n  so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure\n  orphan nsc.\n\n- smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to\n  the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the\n  listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if\n  sc-\u003eaccept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a\n  negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.\n\n- smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables\n  purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:45:41.720Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700"
        }
      ],
      "title": "smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-99563",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:45:41.720Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.422Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:45:41.720Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
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      "date": "2026-11-20",
      "epss": "0.00155",
      "percentile": "0.04708"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
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            "affectedData": [
              {
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "product": "Linux",
                "programFiles": [
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/accept.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/internal.h",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/listen.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.h"
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                    "versionType": "git"
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              },
              {
                "defaultStatus": "affected",
                "product": "Linux",
                "programFiles": [
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/accept.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/internal.h",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/listen.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.c",
                  "fs/smb/smbdirect/socket.h"
                ],
                "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
                "vendor": "Linux",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "7.1"
                  },
                  {
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                    "status": "unaffected",
                    "version": "0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  },
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                    "version": "7.2.15",
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            ],
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener\n\nA child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready\nlist via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was\ndestroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted\n(negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...)\nstayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener\nwas destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections\nsmbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with\n-EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop\nksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.\n\nNow a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the\nend of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was\nstarted, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it\nwith smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener\u0027s\nrdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy()\ndoes for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against\nthe backlog until they are released.\n\nsc-\u003eaccept.listener is now only changed under listener-\u003elisten.lock\nand whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket:\nsmbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the\nlistener.\n\nIn order to make that work:\n\n- a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via\n  kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc-\u003eaccept.listener\n  under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.\n\n- smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending\n  list and sets nsc-\u003eaccept.listener before it calls\n  smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the\n  rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero\n  return it schedules nsc\u0027s teardown with\n  smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the\n  listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its\n  own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The\n  teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc\u0027s\n  id_priv-\u003ehandler_mutex across the handler, so nsc-\u003erdma.cm_id must\n  not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex\n  (and the listener\u0027s) also guarantees nsc can\u0027t go away under us,\n  so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure\n  orphan nsc.\n\n- smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to\n  the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the\n  listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if\n  sc-\u003eaccept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a\n  negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.\n\n- smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables\n  purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-99563",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.993",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12.993",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/328c7e307e8411899e2f90beae83da9e4c45d700"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13279523ed5da31ca7bba761115afdbd40e06eb"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7e97ff4f114e1dc2188d11339b8d0299c4a77f"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Received"
      }
    },
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Important",
      "current_release_date": "2026-11-19T21:49:23+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-99563",
      "id": "CVE-2026-99563",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-11-19T14:45:41.720000+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "1",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "203",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via connection backlog exhaustion in SMB-Direct",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99563.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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