CVE-2026-99459 (GCVE-0-2026-99459)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:42 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:42| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
7bfe3b8ea6e30437e01fcb8e4f56ef6e4d986d0f , < ce2b83e47af491f4b7f0f286367b34cdc57e17e9
(git)
Affected: 7bfe3b8ea6e30437e01fcb8e4f56ef6e4d986d0f , < efc5dc4c15713fdd6e87882686a26ed1deb22dab (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.19
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.19 (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.2 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.4-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hv/mshv_vtl_main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "7bfe3b8ea6e30437e01fcb8e4f56ef6e4d986d0f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"versionType": "git"
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{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hv/mshv_vtl_main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmshv_vtl: detach poll waiter on POLLFREE\n\nMSHV_SET_POLL_FILE keeps a poll wait entry after the ioctl returns. A\nfile reference does not always pin the registered waitqueue:\nsignalfd_poll() uses current-\u003esighand-\u003esignalfd_wqh, whose lifetime is\ntied to the task.\n\nsignalfd_cleanup() sends POLLFREE before the sighand is freed. The MSHV\ncallback currently leaves its entry linked, so __wake_up_pollfree()\nwarns and a later replacement calls remove_wait_queue() through a stale\nwqh pointer. A source-equivalent KASAN run reproduced:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave\n _raw_spin_lock_irqsave\n remove_wait_queue\n harness_ioctl [mshv_pollfree_harness]\n\nThe object belonged to sighand_cache and had been released through\nslab_free_after_rcu_debug() after __cleanup_sighand().\n\nOn POLLFREE, unlink the entry under the provider waitqueue lock. Preserve\nthe existing CPU cancellation before publishing a NULL wqh, since a NULL\nload lets a racing replacement reuse the persistent poll state. Use a\nmatching acquire load under RCU when removing a normal registration.\n\nThe callback takes no mutex and does not sleep, so the existing\nmutex-to-waitqueue-lock order is unchanged.\n\nAn LLM assisted the source audit, fix development, and validation of this\nissue."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:42:06.721Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce2b83e47af491f4b7f0f286367b34cdc57e17e9"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efc5dc4c15713fdd6e87882686a26ed1deb22dab"
}
],
"title": "mshv_vtl: detach poll waiter on POLLFREE",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99459",
"datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:42:06.721Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.416Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:42:06.721Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-99459",
"date": "2026-11-20",
"epss": "0.00156",
"percentile": "0.04831"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hv/mshv_vtl_main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "ce2b83e47af491f4b7f0f286367b34cdc57e17e9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7bfe3b8ea6e30437e01fcb8e4f56ef6e4d986d0f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "efc5dc4c15713fdd6e87882686a26ed1deb22dab",
"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hv/mshv_vtl_main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmshv_vtl: detach poll waiter on POLLFREE\n\nMSHV_SET_POLL_FILE keeps a poll wait entry after the ioctl returns. A\nfile reference does not always pin the registered waitqueue:\nsignalfd_poll() uses current-\u003esighand-\u003esignalfd_wqh, whose lifetime is\ntied to the task.\n\nsignalfd_cleanup() sends POLLFREE before the sighand is freed. The MSHV\ncallback currently leaves its entry linked, so __wake_up_pollfree()\nwarns and a later replacement calls remove_wait_queue() through a stale\nwqh pointer. A source-equivalent KASAN run reproduced:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave\n _raw_spin_lock_irqsave\n remove_wait_queue\n harness_ioctl [mshv_pollfree_harness]\n\nThe object belonged to sighand_cache and had been released through\nslab_free_after_rcu_debug() after __cleanup_sighand().\n\nOn POLLFREE, unlink the entry under the provider waitqueue lock. Preserve\nthe existing CPU cancellation before publishing a NULL wqh, since a NULL\nload lets a racing replacement reuse the persistent poll state. Use a\nmatching acquire load under RCU when removing a normal registration.\n\nThe callback takes no mutex and does not sleep, so the existing\nmutex-to-waitqueue-lock order is unchanged.\n\nAn LLM assisted the source audit, fix development, and validation of this\nissue."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99459",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:59.933",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:17:59.933",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce2b83e47af491f4b7f0f286367b34cdc57e17e9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efc5dc4c15713fdd6e87882686a26ed1deb22dab"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-19T21:38:35+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-99459",
"id": "CVE-2026-99459",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-19T14:42:06.721000+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "204",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in mshv_vtl",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99459.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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