CVE-2026-99081 (GCVE-0-2026-99081)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 12:23 – Updated: 2026-10-24 14:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
bnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets
Stefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412
NetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN/macvlan interfaces:
DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000
[fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set
bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001
...
NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out
The fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary,
pointing to a DMA read buffer overrun.
In bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes),
such as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded:
if (length < BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) {
pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length;
if (skb_pad(skb, pad))
goto tx_kick_pending;
length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE;
}
mapping = dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, skb->data, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
...
dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len);
However, 'len' was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes)
and is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and
dma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes.
Later, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length:
txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type =
cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags |
TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END);
The NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where
only 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb->data ends near the boundary of a 4KB
page (within 'pad' bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns
into the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault.
This issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 ("vlan: fix skb_under_panic
and races when toggling HW VLAN offload") because reserving extra VLAN
headroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb->data
offsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page
boundaries.
Fix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in
bnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags is sampled,
because padding might linearize the skb.
This ensures skb->len and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so
that dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is
consistent. This also removes the temporary 'pad' variable and masking logic.
The padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise
bnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload
and send it in extra segments.
Note that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment
carrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short
last segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE.
This is a separate issue, left for a followup patch.
Severity
7.5 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
c0c050c58d840994ba842ad1c338a98e7c12b764 , < cf8530a25ae92c4493e2f22981ecb46f0b66f4c8
(git)
Affected: c0c050c58d840994ba842ad1c338a98e7c12b764 , < 2956aca14dd2977cd08bd2ccafae3beb8b84b268 (git) Affected: c0c050c58d840994ba842ad1c338a98e7c12b764 , < fbd977e513971ccb4f0762a7f59eac500e474f89 (git) Affected: c0c050c58d840994ba842ad1c338a98e7c12b764 , < 5213f65a9667d3dd85db2e6df8f2e0516290db34 (git) Affected: c0c050c58d840994ba842ad1c338a98e7c12b764 , < a51d233ccd4889aadb71dace863525cc2b00271e (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
4.4
Unaffected: 0 , < 4.4 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.160 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.113 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.57 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.11 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets\n\nStefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412\nNetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN/macvlan interfaces:\n\n DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000\n [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set\n bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001\n ...\n NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out\n\nThe fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary,\npointing to a DMA read buffer overrun.\n\nIn bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes),\nsuch as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded:\n\n if (length \u003c BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) {\n pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length;\n if (skb_pad(skb, pad))\n goto tx_kick_pending;\n length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE;\n }\n\n mapping = dma_map_single(\u0026pdev-\u003edev, skb-\u003edata, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);\n ...\n dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len);\n\nHowever, \u0027len\u0027 was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes)\nand is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and\ndma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes.\n\nLater, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length:\n\n txbd-\u003etx_bd_len_flags_type =\n cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) \u003c\u003c TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags |\n TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END);\n\nThe NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where\nonly 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb-\u003edata ends near the boundary of a 4KB\npage (within \u0027pad\u0027 bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns\ninto the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault.\n\nThis issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 (\"vlan: fix skb_under_panic\nand races when toggling HW VLAN offload\") because reserving extra VLAN\nheadroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb-\u003edata\noffsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page\nboundaries.\n\nFix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in\nbnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)-\u003enr_frags is sampled,\nbecause padding might linearize the skb.\nThis ensures skb-\u003elen and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so\nthat dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is\nconsistent. This also removes the temporary \u0027pad\u0027 variable and masking logic.\n\nThe padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise\nbnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload\nand send it in extra segments.\n\nNote that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment\ncarrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short\nlast segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE.\nThis is a separate issue, left for a followup patch."
}
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"value": "AV:N - A minimal IPv4 ICMP Echo Request follows bnxt_poll\u2192bnxt_rx_pkt\u2192icmp_rcv\u2192icmp_echo; icmp_reply builds a 42-byte reply that reaches the patched bnxt_start_xmit through ip_finish_output2\u2192dev_queue_xmit, including vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit on the reported VLAN setup.\nAC:L - A request burst keeps the TX ring nonempty, bypassing the push fast path and repeatedly exercising the 42-to-52-byte mismatch; repeated skb allocations provide the documented 4-KiB boundary placement without a race, second actor, or hardware failure.\nPR:N - icmp_rcv and icmp_echo process the Echo Request and invoke icmp_reply without socket credentials, capability checks, or authentication, so the remote sender needs no account or privileges.\nUI:N - Receipt of the ICMP Echo Request automatically constructs and transmits the short reply through bnxt_start_xmit; no victim must open a file, run a command, or otherwise act.\nS:U - bnxt_start_xmit misprograms the host NIC\u0027s TX DMA length, but the IOMMU rejects the overrun rather than being bypassed; no guest, sandbox, or other security authority is crossed.\nC:N - skb_pad zero-fills the intended ten padding bytes, while the demonstrated access reaches an unmapped IOVA page and faults; the code provides no path that returns host memory to the routed ICMP peer.\nI:N - The erroneous operation is a DMA_TO_DEVICE read of up to ten bytes beyond the mapping; it neither authorizes a NIC write into host memory nor modifies kernel data.\nA:H - The 52-byte descriptor read from a 42-byte mapping causes the documented IOMMU fault and NETDEV WATCHDOG TX-queue timeout; bnxt_tx_timeout then schedules bnxt_reset_task to close and reopen the NIC, and repeated requests can continually disrupt all interface traffic."
}
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"datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:23:28.347Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.390Z",
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"initial_release_date": "2026-10-25T01:05:23.000Z",
"product_status:under_investigation": "2",
"source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
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"title": "bnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-99081.json",
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets\n\nStefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412\nNetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN/macvlan interfaces:\n\n DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000\n [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set\n bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001\n ...\n NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out\n\nThe fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary,\npointing to a DMA read buffer overrun.\n\nIn bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes),\nsuch as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded:\n\n if (length \u003c BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) {\n pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length;\n if (skb_pad(skb, pad))\n goto tx_kick_pending;\n length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE;\n }\n\n mapping = dma_map_single(\u0026pdev-\u003edev, skb-\u003edata, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);\n ...\n dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len);\n\nHowever, \u0027len\u0027 was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes)\nand is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and\ndma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes.\n\nLater, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length:\n\n txbd-\u003etx_bd_len_flags_type =\n cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) \u003c\u003c TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags |\n TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END);\n\nThe NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where\nonly 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb-\u003edata ends near the boundary of a 4KB\npage (within \u0027pad\u0027 bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns\ninto the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault.\n\nThis issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 (\"vlan: fix skb_under_panic\nand races when toggling HW VLAN offload\") because reserving extra VLAN\nheadroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb-\u003edata\noffsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page\nboundaries.\n\nFix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in\nbnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)-\u003enr_frags is sampled,\nbecause padding might linearize the skb.\nThis ensures skb-\u003elen and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so\nthat dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is\nconsistent. This also removes the temporary \u0027pad\u0027 variable and masking logic.\n\nThe padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise\nbnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload\nand send it in extra segments.\n\nNote that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment\ncarrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short\nlast segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE.\nThis is a separate issue, left for a followup patch."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99081",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:55.093",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
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"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:32.293",
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}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.