CVE-2026-97595 (GCVE-0-2026-97595)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 10:22 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:09
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames
The RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon
and MAC-command frames onto local->rx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and
schedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt->sdata (and
skb->dev == sdata->dev) with neither a reference nor any locking:
- the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the
mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt
the list;
- the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.
mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt->sdata directly, and
mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -> mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences
skb->dev (== sdata->dev). Removing an interface frees its sdata
(netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker
run is a use-after-free.
Reproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command
frames and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb->dev):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31
Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]
Call Trace:
mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]
process_one_work+0x611/0xe80
worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0
kthread+0x30c/0x630
ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0
Fix both lists together:
- add local->rx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq
producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush
(spin_lock_bh, process context);
- pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with
netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /
skb->dev even while the interface is being removed;
- dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the
workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a
later enqueue to drain the rest);
- drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,
from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the
ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy
teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().
An in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev
reference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),
which runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has
been closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association
TX only delays that one interface's unregister (the usual "waiting for %s
to become free"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this
reason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on
the worker's unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().
The mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped
interface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association
response during teardown.
Severity
7.5 (High)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 , < 4826fd8373f684f9952536333ad45b26acd3455d
(git)
Affected: 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 , < 4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06 (git) Affected: 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 , < 07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099 (git) Affected: 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 , < 3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc (git) Affected: 57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786 , < 2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.3
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.3 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.158 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.111 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.53 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.7 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/cfg802154.h",
"net/mac802154/ieee802154_i.h",
"net/mac802154/iface.c",
"net/mac802154/main.c",
"net/mac802154/rx.c",
"net/mac802154/scan.c"
],
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786",
"versionType": "git"
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"versionType": "git"
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{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/cfg802154.h",
"net/mac802154/ieee802154_i.h",
"net/mac802154/iface.c",
"net/mac802154/main.c",
"net/mac802154/rx.c",
"net/mac802154/scan.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.3"
},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.158",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.111",
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"vulnerable": true
},
{
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},
{
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{
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}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
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],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames\n\nThe RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon\nand MAC-command frames onto local-\u003erx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and\nschedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt-\u003esdata (and\nskb-\u003edev == sdata-\u003edev) with neither a reference nor any locking:\n\n - the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the\n mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt\n the list;\n\n - the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.\n mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt-\u003esdata directly, and\n mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -\u003e mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences\n skb-\u003edev (== sdata-\u003edev). Removing an interface frees its sdata\n (netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker\n run is a use-after-free.\n\nReproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command\nframes and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb-\u003edev):\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31\n Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]\n Call Trace:\n mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n process_one_work+0x611/0xe80\n worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0\n kthread+0x30c/0x630\n ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0\n\nFix both lists together:\n\n - add local-\u003erx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq\n producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush\n (spin_lock_bh, process context);\n\n - pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with\n netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /\n skb-\u003edev even while the interface is being removed;\n\n - dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the\n workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a\n later enqueue to drain the rest);\n\n - drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,\n from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the\n ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy\n teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().\n\nAn in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev\nreference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),\nwhich runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has\nbeen closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association\nTX only delays that one interface\u0027s unregister (the usual \"waiting for %s\nto become free\"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this\nreason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on\nthe worker\u0027s unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().\n\nThe mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped\ninterface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association\nresponse during teardown."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:A - ieee802154_subif_frame() queues every received IEEE 802.15.4 MAC command frame (and beacons during a scan) onto local-\u003erx_mac_cmd_list/rx_beacon_list from the RX tasklet with no lock, so a sender in radio range supplies the frames that race the mac_wq worker; 802.15.4 is a radio link, so this is adjacent rather than network.\nAC:H - A remote attacker only reaches the bug by making the tasklet\u0027s unlocked list_add_tail() collide with the worker\u0027s list_del() on another CPU. They control the flood but not the worker\u0027s timing, and the window is a few pointer writes. The use-after-free of sdata also needs an interface removal that the remote attacker cannot cause.\nPR:N - __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() hands every parsed frame to each running non-monitor interface, and ieee802154_subif_frame() queues MAC command frames with no association or scan state required; unsecured frames pass mac802154_llsec_decrypt(), so no credentials are needed.\nUI:N - The victim only needs a running 802.15.4 interface, which is its normal operating state; the attacker sends the frames and the kernel queues and processes them without any user action.\nS:U - The corruption stays within the host kernel (mac802154 RX lists, cfg802154_mac_pkt, netdev_priv sdata) and crosses no VM or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - A corrupted rx_mac_cmd_list or rx_beacon_list lets the worker dereference freed cfg802154_mac_pkt entries, their skb and sdata. Reclaimed slab contents are then read as kernel pointers, a use-after-free read that can disclose kernel memory.\nI:H - The worker does list_del(), kfree() and kfree_skb() on stale mac_pkt entries, and mac802154_process_association_req/resp() write through the freed sdata, giving write and double-free primitives on reclaimable slab memory.\nA:H - List corruption or the sdata use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() or mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() causes a kernel oops; the commit\u0027s KASAN report shows such a slab-use-after-free."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:09:59.016Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4826fd8373f684f9952536333ad45b26acd3455d"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031"
}
],
"title": "mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-97595",
"datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:22:11.134Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-24T16:01:01.157Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:09:59.016Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-97595",
"date": "2026-11-14",
"epss": "0.00288",
"percentile": "0.21633"
},
"microsoft_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2026-10-22T01:14:14.000Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-97595",
"id": "msrc_CVE-2026-97595",
"initial_release_date": "2026-09-28T00:27:18.000Z",
"product_status:fixed": "1",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"product_status:under_investigation": "1",
"source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-97595.json",
"version": "4"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/net/cfg802154.h",
"net/mac802154/ieee802154_i.h",
"net/mac802154/iface.c",
"net/mac802154/main.c",
"net/mac802154/rx.c",
"net/mac802154/scan.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
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"status": "affected",
"version": "57588c71177f0bfc08509c2c3a9bfe32850c0786",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
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"status": "affected",
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"versionType": "git"
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"programFiles": [
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"net/mac802154/iface.c",
"net/mac802154/main.c",
"net/mac802154/rx.c",
"net/mac802154/scan.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames\n\nThe RX softirq producer ieee802154_subif_frame() queues received beacon\nand MAC-command frames onto local-\u003erx_beacon_list / rx_mac_cmd_list and\nschedules a process-context worker, storing a raw mac_pkt-\u003esdata (and\nskb-\u003edev == sdata-\u003edev) with neither a reference nor any locking:\n\n - the lists have no lock: the softirq producer list_add_tail()s while the\n mac_wq worker list_del()s, so sibling interfaces on the same phy corrupt\n the list;\n\n - the workers dereference the interface after it may have been freed.\n mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker() touches mac_pkt-\u003esdata directly, and\n mac802154_rx_beacon_worker() -\u003e mac802154_process_beacon() dereferences\n skb-\u003edev (== sdata-\u003edev). Removing an interface frees its sdata\n (netdev_priv) while a queued frame still points at it, so a later worker\n run is a use-after-free.\n\nReproduced under KASAN by flooding a victim interface with MAC command\nframes and removing it (the beacon path is the same class via skb-\u003edev):\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff888002f9ea18 by task kworker/u8:1/31\n Workqueue: phy0-mac-cmds mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker [mac802154]\n Call Trace:\n mac802154_rx_mac_cmd_worker+0x463/0x630 [mac802154]\n process_one_work+0x611/0xe80\n worker_thread+0x52e/0xdc0\n kthread+0x30c/0x630\n ret_from_fork+0x2fd/0x3e0\n\nFix both lists together:\n\n - add local-\u003erx_lock and take it around every list access: the softirq\n producer (plain spin_lock, softirq context) and the workers and flush\n (spin_lock_bh, process context);\n\n - pin the interface for the lifetime of a queued frame with\n netdev_hold()/netdev_put(), so the worker can safely dereference sdata /\n skb-\u003edev even while the interface is being removed;\n\n - dequeue under the lock at the head and loop-drain the whole list in the\n workers (they previously processed one frame per run and relied on a\n later enqueue to drain the rest);\n\n - drop not-yet-started frames of an interface before it is unregistered,\n from ieee802154_if_remove() (after the RCU grace period) and from the\n ieee802154_remove_interfaces() loop -- the latter is the whole-phy\n teardown path, which does not go through ieee802154_if_remove().\n\nAn in-flight worker that already dequeued a frame keeps its own netdev\nreference; unregister_netdevice() then waits it out in netdev_run_todo(),\nwhich runs at rtnl_unlock() (rtnl released) and after the interface has\nbeen closed, so it does not pin rtnl. A worker blocked in an association\nTX only delays that one interface\u0027s unregister (the usual \"waiting for %s\nto become free\"), it does not hold rtnl. netdev_hold() is used for this\nreason instead of a cancel_work_sync() under rtnl, which would block on\nthe worker\u0027s unbounded MLME TX wait via ieee802154_sync_queue().\n\nThe mac-command worker additionally skips processing for a stopped\ninterface (ieee802154_sdata_running()), avoiding a needless association\nresponse during teardown."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97595",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:17:29.053",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-25T11:17:10.770",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f0214018d7241e3610c1be984c8abfce16c099"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f37fba846c9fdff5fc15b6d93656057ccd13031"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1fde35f95d7f02a7dc473c51d81e8d9e992cfc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4740ef0518c5e3bf31ebfb2288a6ac3b462ead06"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4826fd8373f684f9952536333ad45b26acd3455d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-06T02:31:20+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-97595",
"id": "CVE-2026-97595",
"initial_release_date": "2026-09-25T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "202",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: mac802154: fix use-after-free of sdata via queued RX frames",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-97595.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.