CVE-2026-95613 (GCVE-0-2026-95613)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 15:44 – Updated: 2026-11-13 20:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Zenitel Connect pREST API adopts arbitrary PostgreSQL role from unvalidated JWT sub claim
Summary
The pREST database REST API in Zenitel Connect firmware before 1.11.0 signs and verifies JWTs with the platform CA private key, which is stored on a data volume shared between containers, and sets the PostgreSQL session role from the unvalidated sub claim of each request while connected to the database as the "postgres" superuser, which allows local attackers who can read the platform CA private key from the container filesystem to execute database operations as the PostgreSQL superuser, including reading the master encryption key and password hashes, via a forged JWT with sub=postgres sent to the pREST API.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-13 19:52 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zenitel | Zenitel Connect |
Affected:
0 , < 1.11.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
Date Public
2026-11-13 15:44
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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