CVE-2026-85500 (GCVE-0-2026-85500)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:09 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:12
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
`require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2 decides whether the attribute named by require_confirmed_with is set using a bare is_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record Map.get/2 returns %Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns %Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither is nil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i
require_confirmed_with is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every configuration. sign_in_with_token and register are checked only inside AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any caller that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as AshGraphql or AshJsonApi invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration. Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against nil. That attribute holds %Ash.NotLoaded{} or %Ash.ForbiddenField{} when it sets select_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read's select, or when a field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is nil, so those configurations read every user as confirmed.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 18:12 UTC
CWE
- CWE-305 - Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
4.3.8 , < 4.15.0
(semver)
Affected: 5.0.0-rc.0 , < 5.0.0-rc.14 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-85500"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-305"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-85500",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T18:12:03.493938Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:12:11.379Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/password/actions.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:check_user/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:sign_in_with_token/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:register/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.15.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.3.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027"
],
"packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/password/actions.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:check_user/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:sign_in_with_token/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u0027:register/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.3.8",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "James Harton"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-11T18:24:17.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2\u003c/code\u003e decides whether the attribute named by \u003ccode\u003erequire_confirmed_with\u003c/code\u003e is set using a bare \u003ccode\u003eis_nil(Map.get(user, value))\u003c/code\u003e. When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record \u003ccode\u003eMap.get/2\u003c/code\u003e returns \u003ccode\u003e%Ash.NotLoaded{}\u003c/code\u003e, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns \u003ccode\u003e%Ash.ForbiddenField{}\u003c/code\u003e. Neither is \u003ccode\u003enil\u003c/code\u003e, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003erequire_confirmed_with\u003c/code\u003e is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every\nconfiguration. \u003ccode\u003esign_in_with_token\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eregister\u003c/code\u003e are checked only inside\n\u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions\u003c/code\u003e, not on the action itself, so any caller\nthat invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as \u003ccode\u003eAshGraphql\u003c/code\u003e or\n\u003ccode\u003eAshJsonApi\u003c/code\u003e invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration.\nWhere a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against \u003ccode\u003enil\u003c/code\u003e. That\nattribute holds \u003ccode\u003e%Ash.NotLoaded{}\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e%Ash.ForbiddenField{}\u003c/code\u003e when it sets\n\u003ccode\u003eselect_by_default?: false\u003c/code\u003e, when an API layer narrows the read\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eselect\u003c/code\u003e, or when a\nfield policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is \u003ccode\u003enil\u003c/code\u003e, so those\nconfigurations read every user as confirmed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.\n\n`AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2` decides whether the attribute named by `require_confirmed_with` is set using a bare `is_nil(Map.get(user, value))`. When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record `Map.get/2` returns `%Ash.NotLoaded{}`, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns `%Ash.ForbiddenField{}`. Neither is `nil`, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i\n\n`require_confirmed_with` is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every\nconfiguration. `sign_in_with_token` and `register` are checked only inside\n`AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions`, not on the action itself, so any caller\nthat invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as `AshGraphql` or\n`AshJsonApi` invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration.\nWhere a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against `nil`. That\nattribute holds `%Ash.NotLoaded{}` or `%Ash.ForbiddenField{}` when it sets\n`select_by_default?: false`, when an API layer narrows the read\u0027s `select`, or when a\nfield policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is `nil`, so those\nconfigurations read every user as confirmed.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement.\n\nAshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2 decides whether the attribute named by require_confirmed_with is set using a bare is_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record Map.get/2 returns %Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns %Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither is nil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i\n\nrequire_confirmed_with is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every configuration. sign_in_with_token and register are checked only inside AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any caller that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as AshGraphql or AshJsonApi invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration. Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against nil. That attribute holds %Ash.NotLoaded{} or %Ash.ForbiddenField{} when it sets select_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read\u0027s select, or when a field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is nil, so those configurations read every user as confirmed.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-115",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-305",
"description": "CWE-305 Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T13:09:43.000Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-85500",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-85500.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-85500",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-85500"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 7d37bc6 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 17f4c25 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 1076639 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "`require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-85500",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:09:43.000Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-07T23:45:01.895Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:12:54.127Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.