CVE-2026-82723 (GCVE-0-2026-82723)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:08 – Updated: 2026-09-24 20:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries
Summary
Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.
The audit_log add-on builds each entry's extra_data in AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4, which takes :actor from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with actor: set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its hashed_password attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1 and filters params against the strategy's configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute sensitive?: true does not help, because that redacts inspect/1 output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.
There is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker's own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises Protocol.UndefinedError and drops the entry unless the user resource derives Jason.Encoder.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 18:18 UTC
CWE
- CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
4.12.0 , < 4.15.0
(semver)
Affected: 5.0.0-rc.0 , < 5.0.0-rc.2 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-09-17 13:08
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"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-82723",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T18:18:14.370339Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:18:23.782Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/audit_log/auditor.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor\u0027:build_extra_data/4"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.15.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.12.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor\u0027"
],
"packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/audit_log/auditor.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor\u0027:build_extra_data/4"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "17ea0dff3bad56a7e915e050c43ab7160b37901f",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "f6b49cc98b9ff7c16a1aeb12e35633a8d93a211f",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.12.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "James Harton"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eInsertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003eaudit_log\u003c/code\u003e add-on builds each entry\u0027s \u003ccode\u003eextra_data\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4\u003c/code\u003e, which takes \u003ccode\u003e:actor\u003c/code\u003e from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with \u003ccode\u003eactor:\u003c/code\u003e set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its \u003ccode\u003ehashed_password\u003c/code\u003e attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via \u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1\u003c/code\u003e and filters \u003ccode\u003eparams\u003c/code\u003e against the strategy\u0027s configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute \u003ccode\u003esensitive?: true\u003c/code\u003e does not help, because that redacts \u003ccode\u003einspect/1\u003c/code\u003e output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker\u0027s own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises \u003ccode\u003eProtocol.UndefinedError\u003c/code\u003e and drops the entry unless the user resource derives \u003ccode\u003eJason.Encoder\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.\n\nThe `audit_log` add-on builds each entry\u0027s `extra_data` in `AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4`, which takes `:actor` from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with `actor:` set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its `hashed_password` attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via `AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1` and filters `params` against the strategy\u0027s configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute `sensitive?: true` does not help, because that redacts `inspect/1` output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.\n\nThere is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker\u0027s own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises `Protocol.UndefinedError` and drops the entry unless the user resource derives `Jason.Encoder`.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2."
}
],
"value": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows disclosure of user password digests to readers of the audit store.\n\nThe audit_log add-on builds each entry\u0027s extra_data in AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.Auditor.build_extra_data/4, which takes :actor from the action callback context verbatim. Any audited action invoked with actor: set to a user record therefore deposits that record, including its hashed_password attribute, into the audit entry. The same module already collapses the audited identity to an opaque string via AshAuthentication.user_to_subject/1 and filters params against the strategy\u0027s configured allow-list, so the actor is the only stored value that reaches the audit store unfiltered. Marking the attribute sensitive?: true does not help, because that redacts inspect/1 output rather than JSON encoding or raw-term storage.\n\nThere is no attacker-controlled trigger and no network disclosure path: entries accumulate from ordinary authenticated activity, and an attacker\u0027s own requests deposit only their own digest. Exploitation requires independent read access to the audit store, such as database credentials, an audit role, a backup, or a log shipper, at which point the digests support offline password attack against every active account. Whether the material persists depends on the data layer, since raw-term stores keep it verbatim while a SQL store raises Protocol.UndefinedError and drops the entry unless the user resource derives Jason.Encoder.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.2."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-49",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-49 Password Brute Forcing"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"baseScore": 1.8,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-532",
"description": "CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T13:08:05.355Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-59wx-q3r8-ghv4"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82723",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82723.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82723",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82723"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 255cfc9 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 17ea0df in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17ea0dff3bad56a7e915e050c43ab7160b37901f"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit f6b49cc in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/f6b49cc98b9ff7c16a1aeb12e35633a8d93a211f"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82723",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:08:05.355Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T00:59:08.960Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:18:28.208Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.