CVE-2026-80683 (GCVE-0-2026-80683)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-28 06:52 – Updated: 2026-08-29 06:22
VLAI
Title
Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference sco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient reference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the sco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the !sk branch releases a second one: conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn); ... sk = sco_sock_hold(conn); sco_conn_unlock(conn); sco_conn_put(conn); if (!sk) { sco_conn_put(conn); return; } When close() races the controller's Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del() clears conn->sk and drops the socket's reference while sco_conn_del() is running. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count to zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413 Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work Call Trace: sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190 hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0 hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650 hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0 Allocated by task 413: sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0 sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670 Freed by task 413: sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0 hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. The root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a reference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does: sco_pi(sk)->conn = conn; so the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and the callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a counted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released together with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct(). With the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs the extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away. Making the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually freed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in turn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon). To keep the hci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well: sco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for its lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by hci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths; sco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with hci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if the allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready() is removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner.
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c , < a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690 (git)
Affected: e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c , < 8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43 (git)
Affected: e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c , < abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 6.13
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.13 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.44 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1.8 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/sco.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
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              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
            },
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/sco.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.13"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.13",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.44",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.44",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.8",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference\n\nsco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient\nreference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the\nsco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the\n!sk branch releases a second one:\n\n    conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);\n    ...\n    sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);\n    sco_conn_unlock(conn);\n    sco_conn_put(conn);\n\n    if (!sk) {\n            sco_conn_put(conn);\n            return;\n    }\n\nWhen close() races the controller\u0027s Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()\nclears conn-\u003esk and drops the socket\u0027s reference while sco_conn_del() is\nrunning. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count\nto zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\n    Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413\n    Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work\n    Call Trace:\n     sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\n     hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\n     hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650\n     hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0\n    Allocated by task 413:\n     sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0\n     sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670\n    Freed by task 413:\n     sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0\n     hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\n    refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n\nThe root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a\nreference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:\n\n    sco_pi(sk)-\u003econn = conn;\n\nso the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and\nthe callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a\ncounted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released\ntogether with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().\nWith the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs\nthe extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.\n\nMaking the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually\nfreed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in\nturn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn-\u003ehcon). To keep the\nhci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:\nsco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for\nits lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by\nhci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;\nsco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with\nhci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if\nthe allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()\nis removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:A - The UAF is triggered in sco_conn_del() from hci_disconn_complete_evt on hci_rx_work when the Bluetooth controller reports SCO/eSCO teardown, which is driven by an in-range peer disconnect; Bluetooth SCO is an adjacent-radio protocol path, not a local-only syscall entry point.\nAC:L - The failure is a close()-versus-Disconnection-Complete race where the attacker controls both sides by concurrently closing the SCO socket while inducing HCI disconnect (local threads or a nearby peer hanging up), and can repeat connect/disconnect cycles until the window is hit.\nPR:N - An adjacent Bluetooth peer can send the disconnect that produces Disconnection Complete without any Linux credentials on the victim, and SCO sockets have no capability gate; only an active SCO session on init_net is needed, not root or CAP_NET_ADMIN.\nUI:N - Exploitation does not require victim interaction beyond an already-active SCO link (headset/call); the attacker can time peer-initiated disconnects against automatic socket teardown without social engineering or manual victim steps.\nS:U - The refcount use-after-free corrupts kernel Bluetooth connection state within the same kernel security authority; it is standard kernel memory corruption, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-scope boundary violation.\nC:H - sco_conn_del() performs a double sco_conn_put() that writes to a freed kref (4-byte slab UAF), enabling heap reuse and arbitrary kernel memory disclosure primitives consistent with kernel use-after-free confidentiality impact.\nI:H - The post-free kref decrement is a controlled kernel heap write that can be groomed via repeated SCO connect/close and disconnect cycles to corrupt adjacent slab objects and achieve arbitrary write or control-flow hijack.\nA:H - The bug reliably triggers kernel KASAN slab-use-after-free and refcount underflow on hci_rx_work during disconnect handling, producing oops/panic, and can be retriggered to deny service."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:10.283Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-80683",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:52:50.099Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.784Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:10.283Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-80683",
      "date": "2026-09-01",
      "epss": "0.00235",
      "percentile": "0.14327"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-80683\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-08-28T08:16:53.737\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-29T07:16:50.850\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nBluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference\\n\\nsco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient\\nreference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the\\nsco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the\\n!sk branch releases a second one:\\n\\n    conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);\\n    ...\\n    sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);\\n    sco_conn_unlock(conn);\\n    sco_conn_put(conn);\\n\\n    if (!sk) {\\n            sco_conn_put(conn);\\n            return;\\n    }\\n\\nWhen close() races the controller\u0027s Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()\\nclears conn-\u003esk and drops the socket\u0027s reference while sco_conn_del() is\\nrunning. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count\\nto zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:\\n\\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\\n    Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413\\n    Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work\\n    Call Trace:\\n     sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190\\n     hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\\n     hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650\\n     hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0\\n    Allocated by task 413:\\n     sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0\\n     sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670\\n    Freed by task 413:\\n     sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0\\n     hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0\\n    refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\\n\\nThe root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a\\nreference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:\\n\\n    sco_pi(sk)-\u003econn = conn;\\n\\nso the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and\\nthe callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a\\ncounted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released\\ntogether with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().\\nWith the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs\\nthe extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.\\n\\nMaking the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually\\nfreed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in\\nturn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn-\u003ehcon). To keep the\\nhci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:\\nsco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for\\nits lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by\\nhci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;\\nsco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with\\nhci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if\\nthe allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()\\nis removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/bluetooth/sco.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c\",\"lessThan\":\"a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c\",\"lessThan\":\"8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"e6720779ae612a14ac4ba7fe4fd5b27d900d932c\",\"lessThan\":\"abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/bluetooth/sco.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"6.13\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"6.13\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.44\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1.8\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":8.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"ADJACENT_NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":2.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-09-01T10:42:24+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-80683",
      "id": "CVE-2026-80683",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-28T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_affected": "198",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "76",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-80683.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.