CVE-2026-79901 (GCVE-0-2026-79901)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-01 13:52 – Updated: 2026-10-01 14:43- CWE-338 - Use of cryptographically weak Pseudo-Random number generator (PRNG)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fortra | BoKS Manager boks-server |
Affected:
0 , < 9.0.0.6
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Solutions
Workarounds
Configurations
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
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