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CVE-2026-72380 (GCVE-0-2026-72380)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-15 05:56 – Updated: 2026-08-17 05:43
VLAI
Title
xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[] pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation. req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single bound covers both ends. A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()). The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments).
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linux Linux Affected: 2195046bfd69e487d9a76dc47840f15c8412840c , < d1297a9e2fd6ce08678b370d41bc980ca798f809 (git)
Affected: 2195046bfd69e487d9a76dc47840f15c8412840c , < d33846c8dcc06b83b7acdeac1e8bfbb5c0c26cb2 (git)
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Linux Linux Affected: 4.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 4.15 (semver)
Unaffected: 7.1.5 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
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      "affected": [
        {
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          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c"
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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]\n\npvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the\nbackend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size\nbedata-\u003ersp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A\nmalicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING\nand drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation.\n\nreq_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp-\u003ereq_id is u32, so\na range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend\nreq_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a \u003e= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING\ntest and indexes bedata-\u003ersp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single\nbound covers both ends.\n\nA backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire\nprotocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and\nstop trusting the backend: set bedata-\u003edisabled. The event handler then\nignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a\nresponse return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the\nfatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()).\n\nThe pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a\nclassic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends\nagainst malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments)."
        }
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            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:A - The bug is reached when a malicious Xen PVCalls backend writes crafted responses into the shared grant-table ring and notifies the guest frontend via an inter-domain event channel; this is an adjacent on-host backend-to-guest path, not remote IP delivery to the guest.\nAC:L - A compromised backend fully controls ring response contents and can set any req_id (including 0xffffffff for rsp[-1]) and re-notify the frontend IRQ at will; no races or attacker-uncontrollable heap layout are required to trigger the out-of-bounds write.\nPR:N - No credentials inside the vulnerable guest are needed; once the pvcalls frontend is xenbus-connected to a backend, that backend alone can inject the malformed response. Backend/domain control is the attack position, not privileges obtainable in the guest via user namespaces.\nUI:N - No victim user or application action is required after xenbus binds the pvcalls frontend to its backend; backend-driven ring writes and event-channel interrupts alone reach pvcalls_front_event_handler() without mounts, socket use, or other interactive steps.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds write corrupts kmalloc heap memory and kernel objects within the guest running the pvcalls frontend. This is backend-to-guest hardening, not a demonstrated guest-to-host or hypervisor escape across the VM security boundary.\nC:H - Backend-chosen req_id indexes bedata-\u003ersp[] out of bounds for a ~20-byte memcpy plus req_id store, corrupting adjacent kernel heap memory (including rsp[-1] via the signed req_id bug) and enabling plausible arbitrary kernel memory disclosure if shaped further.\nI:H - The heap out-of-bounds write can overwrite adjacent kmalloc objects or allocator metadata, providing a credible path to arbitrary guest-kernel memory modification and control-flow hijack rather than being limited to a bounded or non-security integrity effect.\nA:H - Corrupting kernel heap structures via the unbounded rsp[] indexing can immediately panic or oops the guest kernel; even unexploited attempts are likely to crash or disable the frontend, causing total loss of guest availability."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:43:30.909Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
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      "references": [
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1297a9e2fd6ce08678b370d41bc980ca798f809"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d33846c8dcc06b83b7acdeac1e8bfbb5c0c26cb2"
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    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-72380",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:56:12.866Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-09T03:40:39.922Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:43:30.909Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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    "redhat_vex": {
      "aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-19T07:00:07+00:00",
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72380",
      "id": "CVE-2026-72380",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-15T00:00:00+00:00",
      "product_status:known_not_affected": "274",
      "source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
      "status": "final",
      "title": "kernel: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-72380.json",
      "version": "3"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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