Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-66908 (GCVE-0-2026-66908)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-24 16:14 – Updated: 2026-08-25 19:38

Title

Apache Camel: Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never validated, so any unexpired token signed by a trusted key was accepted

Summary

Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed. Notes: The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details. The fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-25 19:38 UTC

CWE

CWE-287 - Improper Authentication

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1092 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-66908.html	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Camel	Affected: 4.8.0 , < 4.22.0 (semver)	guessed

Credits

n0mi1k Andrea Cosentino

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eImproper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNotes:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe JIRA ticket:\u0026nbsp;\u003ca href=\"https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281\" rel=\"noopener nofollow noreferrer\"\u003ehttps://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281\u003c/a\u003e\u0026nbsp;refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"
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FKIE_CVE-2026-66908

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-24 17:18 - Updated: 2026-10-24 16:10

Severity

7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-66908.html	Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/24/12	Mailing List, Third Party Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	apache	camel	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
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      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0.\n\n\n\nThe camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed.\n\n\n\nNotes:\n\n\n\nThe JIRA ticket:\u00a0 https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 \u00a0refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.\n\n\n\nThe fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Vulnerabilidad de autenticaci\u00f3n incorrecta en el componente principal HTTP de la plataforma Apache Camel.\n\nEste problema afecta a Apache Camel: desde la 4.8.0 antes de la 4.22.0.\n\nEl servidor HTTP embebido de camel-main puede proteger sus puntos finales con autenticaci\u00f3n JWT, configurado a trav\u00e9s de authenticationEnabled junto con las propiedades del almac\u00e9n de claves JWT. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions devolvi\u00f3 nulo cuando ni jwtIssuer ni jwtAudience estaban configurados, y el llamador entonces omiti\u00f3 la llamada a JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions por completo, por lo que la instancia de Vert.x JWTAuth se construy\u00f3 solo a partir del almac\u00e9n de claves. El resultado fue que los tokens entrantes se verificaron solo por firma y caducidad: las reclamaciones iss y aud no se validaron en absoluto. Nada se\u00f1al\u00f3 esto -el servidor se inici\u00f3 normalmente y no inform\u00f3 ninguna advertencia- por lo que una implementaci\u00f3n configurada de la manera documentada aplic\u00f3 silenciosamente menos de lo que el operador cre\u00eda haber habilitado, y la propia documentaci\u00f3n del componente present\u00f3 la verificaci\u00f3n de firma y caducidad como predeterminada con el emisor y la audiencia como un extra opcional. Tanto el servidor de aplicaciones como el servidor de gesti\u00f3n se vieron afectados, porque la omisi\u00f3n estaba en cada una de las dos rutas de configureAuthentication. Cualquier token no caducado firmado por cualquier clave en la que conf\u00eda el almac\u00e9n de claves configurado fue, por lo tanto, aceptado, independientemente de qu\u00e9 emisor lo acu\u00f1\u00f3 o para qu\u00e9 audiencia estaba destinado. Hasta d\u00f3nde llega eso depende del conjunto de confianza del almac\u00e9n de claves: donde la clave de firma pertenece a un proveedor de identidad compartido o multi-inquilino, se acepta un token emitido leg\u00edtimamente para una audiencia completamente diferente, mientras que un almac\u00e9n de claves que contiene un firmante dedicado lo restringe a la reutilizaci\u00f3n de tokens acu\u00f1ados para otros servicios dentro del mismo dominio de confianza. Las opciones jwtIssuer y jwtAudience no exist\u00edan antes de la 4.21.0, por lo que en versiones anteriores no hab\u00eda una forma compatible de hacer cumplir estas reclamaciones en absoluto.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 4.22.0, que corrige el problema. A partir de la 4.22.0, el servidor se niega a iniciar cuando un almac\u00e9n de claves JWT est\u00e1 configurado pero ni jwtIssuer ni jwtAudience est\u00e1n establecidos, nombrando las propiedades involucradas, y una implementaci\u00f3n que genuinamente solo desea la validaci\u00f3n de firma y caducidad debe indicarlo expl\u00edcitamente con la nueva opci\u00f3n jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience, que por defecto es falso. Este comportamiento se corrige solo en la 4.22.0. Las versiones 4.14.9 y 4.18.4 no cambian el valor predeterminado: a\u00f1aden las opciones jwtIssuer y jwtAudience para que los operadores en esas l\u00edneas de mantenimiento puedan hacer cumplir las reclamaciones mediante configuraci\u00f3n, y una instalaci\u00f3n que actualiza a la 4.14.9 o 4.18.4 sin establecer tambi\u00e9n al menos una de esas dos propiedades sigue aceptando cualquier token no caducado firmado por una clave de confianza. Por lo tanto, los usuarios de 4.14.x o 4.18.x deben actualizar a la 4.14.9 o 4.18.4 y luego establecer jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, o ambos. Las versiones desde la 4.8.0 hasta la 4.21.x inclusive no ofrecen ninguna forma de hacer cumplir estas reclamaciones y deben ser trasladadas a una versi\u00f3n que s\u00ed lo haga. Independientemente de la versi\u00f3n, restrinja el almac\u00e9n de claves JWT al conjunto de confianza m\u00e1s peque\u00f1o posible -idealmente un firmante dedicado a este servicio en lugar de una clave de proveedor de identidad compartida- y donde una pasarela ya valida el emisor y la audiencia delante del servidor, aseg\u00farese de que no pueda ser eludida.\n\nNotas:\n\nEl ticket de JIRA: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 se refiere a las diversas confirmaciones que resolvieron el problema, y tiene m\u00e1s detalles.\n\nLa protecci\u00f3n de fallo cerrado no pudo ser retroportada --TRUNCADO--"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-66908",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T16:10:00.153",
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      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/24/12"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FPM2-M4QQ-WGHR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:56

Summary

Apache Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never validated, so any unexpired token signed by a trusted key was accepted

Details

Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0.

The camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed.

Notes:

The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.

The fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.camel:camel-platform-http-main"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66908"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T21:56:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T17:18:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0.\n\nThe camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed.\n\nNotes:\n\nThe JIRA ticket:\u00a0 https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 \u00a0refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.\n\nThe fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.",
  "id": "GHSA-fpm2-m4qq-wghr",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T21:56:58Z",
  "published": "2026-08-24T18:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25187"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/23c6bbf0e026277f03732481f780b9f18044792b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/4dbb9387102c102ab207e61c8307a3eaaeec7fcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/commit/a69ff2b4504f9f10d6af6c6837142da6f076bdeb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-66908.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/releases/tag/camel-4.22.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/24/12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never validated, so any unexpired token signed by a trusted key was accepted"
}

RHSA-2026:71675

Vulnerability from csaf_redhat - Published: 2026-09-24 19:56 - Updated: 2026-10-30 05:56

Summary

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.18.4 for Spring Boot release.

Severity

Important

Scope

36 vulnerabilities in this advisory, including CVE-2026-66908.

CVE-2026-66908

A flaw was found in the Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component. When JSON Web Token (JWT) authentication is configured with a keystore but without specifying an issuer or audience, the system fails to validate the 'iss' and 'aud' claims. This improper authentication allows an attacker to use any unexpired JWT signed by a trusted key, regardless of its intended issuer or audience. Consequently, unauthorized access to resources protected by the embedded HTTP server may occur, potentially leading to a bypass of security controls.

8.2 (High)


                
                  CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Fixed: 1 product

https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71675

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Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

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Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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CVE-2026-66908 (GCVE-0-2026-66908)

FKIE_CVE-2026-66908

GHSA-FPM2-M4QQ-WGHR

RHSA-2026:71675

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