CVE-2026-64586 (GCVE-0-2026-64586)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-06 07:06 – Updated: 2026-10-19 20:48- CWE-416 - Use After Free
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da
(git)
Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7 (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683 (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 (git) Affected: 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 , < 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
5.2
Unaffected: 0 , < 5.2 (semver) Unaffected: 5.10.266 , ≤ 5.10.* (semver) Unaffected: 5.15.217 , ≤ 5.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.1.184 , ≤ 6.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.151 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.103 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.44 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.6 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
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"metrics": [
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"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64586",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
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{
"Automatable": "no"
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{
"Technical Impact": "total"
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:43:21.576355Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"type": "ssvc"
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"description": "CWE-416 Use After Free",
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
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{
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"programFiles": [
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"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"version": "5.2"
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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"version": "7.1.6",
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.266",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.2",
"vulnerable": true
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{
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal\n\nbrcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs \"reset\" entry both schedule\ndrvr-\u003ebus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()\nand dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -\u003e\nwiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending\nor running during removal can outlive drvr.\n\nCancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work\ncallback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe\nbrcmf_pcie_reset -\u003e brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -\u003e\nbrcmf_sdiod_remove -\u003e brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for\nthe running work and deadlock.\n\nAdd a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through\nbrcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is\nmarked removing. Each bus remove entry calls\nbrcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing\nand cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes\nthe set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming\npath from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in\nthe threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail\npath runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in\nsleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the\nfirmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;\non SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which\nalso reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is\ninitialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees\ndrvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;\nresume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.\n\nAlso guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire\nbefore brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr\n(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.\n\nThe bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to\nevery remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),\nSDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the\ndebugfs \"reset\" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending\nbus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the\nscratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released\nthose DMA buffers.\n\nThis patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does\nnot attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the\nasynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That\ncallback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked\nseparately.\n\nThis issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:A - bus_reset is armed by brcmf_fw_crashed() when Broadcom fullmac signals FWHALT (PCIe mailbox ISR thread / SDIO hostmail). An adjacent 802.11 attacker can induce that halt with malformed frames; the pending work then races device removal (USB hot-unplug, SDIO suspend power-off) that frees drvr without draining the work.\nAC:L - The attacker repeatedly induces firmware halts to schedule bus_reset and can align removal (USB unplug on shared dongles/kiosks, or SDIO suspend) so the work runs after wiphy_free; both sides are attacker-influenced and freely retryable, so success does not depend on uncontrollable timing.\nPR:N - FWHALT delivery and brcmf_fw_crashed() need no host credentials; concurrent free via USB disconnect or automatic SDIO power-cut suspend likewise requires no account or capability. The debugfs reset path is root-only but is not the highest-severity reachability.\nUI:N - Firmware-halt recovery and device removal/suspend paths run in kernel workqueues and bus callbacks without the victim opening a file, mounting media, or otherwise interacting.\nS:U - The UAF corrupts host-kernel heap (struct brcmf_pub embedded in the wiphy) within the same kernel security authority; it is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Use-after-free of drvr via container_of on the freed bus_reset work_struct lets an attacker reallocate the wiphy/drvr slab and observe attacker-controlled object contents through subsequent driver dereferences, yielding an arbitrary kernel read primitive.\nI:H - The recycled work_struct/drvr is dispatched by the workqueue (func pointer / bus_if ops), enabling heap corruption and control-flow hijack when brcmf_core_bus_reset runs on attacker-shaped memory after brcmf_free/wiphy_free.\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, running bus_reset after wiphy_free dereferences freed drvr/bus_if state and reliably causes kernel oops/panic or driver teardown failure, denying availability of the host."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-23T12:45:44.685Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945"
}
],
"title": "wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-64586",
"datePublished": "2026-08-06T07:06:27.158Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-19T15:36:31.798Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T20:48:43.327Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
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"date": "2026-11-10",
"epss": "0.0025",
"percentile": "0.16517"
},
"microsoft_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2026-09-25T02:34:36.000Z",
"cve": "CVE-2026-64586",
"id": "msrc_CVE-2026-64586",
"initial_release_date": "2026-08-07T01:15:09.000Z",
"product_status:fixed": "1",
"product_status:known_affected": "2",
"source": "Microsoft CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-64586.json",
"version": "4"
},
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"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
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{
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"programFiles": [
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"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.266",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.217",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.184",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.151",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.103",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.44",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal\n\nbrcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs \"reset\" entry both schedule\ndrvr-\u003ebus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()\nand dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -\u003e\nwiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending\nor running during removal can outlive drvr.\n\nCancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work\ncallback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe\nbrcmf_pcie_reset -\u003e brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -\u003e\nbrcmf_sdiod_remove -\u003e brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for\nthe running work and deadlock.\n\nAdd a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through\nbrcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is\nmarked removing. Each bus remove entry calls\nbrcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing\nand cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes\nthe set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming\npath from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in\nthe threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail\npath runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in\nsleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the\nfirmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;\non SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which\nalso reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is\ninitialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees\ndrvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;\nresume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.\n\nAlso guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire\nbefore brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr\n(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.\n\nThe bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to\nevery remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),\nSDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the\ndebugfs \"reset\" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending\nbus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the\nscratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released\nthose DMA buffers.\n\nThis patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does\nnot attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the\nasynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That\ncallback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked\nseparately.\n\nThis issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64586",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:17:48.760",
"metrics": {
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{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
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}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:43:21.576355Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-06T08:16:33.830",
"references": [
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{
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
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"value": "CWE-416"
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],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-05T22:07:52+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-64586",
"id": "CVE-2026-64586",
"initial_release_date": "2026-08-06T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "110",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "90",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-64586.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
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"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64586",
"options": [
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"version": "2.0.3"
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"problemTypes": [
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
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"cna": {
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{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
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"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bus.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.266",
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},
{
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"version": "5.15.217",
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},
{
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},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.151",
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},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
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},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
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},
{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal\n\nbrcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs \"reset\" entry both schedule\ndrvr-\u003ebus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()\nand dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -\u003e\nwiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending\nor running during removal can outlive drvr.\n\nCancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work\ncallback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe\nbrcmf_pcie_reset -\u003e brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -\u003e\nbrcmf_sdiod_remove -\u003e brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for\nthe running work and deadlock.\n\nAdd a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through\nbrcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is\nmarked removing. Each bus remove entry calls\nbrcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing\nand cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes\nthe set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming\npath from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in\nthe threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail\npath runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in\nsleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the\nfirmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;\non SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which\nalso reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is\ninitialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees\ndrvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;\nresume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.\n\nAlso guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire\nbefore brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr\n(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.\n\nThe bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to\nevery remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),\nSDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the\ndebugfs \"reset\" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending\nbus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the\nscratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released\nthose DMA buffers.\n\nThis patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does\nnot attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the\nasynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That\ncallback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked\nseparately.\n\nThis issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool."
}
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"version": "3.1"
},
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"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:A - bus_reset is armed by brcmf_fw_crashed() when Broadcom fullmac signals FWHALT (PCIe mailbox ISR thread / SDIO hostmail). An adjacent 802.11 attacker can induce that halt with malformed frames; the pending work then races device removal (USB hot-unplug, SDIO suspend power-off) that frees drvr without draining the work.\nAC:L - The attacker repeatedly induces firmware halts to schedule bus_reset and can align removal (USB unplug on shared dongles/kiosks, or SDIO suspend) so the work runs after wiphy_free; both sides are attacker-influenced and freely retryable, so success does not depend on uncontrollable timing.\nPR:N - FWHALT delivery and brcmf_fw_crashed() need no host credentials; concurrent free via USB disconnect or automatic SDIO power-cut suspend likewise requires no account or capability. The debugfs reset path is root-only but is not the highest-severity reachability.\nUI:N - Firmware-halt recovery and device removal/suspend paths run in kernel workqueues and bus callbacks without the victim opening a file, mounting media, or otherwise interacting.\nS:U - The UAF corrupts host-kernel heap (struct brcmf_pub embedded in the wiphy) within the same kernel security authority; it is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Use-after-free of drvr via container_of on the freed bus_reset work_struct lets an attacker reallocate the wiphy/drvr slab and observe attacker-controlled object contents through subsequent driver dereferences, yielding an arbitrary kernel read primitive.\nI:H - The recycled work_struct/drvr is dispatched by the workqueue (func pointer / bus_if ops), enabling heap corruption and control-flow hijack when brcmf_core_bus_reset runs on attacker-shaped memory after brcmf_free/wiphy_free.\nA:H - Even without full exploitation, running bus_reset after wiphy_free dereferences freed drvr/bus_if state and reliably causes kernel oops/panic or driver teardown failure, denying availability of the host."
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-23T12:45:44.685Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945"
}
],
"title": "wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal",
"x_generator": {
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}
}
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"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-64586",
"datePublished": "2026-08-06T07:06:27.158Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-19T15:36:31.798Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T20:48:43.327Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.