CVE-2026-63377 (GCVE-0-2026-63377)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 22:18 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:18
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Unauthenticated first-run administrator takeover
Summary
TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, `POST /api/auth/setup` in `src/api/routers/auth.py` allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The `initial_setup` function checks only the `is_setup` completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the `Dockerfile` starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and `src/api/main.py` mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes `create_auth_user` with `UserRole.ADMIN` and `set_auth_cookie`, issuing a valid `fctr_session` JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CWE
- CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/security… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/commit/3… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/releases… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| fctr-id | okta-ai-agent |
Affected:
< 3.0.1-beta
|
guessed |
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}
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"providerMetadata": {
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"x_refsource_MISC"
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"url": "https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/releases/tag/v3.0.1-beta"
}
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"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"title": "TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Unauthenticated first-run administrator takeover"
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"dateReserved": "2026-07-16T17:39:30.170Z",
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}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-63377",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T23:17:14.267",
"metrics": {
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}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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