CVE-2026-57494 (GCVE-0-2026-57494)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-20 22:01 – Updated: 2026-07-21 14:56
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
AgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API
Summary
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-21 13:13 UTC
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/securi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agenticmail | @agenticmail/api |
Affected:
< 0.9.64
|
guessed |
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