CVE-2026-52841 (GCVE-0-2026-52841)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-14 15:27 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:45
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync
Summary
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointment… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointment… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| alextselegidis | easyappointments |
Affected:
< 1.6.0
|
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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