{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "lemur",
          "vendor": "Netflix",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.9.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.1, StrictRolePermission and AuthorityCreatorPermission in lemur/auth/permissions.py call flask_principal.Permission.__init__() with zero Need objects when ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION and LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT are unset because both flags default to False. Flask-Principal Permission.allows() returns True when self.needs is empty, so the .can() authorization gate permits every authenticated identity, including the read-only role. A read-only user can access POST /api/1/authorities, POST /api/1/certificates/upload, POST /api/1/pending_certificates//upload, POST /api/1/notifications, PUT or DELETE /api/1/notifications/, and POST /api/1/domains to create root Certificate Authorities, upload arbitrary certificates, create or edit notifications that reach an SSRF sink, and create domain entries. Explicitly setting either flag to False continues to opt into the permissive behavior. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-48508",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-16T13:42:45.320",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-48508",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-18T19:31:14.964206Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-18T18:17:41.073",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/e6a41e2c1b2028840d19039b06895524a19ad36f"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lemur"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`StrictRolePermission` and `AuthorityCreatorPermission` in `lemur/auth/permissions.py` call `flask_principal.Permission.__init__()` with zero `Need`s when their config flags are unset. Both flags defaulted to `False` in code prior to the fix, so this was the state of any Lemur install that hadn\u0027t explicitly opted in.\n\nFlask-Principal\u0027s `Permission.allows()` returns `True` whenever `self.needs` is empty. The `.can()` gate therefore passes for every authenticated identity, including the lowest-privilege role Lemur ships (`read-only`).\n\nA user holding only `read-only` can create root Certificate Authorities, create and edit notifications (an SSRF sink), create domain entries, and upload arbitrary certificates. These classes are the sole authorization check on those endpoints.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```python\n# lemur/auth/permissions.py\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", False)\n        if requires_admin:\n            super().__init__(RoleNeed(\"admin\"))\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", False)\n        if strict_role_enforcement:\n            needs = [RoleNeed(\"admin\"), RoleNeed(\"operator\")]\n            super().__init__(*needs)\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n```\n\n`flask_principal.Permission.allows()` (upstream, v0.4.0):\n\n```python\ndef allows(self, identity):\n    if self.needs and not self.needs.intersection(identity.provides):\n        return False\n    ...\n    return True\n```\n\nWhen `self.needs == set()`, the first guard is falsy and is skipped. `excludes` is also empty, so `allows()` returns `True` for any identity. `AuthenticatedResource` (the parent class for these views) sets `method_decorators = [login_required]`, which checks authentication only, no role. So the permission `.can()` is the only authorization layer in front of these endpoints.\n\n## Affected Endpoints\n\nViews whose only authorization check is `StrictRolePermission().can()` or `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can()`:\n\n| Method   | Path                                      | Source                                  |\n|----------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| POST     | /api/1/authorities                        | lemur/authorities/views.py:231          |\n| POST     | /api/1/certificates/upload                | lemur/certificates/views.py:651         |\n| POST     | /api/1/pending_certificates/\\\u003cid\u003e/upload  | lemur/pending_certificates/views.py:545 |\n| POST     | /api/1/notifications                      | lemur/notifications/views.py:227        |\n| PUT/DEL  | /api/1/notifications/\\\u003cid\u003e                | lemur/notifications/views.py:370,384    |\n| POST     | /api/1/domains                            | lemur/domains/views.py:131              |\n\n`POST /api/1/authorities` is gated by `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`; both have empty Needs by default. The other rows are gated by `StrictRolePermission().can()` alone.\n\nNote on scope: `PUT /api/1/authorities/\u003cid\u003e` also references `StrictRolePermission`, but its gate is `AuthorityPermission(...).can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`. `AuthorityPermission` is constructed with non-empty Needs (`RoleNeed(\"admin\")` plus authority-scoped needs), so that endpoint is not bypassable by a `read-only` user and is excluded from this report.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user holding only the `read-only` role can:\n\n1. Create root Certificate Authorities. CA cert and private key are persisted in Lemur\u0027s DB with the attacker as owner. Any internal trust store that pins Lemur-managed roots can now be signed against by the attacker.\n2. Upload arbitrary certificates via `/certificates/upload`, including attacker-supplied keys with destinations such as AWS push.\n3. Create or modify notifications, which reach an SSRF sink (see related finding F3, Slack notification webhook).\n4. Mark arbitrary domains as `sensitive`, manipulating Lemur\u0027s domain registry and the cert-issuance approval path.\n\nCombined with any low-privilege credential leak (phished employee, leaked SSO token) or insider access, this is a pivot from \"any authenticated identity\" to control of the PKI issuance plane.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe config flag defaults for `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` and `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT` were changed from `False` to `True`. Restrictive role enforcement is now active on all default installs without requiring explicit configuration.\n\n```python\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", True)\n        ...\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", True)\n        ...\n```\n\n**Note:** The opt-out branches (empty Needs) remain in the code. Operators who explicitly set `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION = False` or `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT = False` in their config will reintroduce the bypass. These flags should be left unset or set to `True`.",
  "id": "GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:48:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemur has an authorization bypass in StrictRolePermission / AuthorityCreatorPermission"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lemur",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/lemur"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.11.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.9.0",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.2.0",
        "1.3.1",
        "1.3.2",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.5.0",
        "1.6.0",
        "1.7.0",
        "1.8.0",
        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.9.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48508",
    "GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`StrictRolePermission` and `AuthorityCreatorPermission` in `lemur/auth/permissions.py` call `flask_principal.Permission.__init__()` with zero `Need`s when their config flags are unset. Both flags defaulted to `False` in code prior to the fix, so this was the state of any Lemur install that hadn\u0027t explicitly opted in.\n\nFlask-Principal\u0027s `Permission.allows()` returns `True` whenever `self.needs` is empty. The `.can()` gate therefore passes for every authenticated identity, including the lowest-privilege role Lemur ships (`read-only`).\n\nA user holding only `read-only` can create root Certificate Authorities, create and edit notifications (an SSRF sink), create domain entries, and upload arbitrary certificates. These classes are the sole authorization check on those endpoints.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```python\n# lemur/auth/permissions.py\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", False)\n        if requires_admin:\n            super().__init__(RoleNeed(\"admin\"))\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", False)\n        if strict_role_enforcement:\n            needs = [RoleNeed(\"admin\"), RoleNeed(\"operator\")]\n            super().__init__(*needs)\n        else:\n            super().__init__()              # empty Need set\n```\n\n`flask_principal.Permission.allows()` (upstream, v0.4.0):\n\n```python\ndef allows(self, identity):\n    if self.needs and not self.needs.intersection(identity.provides):\n        return False\n    ...\n    return True\n```\n\nWhen `self.needs == set()`, the first guard is falsy and is skipped. `excludes` is also empty, so `allows()` returns `True` for any identity. `AuthenticatedResource` (the parent class for these views) sets `method_decorators = [login_required]`, which checks authentication only, no role. So the permission `.can()` is the only authorization layer in front of these endpoints.\n\n## Affected Endpoints\n\nViews whose only authorization check is `StrictRolePermission().can()` or `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can()`:\n\n| Method   | Path                                      | Source                                  |\n|----------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| POST     | /api/1/authorities                        | lemur/authorities/views.py:231          |\n| POST     | /api/1/certificates/upload                | lemur/certificates/views.py:651         |\n| POST     | /api/1/pending_certificates/\\\u003cid\u003e/upload  | lemur/pending_certificates/views.py:545 |\n| POST     | /api/1/notifications                      | lemur/notifications/views.py:227        |\n| PUT/DEL  | /api/1/notifications/\\\u003cid\u003e                | lemur/notifications/views.py:370,384    |\n| POST     | /api/1/domains                            | lemur/domains/views.py:131              |\n\n`POST /api/1/authorities` is gated by `AuthorityCreatorPermission().can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`; both have empty Needs by default. The other rows are gated by `StrictRolePermission().can()` alone.\n\nNote on scope: `PUT /api/1/authorities/\u003cid\u003e` also references `StrictRolePermission`, but its gate is `AuthorityPermission(...).can() and StrictRolePermission().can()`. `AuthorityPermission` is constructed with non-empty Needs (`RoleNeed(\"admin\")` plus authority-scoped needs), so that endpoint is not bypassable by a `read-only` user and is excluded from this report.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user holding only the `read-only` role can:\n\n1. Create root Certificate Authorities. CA cert and private key are persisted in Lemur\u0027s DB with the attacker as owner. Any internal trust store that pins Lemur-managed roots can now be signed against by the attacker.\n2. Upload arbitrary certificates via `/certificates/upload`, including attacker-supplied keys with destinations such as AWS push.\n3. Create or modify notifications, which reach an SSRF sink (see related finding F3, Slack notification webhook).\n4. Mark arbitrary domains as `sensitive`, manipulating Lemur\u0027s domain registry and the cert-issuance approval path.\n\nCombined with any low-privilege credential leak (phished employee, leaked SSO token) or insider access, this is a pivot from \"any authenticated identity\" to control of the PKI issuance plane.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe config flag defaults for `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` and `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT` were changed from `False` to `True`. Restrictive role enforcement is now active on all default installs without requiring explicit configuration.\n\n```python\nclass AuthorityCreatorPermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        requires_admin = current_app.config.get(\"ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION\", True)\n        ...\n\nclass StrictRolePermission(Permission):\n    def __init__(self):\n        strict_role_enforcement = current_app.config.get(\"LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT\", True)\n        ...\n```\n\n**Note:** The opt-out branches (empty Needs) remain in the code. Operators who explicitly set `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION = False` or `LEMUR_STRICT_ROLE_ENFORCEMENT = False` in their config will reintroduce the bypass. These flags should be left unset or set to `True`.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2588",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:34.757120Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:46:24.133912Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/lemur"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qcqw-jwxc-2hqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48508"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lemur has an authorization bypass in StrictRolePermission / AuthorityCreatorPermission"
}