CVE-2026-48007 (GCVE-0-2026-48007)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-07 19:32 – Updated: 2026-08-10 13:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Element Call reports full URLs of visited pages to analytics server
Summary
Element Call is a native Matrix video conferencing application. Versions 0.5.17 through 0.19.3 report analytics data to a PostHog server, when configured to by a `posthog` key in config.json or by the `posthogApiHost` and `posthogApiKey` URL parameters. Several fields of this data (`$initial_person_info`, `$session_entry_url`, and `$current_url`) were found to contain the full URL of the user's visited page, including the fragment. Users of a standalone Element Call ‘SPA’ instance such as https://call.element.io may therefore have reported the full URLs of certain calls, including encryption passwords, to the configured PostHog server, potentially compromising the confidentiality of the calls to actors who could access both the PostHog analytics data and the encrypted media streams. The same issue is present in Element Call's embedded package, but in practice it does not impact applications using this package (including Element Web, Element Desktop, Element X iOS, and Element X Android) because they distribute encryption keys over Matrix rather than encoding a password in the URL. The issue is patched in Element Call 0.19.4. Some workarounds are available. Users may opt out of analytics in the 'Feedback' tab of Element Call's settings and create new links for future calls. Admins who host Element Call as a standalone application may disable PostHog analytics entirely by removing the `posthog` key from their deployment's config.json file.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-10 13:27 UTC
CWE
- CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/element-hq/element-call/securi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/element-hq/element-call/releas… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| element-hq | element-call |
Affected:
>= 0.5.17, < 0.19.4
|
guessed |
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"value": "Element Call is a native Matrix video conferencing application. Versions 0.5.17 through 0.19.3 report analytics data to a PostHog server, when configured to by a `posthog` key in config.json or by the `posthogApiHost` and `posthogApiKey` URL parameters. Several fields of this data (`$initial_person_info`, `$session_entry_url`, and `$current_url`) were found to contain the full URL of the user\u0027s visited page, including the fragment. Users of a standalone Element Call \u2018SPA\u2019 instance such as https://call.element.io may therefore have reported the full URLs of certain calls, including encryption passwords, to the configured PostHog server, potentially compromising the confidentiality of the calls to actors who could access both the PostHog analytics data and the encrypted media streams. The same issue is present in Element Call\u0027s embedded package, but in practice it does not impact applications using this package (including Element Web, Element Desktop, Element X iOS, and Element X Android) because they distribute encryption keys over Matrix rather than encoding a password in the URL. The issue is patched in Element Call 0.19.4. Some workarounds are available. Users may opt out of analytics in the \u0027Feedback\u0027 tab of Element Call\u0027s settings and create new links for future calls. Admins who host Element Call as a standalone application may disable PostHog analytics entirely by removing the `posthog` key from their deployment\u0027s config.json file."
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