CVE-2026-46540 (GCVE-0-2026-46540)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-09 23:45 – Updated: 2026-06-10 13:00- CWE-841 - Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/securi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releas… | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| nimiq | core-rs-albatross |
Affected:
< 1.4.0
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46540",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-10T12:59:40.645536Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T13:00:12.382Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "core-rs-albatross",
"vendor": "nimiq",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, when LightBlockchain::rebranch() adopts a fork chain whose tip is a macro block (checkpoint or election), it only updates self.head but fails to update self.macro_head, self.election_head, self.current_validators, or store the election header in the chain_store. This is in direct contrast with the full Blockchain::rebranch() at blockchain/src/blockchain/push.rs:504-518, which correctly updates all macro/election state when the new head is a macro block. After a rebranch to a macro block, the stale macro_head causes subsequent macro blocks pushed via push() to be verified against the wrong predecessor via verify_macro_successor(\u0026this.macro_head). If the rebranch target was an election block, the stale current_validators causes every subsequent block to fail verify_validators(), completely stalling the light client\u0027s chain progression. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-841",
"description": "CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-09T23:45:01.847Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Nimiq light-blockchain: Light blockchain rebranch issue"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-46540",
"datePublished": "2026-06-09T23:45:01.847Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-14T20:42:31.368Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T13:00:12.382Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-46540",
"date": "2026-11-15",
"epss": "0.00259",
"percentile": "0.17717"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "core-rs-albatross",
"vendor": "nimiq",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, when LightBlockchain::rebranch() adopts a fork chain whose tip is a macro block (checkpoint or election), it only updates self.head but fails to update self.macro_head, self.election_head, self.current_validators, or store the election header in the chain_store. This is in direct contrast with the full Blockchain::rebranch() at blockchain/src/blockchain/push.rs:504-518, which correctly updates all macro/election state when the new head is a macro block. After a rebranch to a macro block, the stale macro_head causes subsequent macro blocks pushed via push() to be verified against the wrong predecessor via verify_macro_successor(\u0026this.macro_head). If the rebranch target was an election block, the stale current_validators causes every subsequent block to fail verify_validators(), completely stalling the light client\u0027s chain progression. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Nimiq es una implementaci\u00f3n en Rust del protocolo Nimiq Proof-of-Stake basado en el algoritmo de consenso Albatross. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.4.0, cuando LightBlockchain::rebranch() adopta una cadena bifurcada cuya punta es un macrobloque (punto de control o elecci\u00f3n), solo actualiza self.head pero no actualiza self.macro_head, self.election_head, self.current_validators, ni almacena el encabezado de la elecci\u00f3n en el chain_store. Esto contrasta directamente con el Blockchain::rebranch() completo en blockchain/src/blockchain/push.rs:504-518, que actualiza correctamente todo el estado de macro/elecci\u00f3n cuando el nuevo head es un macrobloque. Despu\u00e9s de un rebranch a un macrobloque, el macro_head obsoleto causa que los macrobloques subsiguientes empujados a trav\u00e9s de push() sean verificados contra el predecesor incorrecto a trav\u00e9s de verify_macro_successor(\u0026this.macro_head). Si el objetivo del rebranch era un bloque de elecci\u00f3n, los current_validators obsoletos causan que cada bloque subsiguiente falle verify_validators(), deteniendo completamente la progresi\u00f3n de la cadena del cliente ligero. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 1.4.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46540",
"lastModified": "2026-07-23T09:10:00.113",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 2.5,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46540",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-10T12:59:40.645536Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-10T00:16:54.230",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-841"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"current_release_date": "2026-06-11T02:59:21+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-46540",
"id": "CVE-2026-46540",
"initial_release_date": "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "1",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "Nimiq light-blockchain: Light blockchain rebranch issue",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-46540.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46540",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-10T12:59:40.645536Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T13:00:03.367Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "core-rs-albatross",
"vendor": "nimiq",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, when LightBlockchain::rebranch() adopts a fork chain whose tip is a macro block (checkpoint or election), it only updates self.head but fails to update self.macro_head, self.election_head, self.current_validators, or store the election header in the chain_store. This is in direct contrast with the full Blockchain::rebranch() at blockchain/src/blockchain/push.rs:504-518, which correctly updates all macro/election state when the new head is a macro block. After a rebranch to a macro block, the stale macro_head causes subsequent macro blocks pushed via push() to be verified against the wrong predecessor via verify_macro_successor(\u0026this.macro_head). If the rebranch target was an election block, the stale current_validators causes every subsequent block to fail verify_validators(), completely stalling the light client\u0027s chain progression. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-841",
"description": "CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-09T23:45:01.847Z",
"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"shortName": "GitHub_M"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_CONFIRM"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3706"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0",
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0"
}
],
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-m3pg-qc2q-mg8c",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Nimiq light-blockchain: Light blockchain rebranch issue"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
"assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-46540",
"datePublished": "2026-06-09T23:45:01.847Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-14T20:42:31.368Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T13:00:12.382Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.