CVE-2026-45575 (GCVE-0-2026-45575)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-26 21:01 – Updated: 2026-05-26 21:01
VLAI
Title
epa4all-client: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Summary
epa4all-client is the Java Client for epa4all / ePA 3.0 in the Telematik Infrastruktur. Prior to 1.2.2, an attacker who can MITM the TLS connection between the client and the IDP (within the TI network) can substitute a forged discovery document. The forged document redirects uri_puk_idp_enc and uri_puk_idp_sig to attacker-controlled URLs. The client then encrypts the SMC-B-signed challenge response to the attacker's encryption key and POSTs it to the attacker's auth endpoint. This captures the signed authentication material. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.2.2.
Severity
7.4 (High)
CWE
- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/oviva-ag/epa4all-client/securi… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/oviva-ag/epa4all-client/pull/36 | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| oviva-ag | epa4all-client |
Affected:
< 1.2.2
|
|
| com.oviva.telematik | epa4all-client |
Affected:
< 1.2.2
|
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}
],
"metrics": [
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"title": "epa4all-client: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"
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"dateReserved": "2026-05-12T19:00:14.600Z",
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}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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