Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-42461 (GCVE-0-2026-42461)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-09 03:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 17:46

Title

Arcane Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Disclosure of Custom Compose Template Content (incl. `.env` secrets)

Summary

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to version 1.18.0, four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.0.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-05-13 17:25 UTC

CWE

CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7886 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
getarcaneapp	arcane	Affected: < 1.18.0	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-42461

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-09 04:16 - Updated: 2026-07-24 21:10

Severity

7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.18.0	Product, Release Notes
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96	Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	getarcane	arcane	*

JSON

To clipboard

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        {
          "product": "arcane",
          "vendor": "getarcaneapp",
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    },
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      "lang": "es",
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  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-42461",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-24T21:10:00.143",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-42461",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-13T17:25:53.846362Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-09T04:16:26.103",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Product",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CXX3-HR75-4Q96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-30 20:55 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:38

Summary

Arcane Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Disclosure of Custom Compose Template Content (incl. `.env` secrets)

Details

Summary

Four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure.

The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access.

Details

Affected file: backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:194-228.

In RegisterTemplates, four huma.Register calls have no Security: block:

// templates.go
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: "listTemplatesPaginated",
    Method:      "GET",
    Path:        "/templates",
    ...
    // <-- no Security
}, h.ListTemplates)

huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: "getAllTemplates",
    Method:      "GET",
    Path:        "/templates/all",
    ...
}, h.GetAllTemplates)

huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: "getTemplate",
    Method:      "GET",
    Path:        "/templates/{id}",
    ...
}, h.GetTemplate)

huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: "getTemplateContent",
    Method:      "GET",
    Path:        "/templates/{id}/content",
    ...
}, h.GetTemplateContent)

Arcane's auth bridge (backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:168-172) only enforces authentication when the operation declares one of the security schemes (BearerAuth or ApiKeyAuth). With Security omitted, parseSecurityRequirements returns isRequired=false and the request flows through with no token check.

TemplateHandler.GetTemplateContent (templates.go:478-499) calls templateService.GetTemplateContentWithParsedData (backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1303-1347), which returns the model's Content, EnvContent, parsed services, and parsed env-variable key/value pairs verbatim. The model models.ComposeTemplate (backend/internal/models/template.go:15-16) stores Content and EnvContent as plain text columns and has no owner / user binding.

Impact

Pre-auth confidentiality breach. An unauthenticated client on the same network (or through any path-unaware reverse proxy) recovers the full envContent of every locally-stored Compose template. Because the supported "Save as Template" workflow takes the operator's real env values verbatim, this commonly includes database passwords, registry tokens, third-party API keys (Stripe, Sentry, etc.), and OIDC client secrets.
Internal asset enumeration. GET /api/templates returns names, descriptions, tags, and registry metadata for every template, leaking what services the team runs internally and which compose files they reuse

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42461"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T20:55:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T04:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nFour `GET` endpoints under `/api/templates*` in Arcane\u0027s Huma backend are registered without any `Security` requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and `.env` content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane\u0027s UI exposes a \"Save as Template\" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator\u0027s *real* env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice \u2014 not a theoretical info-disclosure.\n\nThe frontend explicitly treats `/customize/templates/*` as an authenticated area (`PROTECTED_PREFIXES` in `frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts`), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access.\n\n### Details\nAffected file: `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:194-228`.\n\nIn `RegisterTemplates`, four `huma.Register` calls have no `Security:` block:\n\n```go\n// templates.go\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"listTemplatesPaginated\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates\",\n    ...\n    // \u003c-- no Security\n}, h.ListTemplates)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getAllTemplates\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/all\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetAllTemplates)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getTemplate\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/{id}\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetTemplate)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getTemplateContent\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/{id}/content\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetTemplateContent)\n```\n\nArcane\u0027s auth bridge (`backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:168-172`) only enforces authentication when the operation declares one of the security schemes (`BearerAuth` or `ApiKeyAuth`). With `Security` omitted, `parseSecurityRequirements` returns `isRequired=false` and the request flows through with no token check.\n\n`TemplateHandler.GetTemplateContent` (`templates.go:478-499`) calls `templateService.GetTemplateContentWithParsedData` (`backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1303-1347`), which returns the model\u0027s `Content`, `EnvContent`, parsed services, and parsed env-variable key/value pairs verbatim. The model `models.ComposeTemplate` (`backend/internal/models/template.go:15-16`) stores `Content` and `EnvContent` as plain `text` columns and has no owner / user binding.\n\n### Impact\n- Pre-auth confidentiality breach. An unauthenticated client on the same network (or through any path-unaware reverse proxy) recovers the full `envContent` of every locally-stored Compose template. Because the supported \"Save as Template\" workflow takes the operator\u0027s real env values verbatim, this commonly includes database passwords, registry tokens, third-party API keys (Stripe, Sentry, etc.), and OIDC client secrets.\n- Internal asset enumeration. `GET /api/templates` returns names, descriptions, tags, and registry metadata for every template, leaking what services the team runs internally and which compose files they reuse",
  "id": "GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:38:44Z",
  "published": "2026-04-30T20:55:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42461"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arcane Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Disclosure of Custom Compose Template Content (incl. `.env` secrets) "
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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CVE-2026-42461 (GCVE-0-2026-42461)

FKIE_CVE-2026-42461

GHSA-CXX3-HR75-4Q96

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